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# The Raoul Wallenberg Research Initiative RWI-70

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Formal Request to the Swedish Government and Archival Authorities on the Raoul Wallenberg Case

## GAPS IN THE OFFICIAL RECORD

## SWEDEN




Photo Credit: Raoul Wallenberg's photo on a visa application he filed in June 1943 with the Hungarian Legation, Stockholm. Source: The Hungarian National Archives, Budapest.

March 26, 2018

## Introduction

More than 70 years have now passed since Raoul Wallenberg's tragic disappearance in Russia in 1945. However, crucial gaps remain in the history of the Wallenberg case, not only in Russia, but also in Sweden. The continued existence of these "white spots" is in and of itself revealing. Even though the full circumstances of Wallenberg's fate continue to be concealed in Russia, filling some of the gaps in the Swedish case record could provide important clues needed to solve the mystery of Wallenberg's disappearance. Some of these gaps are clearly more relevant than others but even small pieces of additional information can help open up new and unexpected avenues of research.

Aside from documentation that could answer the question of what exactly happened to Raoul Wallenberg in Soviet imprisonment during the summer of 1947, - when his trail breaks off in Moscow's Internal Prison (Lubyanka) - important gaps also persist about Wallenberg's personal and professional connections before going to Budapest; his selection for the humanitarian mission in 1944; his contacts and activities in Hungary in 1944; and his ties to his famous relatives, the Wallenberg business family (especially the powerful bankers Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg, his cousins once removed) **The information would shed much needed additional light on the question what the Soviet leadership, in fact, knew about Raoul Wallenberg and why Stalin decided not to release him. The requested documentation will also help clarify what political, economic and also possibly ideological factors determined the official Swedish and Russian handling of Wallenberg's case through the years.**

While Raoul Wallenberg's mission to Hungary in 1944 was primarily humanitarian, his work also involved other aspects, ranging from contacts with the anti-Nazi resistance to the support of Swedish and foreign (U.S. and British) intelligence aims. If and how these additional dimensions of his work contributed to his arrest and possibly to the handling of his case must be determined in greater detail. Given Wallenberg's official status as a Swedish diplomat, these actions would have constituted a serious violation of Swedish neutrality.

**Similarly, the question why Swedish representatives in 1945-1947 so readily accepted rumors that Raoul Wallenberg was dead when they had received several credible testimonies that he had been taken into Soviet custody remains one of the central unresolved issues in Wallenberg case. Also, new evidence suggests that Stalin in late April 1946 was not only eager to improve relations with Sweden but that he was willing to negotiate. Stalin instructed the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm to offer the Swedish government a clear 'quid pro quo': If a Swedish-Soviet trade agreement were to be secured in 1946, "favorable conditions for ... positive political Soviet-Swedish relations will be created. .." The offer challenges the prevailing notion among scholars that the Swedish government was simply too afraid to c push the Soviet Union for a clarification of Wallenberg's fate at the time.<sup>1</sup> [Doc. 1]**

Over the last twenty-five years, knowledge about Raoul Wallenberg has increased considerably, both in Sweden and abroad. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, an International Commission, created by Wallenberg's brother, Professor Guy von Dardel, and later, a bilateral Swedish-Russian Working Group, investigated his fate in Russia (1991-2000). In 2003, an official [Swedish] Commission analyzed the Swedish government's handling of his case, in a nearly 800 page report.<sup>2</sup> These investigations focused largely on the years 1945-1947, the most decisive period in the Wallenberg case.

Since 2012, Wallenberg's life and person has become subject of two extensive Swedish biographies (both translated into English), as well as numerous other publications. Yet, despite these thousands of pages of new insights and analysis, many questions persist or remain only partially answered; most importantly among them is why Sweden's passivity in the Wallenberg case has been so extreme. Why was a man who had shown extraordinary courage under harrowing conditions so unceremoniously abandoned to his fate by his own country?

### **The official Swedish handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case**

In the years after World War II, the main task of solving the Wallenberg question obviously fell to the Swedish Foreign Office. It remained in charge of the case during the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With hindsight, it is clear that this choice was in many ways a double edged sword, especially when some access to Russian archives became possible. While it provided Swedish diplomats and researchers working through official Swedish channels with the formal status and contacts required to pursue research in Russia, it also revealed serious inherent conflicts of interests. When it came to the Swedish aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg case, the Swedish Foreign Ministry and, by extension, the Swedish government were, in fact, allowed to oversee and control the investigation into their own past and present actions.<sup>3</sup>

Few people are aware that Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson's official apology to Raoul Wallenberg's family in 2000 was limited to the official Swedish handling of Raoul Wallenberg's case during the years 1945 - 1947. However, many important questions remain also about Sweden's official approach to the case for subsequent decades. This includes the question whether the Swedish and Russian governments in the early 1990s were truly committed to solving the Wallenberg case or if the main aim of the inquiry was to resolve the issue just enough to remove it from the two countries' political agenda. It must be determined in greater detail, for example, what discussions Swedish and Russian officials held before the visit by Raoul Wallenberg's family to Moscow in 1989 and the creation of the Swedish-Russian Working Group in 1991. In particular, it needs to be clarified why the two sides kept the Wallenberg investigation within certain limited parameters, and what internal and external considerations continue to play a role for the Wallenberg inquiry today.

### **Competing theories about the Wallenberg case**

Over the last years, two distinct views or theories about the Swedish actions in the Wallenberg case have emerged among researchers. Experts like the Swedish historian Johan Matz argue that Raoul Wallenberg's fate was essentially sealed with his arrest and that from the start, Stalin did not ever intend to release him.

Matz suggests that the Soviet side never seriously intended to negotiate for Wallenberg's release or use him as a bargaining chip (to secure concessions from Sweden), as had been the case with two Swiss diplomats Harald Feller and Max Meier.<sup>4</sup> This view of events implies that it did not matter what kind of efforts the Swedish side (i.e. the Swedish government, the Wallenberg family and the Swedish public) made on Wallenberg's behalf - the outcome would have been the same, he could not be saved.

Other researchers question this scenario, since Stalin's decision to detain Raoul Wallenberg does not conclusively prove his intentions with regards to Wallenberg's fate. As such, the theory also does not provide an explanation why Stalin would have wanted to eliminate Raoul Wallenberg altogether in 1945. There are indications that especially during the early and decisive years of the Wallenberg case, 1945-1947,

Stalin and the Soviet leadership may well have been ready to make concessions to Sweden, also with regards to Raoul Wallenberg, if a forceful presentation had been made by the Swedish government. Why such a representation was not made remains, therefore, an important question mark. Furthermore, if the Soviet leader had perceived Raoul Wallenberg as a serious problem, the question arises why Stalin apparently waited almost two and a half years or possibly longer to kill Wallenberg?

For years, the Russian government has promoted the notion that no additional documentation exists in Russian archives that could resolve these core issues. However, new documents keep emerging from Russian archival collections that were not previously made available to researchers.<sup>5</sup> This, plus the fact that numerous important archival collections remain strictly classified, raises the obvious question what kind of information Russia in fact possesses about the Wallenberg case? And why have Swedish officials not pressed more convincingly for full access to these files? From the time of the Swedish-Russian Working Group (1991-2000) until today, direct access to uncensored, original documentation, particularly from the Russian intelligence archives, has remained strictly limited. Swedish officials often did not insist on such access which proved to be a fatal flaw in the Wallenberg investigation.

There are increasing indications that Russian officials as early as 1991 intentionally withheld key information in the Wallenberg case from official Swedish investigators. They have continued to do so, in some instances apparently with the knowledge of Swedish officials, over the protests of researchers. Examples include records pertaining to the imprisonment of Wallenberg's cellmate, the German diplomat Willy Rödel as well as the Archival-Investigation files of prisoners with direct connection to the Raoul Wallenberg case. Serious questions also surround [the apparent decision to withhold] documentation related to an as yet unidentified Prisoner no. 7 who was interrogated for 16 1/2 hours in Moscow's Internal (Lubyanka) Prison, together with Wallenberg's driver, Vilmos Langfelder.

According to information released in 2009 by the Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Services (FSB), this interrogation took place on July 23, 1947, six days after Raoul Wallenberg's official date of death (on July 17, 1947). The Chairman of the Swedish side, Ambassador Hans Magnusson, had a chance to review the registers in 1991 but for reasons that are not entirely clear he did not notice the entry.

### **Narrow research parameters and the passivity of the Wallenberg Family**

The difficulties faced by Swedish officials in charge of the Wallenberg investigation during the 1990s cannot be overstated. Swedish diplomats had to cautiously negotiate the chaos of Russia's internal political situation at the time. The lack of any in-depth knowledge of Soviet archives posed a serious obstacle as well. Most of all, Swedish officials had to be mindful to ensure the cooperation of their Russian counterparts. Despite shared motives to close the cases, there existed diverging opinions how much of a resolution of the problems was required to accomplish this

Still, Swedish officials had several opportunities to broaden their approach in the Wallenberg case which they did not pursue, although such a step could have yielded important clues for the investigation. For reasons that remain unclear Swedish and Russian officials applied very narrow investigative parameters during the official Working Group inquiry, arguing that many of these background issues fell outside their main brief, which was to establish *only* what physically happened to Raoul Wallenberg. These narrow research parameters prevented researchers from placing important information in context and reduced the chances of obtaining additional and possibly very helpful documentation.

During the time of the Working Group investigation, the politically sensitive issue of Sweden and the Wallenberg family's close economic ties with Nazi Germany during the war, was discussed only fleetingly. The subject would have been quite relevant since Stalin clearly considered these relations part of a broader Allied, anti-Soviet conspiracy.

Some Swedish historians have argued that the Wallenberg family's lack of engagement in solving Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance was simply the result of unfortunate circumstances. They cite the chaotic conditions at the end of WWII, the distractions caused by the official U.S. investigation of Wallenberg business dealings with Nazi Germany as well as Raoul Wallenberg's position as an 'outsider' in the Wallenberg family in support of this view.<sup>6</sup>

However, one should remember that the Wallenbergs were certainly no strangers to Stalin. The Wallenberg controlled ball bearing trust SKF (Svenska Kullager Föreningen) had a presence in Russia/the Soviet Union since 1916, with a large ball bearing factory operating in Moscow well into the 1930s. The Soviet Union had, in fact, derived many benefits from the association with the Wallenberg brothers personally and from their business ventures, especially during World War II. In particular Marcus Wallenberg had been instrumental in negotiating a Finnish-Soviet peace agreement in 1944. And SKF had provided crucial wartime deliveries to Moscow. So, why would Stalin decide to secretly detain a member of this family?

At the time of Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance, Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg were among the most influential decision makers in Sweden, despite the serious problems they faced as a result of the official post-war U.S. investigation into their business dealings with Nazi Germany. However, there is no evidence to indicate that the Wallenberg brothers ever signaled to the Swedish government or to the Soviets that for them Raoul Wallenberg's return was a key priority. This fact is all the more interesting because the Wallenbergs have a long history of intervening on behalf of their relatives and business associates who require assistance.

The profound passivity of the Wallenberg family in the aftermath of Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance, therefore, continues to raise important questions. It is known that special collections about the wartime business contacts of Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg with both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union exist in several Russian archives, yet only a handful of documents have been declassified.

Of particular interest also remain the personal and professional contacts Raoul Wallenberg had with members of the Wallenberg family and if these contacts in any way affected the later handling of his disappearance by various Swedish entities. These tasks apparently included the protection of business assets of Wallenberg family friends and associates during WWII. There are indications that additional documentation remains to be found in the Wallenberg archive collections that have so far not been shared with the public beyond the documents that were released earlier, especially in the year 2000.<sup>7</sup>

### **Other Swedes in Soviet imprisonment**

One important gap in the Wallenberg case record concerns the fate of other Swedish prisoners in the Soviet Union after 1945. (There were about 500 such individuals, ethnic Swedes from the Baltic countries, Finland as well as Ukraine; Swedish sailors who disappeared during and after World War II; Swedish citizens who had joined the German Wehrmacht; and others). There were also an unspecified number of individuals who worked for Swedish and foreign intelligence interests who remain unaccounted for. Swedish officials have never presented a comprehensive list of these individuals. Their presence in the Soviet prison system

undoubtedly gave rise to considerable confusion among witnesses who claimed to have met Raoul Wallenberg in Russia.<sup>8</sup>

During the 1990s, when researchers repeatedly raised the issue of other disappeared Swedish citizens in Soviet prisons with Swedish officials, in connection with the Wallenberg investigation, they received evasive and misleading answers. They were told, for example, that in 1998, Cabinet Secretary Jan Eliasson had made a formal inquiry to Russian authorities about other Swedes held in the Soviet Union. While this was technically true, the researchers later learned that Eliasson's request had only covered the years 1942-1945 and had been strictly limited to the crew of the Swedish ship *Bengt Sture*.

The former head of the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Department for Secrecy (Sekretariatet för Säkerhet, Sekretess och Beredskap), Berndt Fredriksson, confirmed that his archive contains no requests placed to Russian officials during the time of the Working Groups for comprehensive information about all Swedish nationals who were imprisoned throughout the Soviet penal system after 1945. In the early 1990s, many historians and journalists, too, did not realize the full scope of this problem because information about other missing Swedes was not readily available to them.

Since 1945, the Swedish Foreign Ministry made some attempts to track when and where Swedish prisoners had been encountered, but the system was very basic and received only limited [administrative] circulation. If researchers and the public had been better informed about these Swedish detainees, it would have made the analysis in the Wallenberg case and in all cases of disappeared Swedish citizens far more efficient.<sup>9</sup>

During the time of the Working Group, official consultants and experts did not have access to all witness testimonies in the Wallenberg case, even though their formal task was to review and analyze all such existing witness statements. Some of the documentation was only declassified in late 2000, when the Working Group concluded its work. The official Raoul Wallenberg database of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs excludes many witness statements that do not mention Raoul Wallenberg by name or refer to other Swedes imprisoned in the Soviet Union. There appears to be no formal or organized way for researchers to track statements in the case received by Swedish authorities after 2000.

### **Swedish secrecy laws and the "Principle of Openness"**

Access to public records is governed in large part by Sweden's Constitution (Tryckfrihetsförordning), as well as by a number of domestic and international archival laws. The Swedish Parliament updated the country's secrecy rules most recently in 2009, when it passed a new Public Access and Secrecy Law ([Offentlighets - och sekretesslag](#) 2009:400). Records can normally not be classified more than the maximum of 40 -70 years, but some important exceptions apply.<sup>1</sup> In 2016, the maximum period of classification for documentation concerning military and intelligence matters was extended even further, to 95 years (2016:323). These and other kind of adjustments governing the release of records has lead in some instances to reclassification of documentation under new and more stringent policy guidelines.

The Swedish public as well as researchers have very little sense about what kind of records in fact fall under the more stringent classification guidelines. Even when the collections in question are partially known and the secrecy provisions finally expire, difficult obstacles continue to stand in the way of access, especially when they are held in private collections.

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<sup>1</sup> Depending on the type of documentation, some classification terms are considerably shorter, a maximum of 20-30 years.

Unfortunately, some of the Swedish source material needed to solve the questions about Raoul Wallenberg's contacts and activities has been lost or destroyed or remains inaccessible in several archives. Most collections with immediate relevance to Raoul Wallenberg's case, however, have been nominally declassified. These records originate mostly from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD), as well as the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO). Both SÄPO and UD maintain a central Raoul Wallenberg case file. However, only the records officials deem suitable to be collected there were placed in this file.

While the selection and collection criteria for Swedish public institutions are fairly strict, it does not mean that all documentation relevant to the Raoul Wallenberg case in fact ends up in this central file. Also, some papers that are deemed sensitive could be temporarily placed in separate folders, such as the so-called "red file" ("röd pärm"), or a special Ministry or Police safe, such as the "yellow safe" ("gula skåpet") or "grey safe" of the head of the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Political Department. Swedish censorship of records is sometimes not as easily discernible as in other countries. Censored portions of documents in U.S. archives are generally blacked out. In Sweden, records are often "whited out" or memos are partially copied or re-typed (with specific omissions). Unless redacted items are clearly indicated, this makes it more difficult for researchers to detect censored texts. Public archives also routinely destroy certain types of records, as part of the normal process of archive maintenance.<sup>10</sup>

Even though such document destruction is usually indicated in the files (with a letter "G", for example), many collections do not include so-called "withdrawal slips", to indicate documentation that has been temporarily or permanently withdrawn. This makes it even more difficult for researchers to ascertain what kind of documentation is being withheld and why. Surprisingly few files have been made available from the various Swedish intelligence services, such as Swedish military, foreign and signal intelligence agencies that dealt directly or indirectly with the Raoul Wallenberg case. Allegedly, many records were lost or destroyed in a number of post-war scandals, including the so-called IB-Affair of the 1970s.<sup>11</sup> However, most observers question the idea that all this documentation has been lost. Of some interest also remains the question of the involvement of Swedish intelligence officers in espionage operations in Eastern and Central Europe, during and after WWII.

In later years, events such as the arrest of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerström as a Soviet agent in 1963, and subsequently, the sudden emergence of new witnesses in 1979 that led to a formal reopening of the Wallenberg case (after it had lain dormant for a full fifteen years) should have given rise to at least some comment and assessment by Swedish intelligence personnel; as should have Guy von Dardel's lawsuit against the Soviet Union in 1984 and the 1989 visit by Raoul Wallenberg's next-of-kin in Moscow. However, no such documentation has ever been presented. As a result, researchers have very little information about what internal and inter-agency considerations guided Swedish decision makers in their approach to the Wallenberg case over the years.

Disclosures by whistleblowers and civic groups in recent years have revealed to the public in great detail the full power and reach of the international intelligence community. Quite obviously, thanks to sophisticated surveillance technology, specific facts about certain events not only have become knowable but are almost certainly known. Which begs the question: What information exactly have officials in Sweden and other countries been able to obtain about the Raoul Wallenberg case? One cannot help but conclude that they must have more detailed knowledge than they have shared with his family or the public.

An additional problem is posed by the fact that through the years, foreign governments requested to keep certain information related to the Wallenberg inquiry secret. This is, for example, what the Israeli

government did during the 1980s, when it hesitated to provide specific details (related to witness testimonies), since officials feared that this information could reveal the nature and extent of Israeli intelligence operations behind the Iron Curtain.<sup>12</sup> Clearly, countries like Russia, the U.S. or Great Britain may have approached Sweden with similar requests - and vice versa. The arrangements Sweden has made with other countries regarding the Wallenberg case since 1945 need to be urgently clarified. Under any circumstances, Russian, U.S. and British archives almost certainly hold important additional records, especially about wartime intelligence operations in Hungary that could have direct bearing on the Raoul Wallenberg inquiry.

### **Private archive collections**

There are numerous private collections (enskilda arkiv - special/individual collections) that are of interest for Wallenberg researchers today. They include the private papers of friends and associates of Raoul Wallenberg, like Kálmán Lauer, Per Anger and Sven Salén; public officials like Tage Erlander, Östen Undén or Otto Danielsson; researchers and investigators like Rudolph Philipp, Jenö Levai and Kenne Fant; and of course Raoul Wallenberg's immediate family, especially on his mother's side. They include the personal papers of his parents, Maj and Fredrik von Dardel; his sister Nina Lagergren and his brother Guy von Dardel. Quite a few of these collections are accessible in the Swedish National Archive, but many remain in private hands. The latter includes the papers and correspondence of Raoul's family on his father's side, like Raoul's grandfather, Gustaf Wallenberg, and other members of the Wallenberg family.

Still another example are the personal papers of Thede Palm, the former head of the Swedish Foreign Intelligence Bureau (T-Kontoret) in the postwar years. Earlier this year, after decades of complete closure, the Palm collection was finally made available to researchers in early 2016. Yet, despite the lapsed secrecy requirement, parts of the Palm material remain entirely inaccessible. The Swedish archivists argue that since Palm's papers constitute a private collection, they fall outside the normal rules governing "Freedom of the Press" (Tryckfrihetsförordningen). Archive officials further claim that they have the right to withhold information contained in 'special collections' (enskilda arkiv), "if the information can be assumed to cause injury or harm to any individual or the public interest."

Important questions remain about Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with his Wallenberg relatives after the death of Raoul's grandfather, Gustaf Wallenberg in 1937. It is clear that Raoul's contacts to the Wallenberg family were closer than has been generally portrayed. Unfortunately, few of Raoul Wallenberg's own private papers and business correspondence have been preserved.

Over the past seventy years, however, Wallenberg representatives have granted only limited access to their collections which are kept at a special Foundation, the Stiftelsen för Ekonomisk Historisk Forskning inom Bank och Företagande (SEHFBF) - permitting only a few select scholars and researchers to study their files. In the 1990s, even Raoul Wallenberg's brother, Guy von Dardel, was refused access with the argument that the Wallenberg archive was open only for "serious research" ("seriös forskning").<sup>13</sup>

There is growing evidence that both Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg may have groomed Raoul Wallenberg for a special role in international trade and the Wallenberg sphere. It is not entirely clear why these contacts were downplayed to the degree that they were after Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in 1945. A question mark remains about the claim made by Kálmán Lauer, Raoul Wallenberg's Hungarian business partner, that Raoul worked for some time as Jacob Wallenberg's Private Secretary in the early 1940s.<sup>14</sup> In addition, there are new indications that during the 1940s, Marcus Wallenberg had important business

contacts in Hungary that also involved Raoul Wallenberg's company Mellaneuropeiska. It needs to be established what exactly the Soviets knew about Raoul Wallenberg's personal and professional contacts, before and during the humanitarian mission in Budapest in 1944, and if this closer relationship between Raoul and the Wallenberg brothers had any consequences for the handling of his case. This includes contacts with members of the Swedish intelligence establishment, especially Hellmuth Ternberg, the Deputy head of the C-Byrån (C-Bureau, a Swedish foreign intelligence agency under the Swedish Defense Staff during WWII), who maintained a close association with the Wallenberg family throughout his life, as well as the banker Per Jacobsson who worked for Swedish Intelligence during WWII.

Very little is known about Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg's personal attitudes toward Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance and any actions they may have taken on his behalf. Of special importance in this regard are the private initiatives taken by Jacob Wallenberg; one in 1944, when he, according to his own notes, contacted SS-General and head of Nazi Germany's Foreign Intelligence Services, Walter Schellenberg, to request his personal protection for Raoul Wallenberg prior to Raoul's departure for Hungary; and later, in 1954, when he attempted to contact Soviet representatives via special business contacts in Prague, with the aim of obtaining clarity about Raoul Wallenberg's fate. [\[Doc. 2\]](#)

Swedish Foreign Ministry records show that Jacob Wallenberg was repeatedly involved in tracking a number of witnesses who had provided information about Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance, and he once planned to host a high-ranking Soviet official at his private residence (Malmvik), apparently with the intention of opening a direct channel of communication to the Soviet leadership. It is not known if Marcus Wallenberg was aware of these efforts and if he supported them. The Wallenberg Family Archive has never released any documentation about these private initiatives. Jacob Wallenberg's notes, released in 2000, containing the reference about his approach to Walter Schellenberg, consist of a single handwritten page, with no indication from which larger document or archival collection the paper originated.

Some questions also remain about Marcus Wallenberg's contacts with Soviet officials, including his early efforts in 1945 to inquire about Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts with the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm, Alexandra Kollontay. It needs to be clarified how many letters were, in fact, exchanged and when and how Kollontay or other Soviet officials may have responded to these inquiries. It appears that by 1951, Marcus Wallenberg was convinced that Raoul Wallenberg was dead. It remains unclear on what information he based this belief. Of equal importance remains documentation that can shed light on the extensive post-war discussion with various Soviet authorities regarding the conclusion of the Swedish-Soviet Trade Agreement in the autumn of 1946, as well as the complex negotiations about Soviet financial compensation for lost Swedish businesses in the Iron Curtain countries that lasted well into the 1980s.

Based on reports from researchers who have had at least limited access to the Wallenberg family holdings, some of the collections remain incomplete, due to temporary loaning/borrowing of certain documentation. The loaned documentation is to usually replaced with photo copies for the duration of the borrowing term, but this procedure is not always followed.<sup>15</sup> An added difficulty is posed by the fact that documentation relevant for the Raoul Wallenberg case may be spread over a number of different archival collections, located in different cities, such as the company archives for SKF (in Gothenburg) or Swedish Match (Vadstena). These company archives, too, are only accessible with special permission.

A key problem closely related to private archives is the fact that many public records do not end up in the lawfully designated official collections but in private hands. During the 1990s, for example, high ranking Swedish officials, including the late Per Gunnar Vingé, the former head of the SÄPO and the former Chief of Sweden's National Police (Rikspolis), Carl Persson, confirmed that they, too, upon occasion had stored

official records at their private residences. When confronted about this, Persson repeatedly invoked the argument that some of the documentation should be considered "private". Eva Britta Wallberg, a now retired "Arkivråd" at Riksarkivet, warned about the trend already back in 2004, in her essay "Avoiding the Principle of Openness in Public Records." (Att undvika offentlighetsprincipen) At the time she expressed serious doubts that the digital age would bring any improvement. "There is not much to indicate that people today should be more disposed to preserve controversial or sensitive documents [in official collections]," Wallberg wrote. "It is more likely that modern organization with its digitalized information and rapid changes increases the risks of losing information and that, in future, we will get still more archives without real historical significance."

And indeed, it appears that such practices remain the rule rather than the exception. In 2017, the German Bundesarchiv (Federal Archive of Germany) ordered the estates of the former German Chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl to return official records they had stored in their private residences. Cause for this action was a lawsuit brought by the German journalist Gabriele Weber against the Bundesarchiv for failing to ensure the proper archiving of records of former German government officials such as the former German State Secretary and NS-Man Hans Globke, author of the main commentary accompanying the infamous German "Rassengesetze" (racial laws), which specified their practical application. His personal papers were removed after his death to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, a private foundation, where they have remained out of reach of the law and historians.<sup>16</sup> To address these and other issues, the Swedish government has ordered a formal, in depth review of the country's archive system, with a final report to be presented in 2019.<sup>17</sup>

### **Russian archives as a source of information regarding Swedish background questions in the Wallenberg case**

Aside from private collections and personal memoirs, it is important to keep in mind that many of the currently unanswered questions on the Swedish side of the Raoul Wallenberg case could almost certainly be answered by documentation that has been preserved in other international archives, especially in Russian collections. The Soviet foreign and military intelligence services had an extensive presence in foreign capitals during the war and undoubtedly reported about all these events and contacts in serious detail. Yet, very little substantive information has emerged that would clarify what exactly the Soviet leadership knew about Raoul Wallenberg's various connections and activities, and how they assessed this information.<sup>18</sup>

The exact reasons why none of this information has been presented constitutes a question of considerable importance. When the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) released nearly 7,000 diplomatic cipher cables, covering the communications between the Soviet Legation, Stockholm and Moscow during the years 1945-1947, it made sure to withhold more than 3,000 cables that are stored in the Russian Foreign Intelligence Archives (SVR) and other Russian agencies.<sup>19</sup> The documents could contain important information regarding a number of unsolved issues in the Wallenberg case.

It has never been revealed, for example, what Wallenberg's diplomatic colleagues, including the Swedish Minister Ivan Danielsson, Per Anger and Lars Berg told Russian interrogators about Raoul Wallenberg's contacts and actions in Budapest when they were themselves briefly detained – and later released – by Soviet officials in March 1945. In fact, this gap has a noteworthy parallel in Swedish records. The Swedish Foreign Ministry, for still unexplained reasons, failed to create detailed protocols when it debriefed the members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest upon their return home to Stockholm a month late.<sup>20</sup>

Some of the missing information needed to clarify this and related issues is known to exist in the FSB Central Archive (TsA FSB), in the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Archive and in the Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense (TsAMO). So far, neither agency has allowed an independent review. And despite repeated requests, important collections in the Russian Federation Presidential Archive (AP RF) and the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), especially certain records of the Presidium/Politburo, have not been made available to independent experts. This material could provide key details about Stalin's thinking and precise motivation in the Wallenberg case.

Several Russian sources, including the recently released diaries of the former KGB Chairman Ivan Serov, allege (without evidence) that Raoul Wallenberg and other members of the Wallenberg Family served as some type of conduit between U.S. and German intelligence representatives in Hungary, including during possible separate peace discussions.<sup>21</sup> It is known from a number of sources that Wallenberg was very much aware of such discussions. Serov and several other former Soviet intelligence officials claim that Stalin intended to use Raoul Wallenberg's arrest to pressure the U.S. government and Sweden to obtain important postwar concessions (or to recruit him as a Soviet agent). If any of these accusations are found to be true, it would raise important additional questions about the official Swedish handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case.<sup>22</sup>

Another issue that remains unresolved is if and how exactly ideological considerations affected Sweden's official approach to the Wallenberg case. In his recently published diaries, the former Legal Advisor to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Bo Theutenberg, raises the question how much influence still unknown KGB and Stasi infiltrators may have had on the decision making process in official Swedish institutions during the Cold War years.<sup>23</sup> Aside from failing to make effective use of the arrest of Stig Wennerström, the Swedish government also passed up a seemingly golden opportunity in 1981, when a Soviet submarine (U-137/S-363) ran aground in the waters outside of Karlskrona, in the immediate vicinity of one of Sweden's most highly advanced naval bases. Theutenberg was ready to use the incident to press the Soviets for answers about Raoul Wallenberg. However, the Swedish Foreign Ministry refused to proceed. Both subjects were not probed in depth during the official investigation of the 1990s. In addition, several senior diplomats, among them Sweden's former Ambassador to the U.N., Sverker Åström, have been suspected of working for Soviet interest through the years, although the allegations have never been confirmed. About these issues, too, Swedish, Russian, as well as other international archives, could undoubtedly yield additional information.

March 26, 2018

Susanne Berger  
Coordinator  
**THE RWI-70**

## **Part 1 Swedish Archives**

### **I. Public Records**

#### **1. Government Offices Archive - Archives of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD)**

Records of the individual Swedish government ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are archived as separate collections in the centralized Government Offices Archive (Regeringskansliets centralarkiv). It also includes the papers of the Swedish Prime Minister, and related entities. Many records dating from before 1996 have been transferred to the Swedish National Archive (Riksarkivet), although certain special collections remain at the respective Ministries. The archives of the Swedish Ministry of Defense is located at the Military Archive of Sweden (Krigsarkivet).

The most relevant records for the Raoul Wallenberg case are held in the Archive of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartement, UD), as well as in the Swedish National Archive (Riksarkivet). Since 1945, the Wallenberg question was handled mainly by UD's Political Department and, in particular, its Eastern European Section. Various departments within the Swedish Foreign Ministry create and store papers relevant to the Wallenberg case that are not necessarily included or referenced in the central Raoul Wallenberg case file. These include records from UD's Legal Department, the Press Department, its Economic (Trade) Department and its so-called Secrecy Department (since 2000).

##### **a. The Raoul Wallenberg case file**

Before March 1945, all records regarding the Wallenberg case were archived in P2 Eu 1 and 2 (Swedish diplomatic and consular affairs, Hungary 1944-45); the Swedish Embassy in Moscow's special dossier on Raoul Wallenberg (RW I, 1944-45); HP 21 Eu I-XXII (Questions related to national minorities, 1944-45); HP 21 Eu/allmänt I-III (July 1944-45); HP 80 Ea and P 2 Eu.

Since March 1945, all papers have been collected in a dossier carrying the designation P2 Eu 1 and P2 Eu 1/spec. (Search for Raoul Wallenberg). All relevant information is supposed to have been gathered and filed in this central Raoul Wallenberg case file. The file, therefore, constitutes the Swedish Foreign Ministry's official case record. However, there exists a general misconception that the Raoul Wallenberg case file contains all documentation relevant to the case that either originates from or is obtained by the Swedish Foreign Ministry. Only documentation that has been designated to relate directly to the case is filed here. Documents which make no direct mention of Raoul Wallenberg but which nevertheless have a direct or indirect bearing on the Wallenberg case, may be archived in separate collections, with no cross reference to the central [Swedish Foreign Ministry] case file. Obvious examples are records pertaining to Hungary in WWII, the Holocaust or Sweden's involvement in Jewish rescue operations. Material related to other Swedish citizens imprisoned in the Soviet Union is another good example.

Similarly, documentation that may be of general interest to researchers, i.e. background information about the Soviet Union or the Soviet State Security apparatus may not be filed in the Wallenberg dossier. The number of different files and collections where possible information of interest to the Wallenberg inquiry might still be located are so diverse and numerous, that a full description goes beyond the scope of this summary.

Documents carrying the designation "top secret" and beyond, as well as sensitive internal correspondence, including internal instructions, can be and are often archived separately, at least temporarily, in files or safes specifically designated for this purpose. These papers are eventually to be placed into the general case file later on, but it is not clear that this procedure has always been followed. One example is the separate "Arbetsdossierer" (Work dossiers) created by Swedish officials over the years, especially concerning witness statements.<sup>24</sup> Highly sensitive records were sometimes placed in special folders or even a separate safe. A special cross-referencing system allowed officials to keep track of the records. These included separate reference lists (Företeckning), which included special designations like "red" or "blue" reference sheets (Hänvisningslappar), for specific years. In rare cases, special forms (Blankett) were used that indicated documentation and correspondence which were considered so highly confidential that it prevented their placement in the regular archive dossier.

In some cases, important documentation that should have been placed in the Raoul Wallenberg case file was not filed there. Instead, the papers were placed in other, more general Foreign Ministry collections or are preserved only in the archives of other Swedish agencies. This includes important records about the behind the scenes discussions regarding a possible offer of exchange of Soviet agent Stig Wennerström for information about Raoul Wallenberg's fate during the 1960s. These discussions involved the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Political Department, the Cabinet Secretary, the Swedish Security Police, the Prime Minister's office, as well as contacts in East Germany.<sup>25</sup> The possibility cannot be excluded that additional relevant documentation in the Wallenberg case subject to "special handling" was never placed in the official Wallenberg case file of the Swedish Foreign Ministry. This documentation may be lost or destroyed, or is yet to be discovered in other Swedish archival collections.

Aside from the regular Archive Department, the Foreign Ministry also has a separate Department for Secrecy Issues (Sekretariatet för säkerhet, sekretess och beredskap) which handles decisions about the release of specific information and documentation. Most witness testimonies in the Wallenberg case have been made public. A major release of witness statements and related documentation took place in 1965, and again in 1980. In 2000, the Swedish Foreign Ministry instituted an official database that contains supposedly all available testimonies and official documents received in the Wallenberg case.<sup>26</sup> However, in some cases it remains unclear if the complete testimony has been released. Some important questions remain about new witness testimonies, meaning those received after 2000. There is no formal procedure in place of informing Raoul Wallenberg's family or researchers about these statements or other new information or documents received by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some of the statements received since 2000 have been included in the official database. However, many have not been added and currently remain with the Foreign Ministry's Eastern European Department or with local Swedish missions abroad.

Many of the witnesses who testified in the Raoul Wallenberg case were audio taped. Often, the formal protocols of witness interviews were based on these recordings, but in most cases they were not formally transcribed. It is not clear how many audio tapes exist and how they are archived. Questions also remain about the photos taken by Tamas Veres, a young Hungarian photographer, living in Budapest in 1944, who received a protective document from Per Anger. Veres later accompanied Raoul Wallenberg on his rounds to oversee the Swedish protective houses and took many photographs. Some of these were allegedly sent home to Stockholm with various couriers. It is unclear what has happened to the collection. A considerable part of the collection may have been destroyed during the final Soviet assault on Budapest in late 1944/early 1945. It is also possible that Soviet authorities confiscated some of the photos and films when they ransacked the Swedish Legation building in 1945 or during Raoul Wallenberg's detention by Soviet military counterintelligence units.

The Raoul Wallenberg case file remains at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The collection also encompasses the official records of the Swedish-Russian Working Group (1991-2000). However, documents connected to the work of this Working Group can be found in the collections of other Swedish Foreign Ministry departments.

## **b. related records**

### **i. Political Department, Eastern European Affairs (Diplomatic Records 1945 - present)**

These are mainly papers from the Swedish Ministry's Political Department, which oversaw the Wallenberg case, especially its Eastern European Section; and Swedish Foreign Service Posts (Embassies).

Most of the files of the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Political Department (HP dossiers) from 1945- 1974 have been transferred to the Swedish National Archive (Riksarkivet), where the documentation is available for review, with certain exceptions. Records of other Foreign Ministry departments have been transferred through 1996 or even 2008. Special collections and the most current documentation remain at the Foreign Ministry. These include the Raoul Wallenberg case file, papers of the Swedish-Russian Working Group in the Raoul Wallenberg case, as well as the records of other Working Groups created after the collapse after the Soviet Union in 1991, such as those that investigated the disappearance of Swedish sailors and their ships during the Cold War, the loss of a DC-3 signal intelligence plane and its crew in 1952 and the suspected repeated Soviet U-Boat incursions into Swedish territorial waters. A review of these other Working Group materials can provide helpful insights into how both Sweden and Russia approached the various inquiries.<sup>27</sup> Many records created after 1980 remain inaccessible, including internal correspondence records; inter-agency and foreign correspondence; instructions sent and received, including to and from Swedish Embassies abroad.

### **ii. Inter-agency correspondence/foreign correspondence**

These records are of interest for all Swedish Foreign Ministry sections/departments, regarding internal correspondence, communications with other Swedish Ministries and agencies, such as the Swedish Security Police and different agencies of the Swedish Defense Staff; as well as discussions with foreign entities, such as Swedish missions abroad and foreign governments. They are some of the most important records and also some of the most difficult to access for researchers. Swedish representatives often discussed matters in person, without properly noting the conversation in formal memos or protocols of conversation. In addition, much of this material remains subject to secrecy rules.

### **iii. UD Trade Section, Ministry of Trade (Handelsdepartementet, Kommerskollegium) - economic records**

Many of the open questions in the Wallenberg case cannot be separated from the political and economic discussions of the day. Related records may therefore be found several different collections. Questions involving international trade and industry during the 1940s and 1950s were handled by the Ministry of Trade (Handelsdepartementet), in coordination with a special section in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 1983, UD is in charge of all matters of trade, while issues related to Swedish industry are handled by a separate Industry Department (now the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation). Until 1983, the Ministry of Trade also dealt with patent issues, weapons exports and the Swedish Economic Defense Readiness Program (during WWII).

#### **iv. UD Legal Section** (see also the Ministry of Justice,, the Swedish National Archive)

The Foreign Ministry's Legal Department was repeatedly consulted on a wide range of issues over the years in the Raoul Wallenberg case. This included/s but was/is not limited to

- the legal norms of protective measures undertaken by Swedish diplomats and the Swedish Legation, Budapest in 1944-45
- the handling of witnesses and their testimonies
- assessing possible liability and claims of compensation. After Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance, numerous individuals filed claims of financial compensation for the assistance they had given Wallenberg and his colleagues in Budapest. Examples include the Hungarian businessman Bela Szabo as well as the former employee at the Swedish Legation, Budapest, Herman Grosheim-Krysko. However, the issue of compensation also emerged in other contexts. For example, the question if Russia should be asked for compensation for the unlawful disappearance and imprisonment of a Swedish diplomat? Are persons who worked for Swedish interests/Swedish intelligence during the 1940s and 1950s and who were imprisoned in the Soviet Union eligible for compensation from the Swedish state?
- determining and evaluating criteria for release of information from Swedish ministry/government archives involving third parties (i.e. countries, persons, etc.). Decisions regarding the release of information were taken in coordination with UD's Archive section and, since 2000, with the new office of Secrecy (Sekretariatet för Säkerhet, Sekretess och Beredskap).

#### **v. Passport Records (Passavdelningen)**

The Passport Office handled the issuing of special passports, visa and travel authorizations issued for Raoul Wallenberg and other individuals during WWII. These included the so-called "Courier Passports"(Kurirpass) and the wartime "Cabinet passport" (Kabinettspass). Most of the relevant files have been transferred to the Swedish National Archive, including the requisite passport application forms. Among the documents missing from Raoul Wallenberg's personal papers are his regular Swedish passports for 1937 and for 1943, after his "Kabinettspass" was not renewed. The application for the 1943 passport were recently discovered in the Swedish National Archives, but the actual passport has not been recovered. This passport is important because it would provide insights into Raoul Wallenberg's travels during 1943- 1944.

#### **vi. Press Department**

The UD Press Department releases formal statements to the public on current affairs. It also issues internal recommendations and instructions to Swedish diplomats how to present and address specific topics in public. As such, it fulfills an important role in shaping both the message and the image of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

#### **vii. Personnel and administrative records**

Although no formal personnel file was ever created for Raoul Wallenberg, records confirm that he was indeed formally hired by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1944; that he paid taxes, insurance and other fees. The Swedish Foreign Ministry's personnel files (so-called P-dossierer) provide interesting and useful information about Swedish Foreign Ministry employees and Raoul Wallenberg's colleagues during the 1940s.

## **2. The National Archive (Riksarkivet)**

Records from the Swedish Foreign Ministry have been transferred in several distinct batches over the years. Records from other government agencies, including the Prime Minister's Office, are also kept here, with the more recent documentation remaining at the respective government offices/ministries. The files for the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs are archived according to the so-called 1920 års dossier system (1920s dossier system). However, it is of interest and importance for researchers to realize that records with a direct connection to the Wallenberg inquiry may also be found in records that are archived outside of this system. Several private collections of individuals with direct connection to the Wallenberg case are located at the National Archive, including the papers of Wallenberg's business partner, the Hungarian businessman Kálmán Lauer, and the records of Rudolph Philipp, author of the first book about Raoul Wallenberg.

### **a. Records Swedish Government Ministries**

#### **i. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartement) (see above)**

A number of collections are of special importance for the Wallenberg case, including those of the Swedish missions abroad, for different years. Also, many important registers and finding aids to key collections are now available to researchers.

#### **ii. Ministry of Justice (Justitiedepartement)**

#### **iii. Ministry of Trade (Handelsdepartement)**

#### **iv. Ministry of Social Affairs (Socialdepartement)**

The holdings include information about foreigners living in Sweden during the war; about the extradition of soldiers and refugees from the Baltic states to the Soviet Union in 1946, a.o.

### **b. Other Swedish Agency Records**

#### **i. The Swedish Red Cross**

Aside from its own distinct collection, records of the Swedish Red Cross are spread among various dossiers, including those of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The documentation provides important details about Swedish protective measures undertaken in 1944-45 in Budapest, including financial records; of special interest is the work of Valdemar and Nina Langlet in Hungary in 1944-1945; contacts with Soviet occupation forces and the Allied Control Councils; post-war efforts to identify and track prisoner-of-war, including many witnesses in the Raoul Wallenberg case. In this task the Swedish Red Cross communicated closely with its representations abroad as well as the International Red Cross.

#### **ii. The Swedish Security Police (SÄPO)**

The records of the Swedish Security Police are accessible up through 1948. For documents from 1949 onwards, special permission is required to review certain information. (see also below)

### iii. The National Foreigners Commission (Socialstyrelsen/Statens Utlänningskommission, SUK)

This agency registered all foreigners entering Sweden, regardless if they stayed permanently in the country or if they remained only temporarily. The records provide information about individuals' personal and professional background. The collections show some overlap with the Swedish Security Police records.

Some important and previously unknown information regarding Raoul Wallenberg's personal and business connections before 1944 were recently discovered in these records, including Wallenberg's and Kálmán Lauer's contacts with the German businessman Ludolph Christensen, as well as Raoul Wallenberg's efforts, as early as 1937, to assist the German engineer Dr. Erich Philippi, a Jewish refugee from Germany.

### iv. Records of the Justitieombudsman

### v. Entities dealing with foreign trade

Swedish writer Jan Bergman has claimed that Raoul Wallenberg's company *Mellaneuropeiska* was a creation of Swedish intelligence (C-Byrån).<sup>28</sup> So far, no evidence supporting this claim has been presented. However, a number of interesting and important questions persist about what role *Mellaneuropeiska* fulfilled in the Swedish war time economy. In recent years, new information has emerged that shows the company served as an important war time trade agent, a facilitator of foreign trade, especially with Hungary. The traded goods included many non-food items, including fuel, building materials (betonite) as well as animal furs and skins. This trade apparently occurred on behalf of the Swedish state and its agencies responsible to secure essential provisions and supplies, like the Swedish Reserve Goods Agency (Sverigesreservförrådsnämnd). A close friend of Raoul Wallenberg has stated that Wallenberg had a "special task on behalf of the Swedish state." Collections of interest include:

- The National Budget Office (Folkushållningsdepartementet)
  - The National Economic Defense Readiness Commission (Rikskommissionen för Ekonomisk Försvarsberedskap). *The collection is kept in the Military Archives of Sweden (Krigsarkivet)*
  - The Foreign Currency Office (Valuta Kontoret, Clearingnämnd)
  - The National Agency for ReserVGoods (Statensreservförrådsnämnd)
  - The National Institute of Economic Research (Konjunkturinstitutet)
  - The National Industrial Commission (Statens Industrikommissionen)
  - War Insurance Agency (Krigsförsäkringsnämnd)
- a.o.

Of related interest are numerous professional entities, like the Swedish Grocers Union (Grossistförbundet); The National Food Commission (Statens Livsmedelskommission) a.o.; as well as the economic records of the Swedish Legations abroad, including the Swedish Legation, Budapest and Berlin; (see also the Military Archives of Sweden).

### vi. Company records/registration records (see also regional archives; Patent -och Registreringsverket)

*Mellaneuropeiska's* business archive has never been recovered. However, partial records of certain companies,, i.e. business correspondence, can be traced in a number of archival collections, i.e. wartime economic records. Records of so-called 'limited' companies registered in Sweden before 1960, that are no longer active, are kept at the National Archives , including information about the date of the company's founding, changes in the board of directors, etc. Registration records for other companies are kept at the Patent - och Registreringsverket (PRV) in Sundsvall. Some company archives are kept at local branches of

Riskarkivet. Other company registration information is kept in local and city archives, like the Stockholm City Archive (see below).

#### **vii. Private Collections**

The Swedish National Archive holds a number of private collections (Enskilda Arkiv). These include the personal papers of Fredrik and Maj von Dardel, Kálmán Lauer, Rudolph Philipp, Nanna Svartz and others (see below, under "Private Archives")

#### **viii. Media collections**

Of some interest is the Swedish media archive, including an extensive collection of older editions of Swedish newspapers, as well as a film and photo archive. Also of interest is the collection of the Swedish Telegram Bureau (TT) during WWII.

#### **ix. Archives of Swedish Political Parties/Unions**

Partial records

#### **x. Regional branches of the Swedish National Archives (Landsarkiv)**

The regional branches of the Swedish National Archive keep some important special collections, such as the company archive of SKF (Svenska Kullagerfabriken) in Gothenburg or the Swedish Match Company (Svenska Tändsticks AB) in Vadstena, for example, or documentation related to "Stella Polaris", the secret transfer of Finnish intelligence material and personnel to Sweden in 1944. They also include records related to local activities of Sweden's political parties.

### **3. The Military Archives of Sweden (Krigsarkivet)**

The Military Archives holds the records of the Swedish Ministry of Defense. As with other archives, documentation of interest in this archive is spread over a vast series of collections, with numerous sub-headings/series that can be difficult to identify. One of the chief experts on records pertaining to the work of the Swedish military intelligence services, the former "Arkivråd" Evabritta Wallberg, released a comprehensive guide to these records in 1998. Any researcher seeking information should first consult this publication. Several leading Swedish intelligence historians and WWII experts (Stig Ekman, Sam Nilsson, Lars Ulfving, Wilhelm Agrell, Klas Åmark, a.o.) have had access to still classified materials, but there has never been a systematic or complete, independent review of key collections with a specific focus on the Wallenberg case. Many of the official reviews were limited in scope and faced with serious time limitations. This is also true for the various official (Swedish government) commissions/investigations, like the Security Services Commission, the Neutrality Commission in the late 1990s and others.

Many records generated by Sweden's wartime intelligence services that are of interest in the Raoul Wallenberg case are archived in the collection of the Swedish Defense Staff. It is good to keep in mind, however, that the Swedish General Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force all had their own foreign departments/intelligence sections. Also of interest are the regional archives of various military regiments/units, as are the files of the Swedish Home Guard (Hemvärnet).

The Military Archives of Sweden house a number of private collections (enskilda arkiv) that remain partially classified and require the permission of specific individuals for review. These collections include the papers of Hellmuth Ternberg; Thede Palm's personal papers, which were largely declassified in 2016, although with significant omissions; the papers of his deputy, Jan Rydström (which remain classified); the Military

Attachés Curt Juhlin-Dannfeldt and Curt Kempff a.o.; the papers of Sweden's different Supreme Commanders (Överbefälhavare) during WWII, such as Olof Thörnell and Helge Jung; heads of the Defense Staff C.A. Ehrensvärd, a.o.

### **a. The Swedish Defense Staff - Foreign Section 1937-1942; Sektion II (incl. C-Byrån) 1942-1981**

The Swedish *C-byrån* (C-bureau) was a Swedish intelligence agency that functioned under Section II of the Swedish Defense Staff during WWII. *C-byrån* was established in 1939, headed by Major Carl Petersén, and existed until 1946. During World War II, Petersén was principally responsible for contacts with the Western Allies, while his deputy, Major Hellmuth Ternberg, was in charge of information from Finland, Germany, Hungary, Turkey, and Switzerland.

According to Swedish author Jan Bergman, *Mellaneuropeiska* served as a cover for a number of foreign intelligence missions, carried out by Raoul Wallenberg, due to his ability to travel throughout occupied Europe. Bergman further argued that the deputy head of *C-byrån*, Hellmuth Ternberg, played a major role in Wallenberg's recruitment for the humanitarian mission to Budapest in 1944. One reason for this claim was the fact that by the end of the war, *C-byrån* helped to support U.S. and British intelligence operations, especially in the Baltic region. Bergman offered no evidence for his claim. In Hungary, Ternberg had developed detailed plans to assist the Hungarian resistance movement in an uprising against the Nazi government. Raoul Wallenberg, as well as his diplomatic colleague Per Anger, were in contact with the leader of the group in question. Just as importantly, Ternberg was acquainted with the leading members of the Wallenberg family, while his brother, Egon Ternberg, was one of Raoul Wallenberg's godfathers.

Records of C-Byrån were extensively cleansed and its archive was burnt. In 1997, the papers were partially recovered, when Stig Synnergren, the former Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, provided 31 roles of microfilm containing the Bureau's records to the Swedish Military Archives. Documentation regarding activities in Hungary during WWII are noticeably absent.

The records of the Swedish Defense Staff's Cipher Department (FSt Kry), predecessor of the National Signal Defence Establishment (FRA) contain a collection of wartime transmissions, including communications of the Axis countries.

### **b. T-Kontoret**

T-Kontoret, the successor agency to C-Byrån, was headed by Thede Palm from 1946 -1965. There are some indications in the files of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also SÄPO that Palm's office on a number of occasions was involved in the search or evaluation of witnesses in the Wallenberg case. Two officers of T-Kontoret and the Swedish Security Police traveled repeatedly to Germany to conduct interviews with returning prisoners of war. They were aided by a Swedish ex-patriot living in Berlin who also gathered information about prisoners held in the Soviet Union. According to Palm's memoir, he maintained extensive contacts with British and U.S. intelligence counterparts. Palm indicated that he traded information, especially photos and other details, he obtained from Swedish trade vessels about Stalin's Baltic Fleet. Swedish commercial ships were used in a number of Swedish Cold War operations. Thorsten Akrell (Special Agent of the Swedish Defense Staff) personally oversaw the infiltration of an agent into Poland, using a Swedish ship. At the same time, a Swedish ferry traveling connecting Sweden and Poland was used to smuggle a prominent Polish politician and his wife to Sweden in 1947. Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén was aware of these operations which caused considerable tensions with Poland and the Soviet Union.

T-Kontoret and members of the Swedish Defense Staff also oversaw the training and infiltration of several Baltic and Swedish nationals into Latvia and Estonia. Most of the men were immediately captured and served long prison sentences. It remains unclear exactly how many were recruited and how many were arrested or killed. There have been claims that, aside from the Baltic operations, T-Kontoret maintained an informal network of agents behind the Iron Curtain. Palm's own deputy, John Magnus Lindby, some years ago challenged this suggestion, stating that if there had been such an entity, he would have known about it. There are some indications, however, that a certain form of reporting did occur, especially via representatives of Swedish companies abroad who served as important sources of information. T-Kontoret was eventually torn apart by internal rivalries and re-named IB (Inhämtning Birger), after Palm's successor, Birger Elmér.

### **c. Industriutredningen/Östekonomiska byrån (Industry Investigation/Eastern Economic Bureau)**

This office was originally founded in WWII and was named the Industry Investigation (Industriutredning). Its main purpose was to gather economic data on countries involved in the war. After the war, the focus shifted to the collection of economic and industrial intelligence about the Soviet Union and associated countries. A prominent member of this group was the Swedish banker Lars Erik Thunholm who led the compensation discussions for lost Swedish business in the Baltic countries after the war. He later became head of Skandinaviska Banken at the time of the fusion with SEB.

In 1953, the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) approved funding for a more permanent economic intelligence service which became part of T-Kontoret (Detalj II). The purpose of the group was to provide T-Kontoret with information regarding a broad range of economic issues/indicators, for "strategic consideration". In 1959, the organisation was moved out of the Defense Staff and re-named the East-West Bureau Foundation (Stiftelsen Öst-västbyrån). It was headed by Jan Rydström and received extensive support from Swedish businesses. In 1966, the entity was renamed the Eastern Economic Bureau (Östekonomiska byrån). It was formally disbanded in 1989. The archive was extensively cleaned out before it was delivered to the Military Archives of Sweden in 1998. Rydström's private papers and diaries remain inaccessible.

### **d. IB (partial records, see below)**

The IB was a secret intelligence service within the Swedish Armed Forces, headed by the Social Democrat Birger Elmér. It conducted secret domestic surveillance of Communists and also shared the information with a number of foreign governments, especially the U.S. and Israel. The existence of the IB and its activities were first publicly disclosed by the Swedish journalists Peter Bratt and Jan Guillou in 1973, in the Swedish magazine *Folket i Bild/Kulturfront*. Of special interest are the reports and internal deliberations regarding contacts between high-ranking Swedish diplomats and Soviet intelligence representatives in the 1960s and 70s. Swedish officials reported regularly on these meetings directly to Elmér. Many of the relevant documents remain classified. The few reports that have emerged indicate that Swedish officials did not press their Soviet contacts for full clarification of Raoul Wallenberg's fate.

### **e. MUST (partial records)**

## **4. Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) Archive**

The archive holds the few remaining records of the IB as well as all successor agencies: GBU SSI, USL, USK, KSI, MUST a.o. Some of the biggest gaps in the Wallenberg case records are found here. Events such as the statement of the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in 1957 (announcing that Raoul Wallenberg had supposedly died in July 1947), the arrest of the Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerström as a Soviet agent in 1963, as well as the upheaval caused by Professor Nanna Svartz's testimony about her discussions with Professor Myasnikov (1961-1965) should have generated at least some comments from Swedish intelligence experts regarding potential effects for the Wallenberg investigation. Subsequently, the sudden emergence of new witnesses in 1979 that led to a formal reopening of the Wallenberg case, after it had lain dormant for a full fifteen years, should have prompted Swedish diplomats to seek a professional assessment from the Swedish intelligence community; as should have Guy von Dardel's lawsuit against the Soviet Union in 1984 and the 1989 visit by Raoul Wallenberg's next-of-kin to Moscow. However, no such documentation has ever been presented. The Swedish Foreign Ministry must have sought the input and advice of the intelligence services also in connection with the work of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, the presentation of an official report on the Group's work in 2000, as well as the extensive inquiry into the official Swedish handling of the Wallenberg question by the so-called Eliasson Commission in 2003.

It appears that at some point during the 1970s, according to a number of sources, documentation was archived not in a central repositories but in separate safes of individual intelligence officers.

## **5. The Swedish Security Police (SÄPO);Rikspolis**

(see also above) The main task of the Security Police was to monitor Swedish citizens and their contacts with foreigners; foreign diplomats/diplomatic missions; as well as foreign contacts of Swedish businessmen and companies. The Raoul Wallenberg personal dossier is available for review to most researchers. It constitutes the Swedish Security Police's central record of the Wallenberg case. However, just as in the case of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not all pertinent records are filed there. There is a broad overlap of documentation in the two main Wallenberg case files, but the collections are not identical. Some records continue to be withheld. (see below for more details). Additional findings aids for this archive have been released in recent years. File documentation is subject to routine destruction which is indicated in the respective collections. SÄPO's collections contain some limited correspondence with other Swedish agencies, i.e. Socialstyrelsen, UD, the Swedish Armed Forces, the Swedish Defense Staff, a.o. The original 'Venona' decrypts (deciphered messages exchanged by Soviet agents during the 1940s) are also available here. Those from the 1950s until the project's conclusion are kept at the National Radio Defence Establishment (FRA). Of interest to researchers are also various regional police archives, such as the archives of the police authorities of Stockholm, Härnösand and Östersund.

## **6. The National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)**

According to experts who have reviewed the material held in this archive it contains very little documentation with direct bearing on the Raoul Wallenberg case. However, the kind of information that was obtained by the National Defence Radio Establishment through the years is of great potential importance to the Wallenberg case. They include key World War II and Cold War intercepts which could provide important clues about how foreign and Swedish officials approached the Wallenberg investigation.

The records of the "Venona" project are kept here for 1950, until the end of the project. Additional records concerning the "Stella Polaris" project are also apparently found here. Of special interest to the Wallenberg case are the papers of Swedish cryptologist and signal intelligence expert Sven Wäsström.

## **7. The Swedish Defense College (FOA/FOI)**

Maintains its own archive of research, analysis, official reports and academic papers

## **8. Swedish legal entities/courts** (see also records of the Ministry of Justice)

Numerous records of interest to the Wallenberg case can be found in the local collections of the Swedish Justice system, including those of the federal and local courts, the District Attorneys (Stadsfiskal), the Justitieombudsman a.o. These include trial transcripts, rulings, etc.

## **9. Stockholm City Archive and other local municipalities**

Some relevant files concerning Raoul Wallenberg are archived in various Swedish city and county archives, i.e. income tax records; documentation concerning baptism, inheritance, etc.

## **10. Patent - och Registreringsverket (PRV), Sundsvall**

Contains important information about Swedish businesses, including company registration records

## **11. The Royal Library (Kungliga Bibilioteket)**

Holds a number of important private collections, including the papers of Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén and the former Swedish Ambassador to Moscow, Rolf Sohlman.

## **12. University Archives (The University of Uppsala a.o.)**

The University of Uppsala, for example, houses a number of private collections, including Per Jacobsson's personal papers. It is also the main depository of the interviews with Hungarian refugees and Holocaust Survivors that were conducted during the 1980s and 1990s, as part of the Raoul Wallenberg Research Project. Many of the interviews have not been translated and have never been formally analyzed. The collection also includes a selection of papers and documents Per Anger provided to the project (Per Anger Samling).

## **13. The Swedish National Bank (Riksbank)**

Its archive contains important financial records of WWII and beyond.

## **14. Swedish Television Archive (SVT)**

Over time, this archive has acquired footage from other, older Swedish film bureaus. The SVT archive is also now a main depository of various promotional films from the Swedish Army. This is where the recent, never before seen footage of Raoul Wallenberg, working as an instructor during his time in the Swedish Home Guard in the early 1940s, was discovered.

## **II. Private Archives**

### **1. Institutions**

#### **a. Stiftelse för Ekonomisk Historisk Forskning inom Bank och Företagande (SEHFBF)**

Over the past seventy years, Wallenberg representatives have granted only limited access to these records, permitting only a few select scholars and researchers to study their files. During the 1990s, even Guy von Dardel was refused access to the collection.<sup>21</sup>

Important questions remain about Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with his Wallenberg relatives after the death of Raoul's grandfather, Gustaf Wallenberg in 1937. It is clear that Raoul's contacts to the Wallenberg family were closer than has been generally portrayed. It is not entirely clear why these contacts were downplayed to the degree that they were after Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in 1945. Unfortunately, few of Raoul Wallenberg's own private papers and business correspondence survive that could help to shed light on the issue. There is growing evidence that more information and also documentation should exist in Wallenberg family collections about both Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg's involvement in the Raoul Wallenberg case. It needs to be established what exactly the Soviets knew about Raoul Wallenberg's personal and professional contacts, before and during the humanitarian mission in Budapest in 1944, and if this closer relationship between Raoul and the Wallenberg brothers had any consequences for the official Swedish handling of his case. This includes contacts with members of the Swedish intelligence establishment, especially the Deputy head of C- Byrån Hellmuth Ternberg who maintained a close association with the Wallenberg family throughout his life, as well as the banker Per Jacobsson who worked for Swedish Intelligence during WWII.

Of special interest are the papers of Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg, in particular their personal and and business correspondence. Some documentation is kept in loose (unarchived) collections.

#### **b. Chambers of Commerce**

The contacts and exchanges that occurred as part of official meetings held by various domestic and international chambers of commerce during WWII and beyond provide an important source of information for scholars. Special permission is usually required to access the records, since Chambers of Commerce are considered private institutions.

Stockholm Chamber of Commerce

Swedish - Hungarian Chamber of Commerce Swedish - American Chamber of Commerce

Swedish - Soviet/Russian Chamber of Commerce  
Swedish - German Chamber of Commerce  
The International Chamber of Commerce  
a.o.

**c. Archives of Swedish Political Parties and Unions** (also Swedish National Archive; various regional and university archives)

**i. The Social Democratic Party, the Center Party a.o (Socialdemokraterna, Folkpartiet, Moderaterna a.o.)**  
Party Archives for various years

**ii. Archives of the Worker's Movement (Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek)**

The Swedish Social Democratic Party (partial records)  
Vilmos Böhm  
Karl Kilbom  
Hjalmar Mehr  
Tage Erlander  
Olof Palme a.o.

**d. Archives of the Jewish Community of Stockholm** (Judiska [Mosaiska] Församlingen)

Gunnar Josephson  
Norbert Masur  
Fritz Holländer  
Chief Rabbi Marcus Ehrenpreis  
Gillel Storch a.o.

## **2. Public Officials**

Erik Boheman  
Sven Grafström  
Östen Undén  
Rolf Sohlman  
Staffan Söderblom  
Otto Danielsson  
Arne Lundberg  
Tage Erlander  
Sverker Åström a.o.

### **3. Private citizens**

#### **i. Raoul Wallenberg and his next-of-kin**

Raoul Wallenberg  
Fredrik and Maj von Dardel  
Nina Lagergren  
Guy von Dardel  
Gustaf Wallenberg and descendants  
Jacob Wallenberg and descendants  
Marcus Wallenberg and descendants  
Sonja Wallenberg and Carl Björnstjerna  
Ebba Wallenberg and Carl Bonde  
Elisabeth von Seth (born Björnstjerna), cousin  
Lennart Hagströmer, cousin a.o.

#### **ii. Raoul Wallenberg's friends and business associates**

Kálmán Lauer  
Carl Matthiessen  
Sven Salén  
Björn Burchardt  
Lennart Larsson  
Heinrich von Wahl  
Ludolph Christensen  
a.o.

#### **iii. Researchers, historians and journalists**

Jenö Levai  
Rudolph Philipp  
Torsten Hèrnod  
Kenne Fant  
The Stockholm Wallenberg Committee a.o.

### **4. Private Enterprises**

Relevant records can be found in several different archives, including the Center of Business History (Centrum för Näringslivshistoria/Centre for Business History)

*Specialmetall Föreningen*  
*Banankompaniet*  
*Mellaneuropeiska*  
*Svenska Globus*  
*SUKAB*  
*SKF a.o.*

## Part 2 Open Questions and Research Requests in the Raoul Wallenberg Case

What follows is a compilation of the most important unanswered questions on the Swedish side of the Wallenberg case. Swedish authorities should attempt to answer these questions and, if necessary, obtain the required information from foreign governmental and archival sources.

Three separate lists of questions and specific research requests will be submitted to different Swedish archives:

- The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD).
- The Wallenberg Family Archive (SEHFBF)
- The Swedish Security Police (SÄPO), the Military Archives of Sweden (Krigsarkivet), the Swedish Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST).

The questions in each list are grouped chronologically, according to the three main phases of the Wallenberg investigation:

- Raoul Wallenberg's personal and professional background and his selection for the Budapest humanitarian mission in 1944
- Raoul Wallenberg's contacts and activities in Hungary in 1944-1945
- Raoul Wallenberg's arrest and disappearance after January 1945

**The pending research requests are based in part on new information and challenge some of the previous ideas and theories presented in the Wallenberg case since 1945. The requested details will help clarify which precise considerations determined the official Swedish and Russian handling of Wallenberg's case since 1945.**

Please note the distinction between *open questions* and specific *research requests*. Some answers may undoubtedly be found in open archival collections. It remains a fact, however, that possible pieces to the puzzle remain to be discovered in still classified or lesser known Swedish archive depositories. We are counting very much on the continued assistance and extensive expertise of Swedish archivists and other experts to determine the best way forward. Even partial answers to the questions listed could provide important clues needed to solve the mystery of Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in Russia.

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# The Raoul Wallenberg Research Initiative RWI-70

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Formal Request to the Swedish Government and Archival Authorities on the Raoul Wallenberg

## GAPS IN THE OFFICIAL RECORD

Stiftelsen för Ekonomisk Historisk Forskning inom Bank och Företagande  
(The Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise)

The Wallenberg Family Archive<sup>29</sup>




Photo Credit: Raoul Wallenberg's photo on a visa application he filed in June 1943 with the Hungarian Legation, Stockholm.  
Source: The Hungarian National Archives, Budapest.

March 26, 2018

## Introduction

Important questions remain about Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with his Wallenberg relatives, especially after the death of Raoul's grandfather, Gustaf Wallenberg in 1937.

It is clear that Raoul's relations with Wallenberg family were closer than has been generally portrayed. Yet, until very recently, the ties to his famous relatives were consistently and possibly intentionally deemphasized. Unfortunately, few of Raoul Wallenberg's own private papers have been preserved. They include his personal and business correspondence, address books and appointment calendars that could clarify some of the unresolved issues.

At the time of Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance, the bankers Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg were among the most influential decision makers in Sweden, despite the serious problems they faced as a result of the official post-war U.S. investigation into their business dealings with Nazi Germany. They clearly had the power to set the Swedish agenda in the Wallenberg case. However, there is no documentary or other evidence to indicate that the Wallenberg brothers ever signaled to the Swedish government or to the Soviets that for them Raoul Wallenberg's return was a key priority. This fact is all the more interesting because the Wallenbergs have a long history of intervening on behalf of their relatives and business associates who require assistance.<sup>30</sup>

Over the past seventy years, Wallenberg representatives have granted only limited access to their collections which are kept at a special Foundation, the Stiftelsen för Ekonomisk Historisk Forskning inom Bank och Företagande - permitting only a few select scholars and researchers to study their files. In the 1990s, even Raoul Wallenberg's brother, Guy von Dardel, was refused access with the argument that the Wallenberg archive was open only for "serious research" ("seriös forskning").<sup>31</sup>

There is growing evidence that both Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg may have groomed Raoul Wallenberg for a special role in international trade and the Wallenberg sphere. These tasks apparently included the protection of business assets of Wallenberg family friends and associates during WWII. It is not entirely clear why these contacts were downplayed to the degree that they were after Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in 1945. There are clear signs, for example, that the private papers of Raoul Wallenberg's business partner Kálmán Lauer were edited in order to strike repeated references to Jacob Wallenberg. It is unclear who was the author of this censorship.

Another big question mark remains about Lauer's claim that Raoul Wallenberg worked for some time as Jacob Wallenberg's Private Secretary in the early 1940s.<sup>32</sup> In addition, there are new indications that during the 1940s, Marcus Wallenberg had important business contacts in Hungary that also involved Raoul Wallenberg's company Mellaneuropeiska. It needs to be established what exactly the Soviets knew about Raoul Wallenberg's personal and professional contacts, before and during the humanitarian mission in Budapest in 1944, and if this closer relationship between Raoul and the Wallenberg brothers had any consequences for the handling of his case. This includes contacts with members of the Swedish intelligence establishment, especially Hellmuth Ternberg, the Deputy head of the C-Byrån (C-Bureau, a Swedish foreign intelligence agency under the Swedish Defense Staff during WWII), who maintained a close association with the Wallenberg family throughout his life, as well as the banker Per Jacobsson who worked for Swedish Intelligence during WWII.

While Raoul Wallenberg's mission to Hungary in 1944 was primarily humanitarian, his work also involved other aspects, ranging from contacts with the anti-Nazi resistance, the support of Swedish and foreign intelligence aims, to the pursuit of wartime as well as post-war business interests. If and how these additional dimensions of his work contributed to his arrest and possibly to the handling of his case must be determined in greater detail. Given Wallenberg's official status as a [Swedish] diplomat, these actions would have constituted a serious violation of Swedish neutrality.

Very little is known about Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg's personal attitudes toward Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance and any actions they may have taken on his behalf. Of special importance in this regard are the private initiatives taken by Jacob Wallenberg; one in 1944, when he, according to his own notes, contacted SS-General and head of Nazi Germany's Foreign Intelligence Services, Walter Schellenberg, to request his personal protection for Raoul Wallenberg prior to Raoul's departure for Hungary; and later, in 1954, when he attempted to contact Soviet representatives via special business contacts in Prague, with the aim of obtaining clarity about Raoul Wallenberg's fate.

Swedish Foreign Ministry records show that Jacob Wallenberg was repeatedly involved in tracking a number of witnesses who had provided information about Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance, and he once planned to host a high-ranking Soviet official at his private residence (Malmvik), apparently with the intention of opening a direct channel of communication to the Soviet leadership. It is not known if Marcus Wallenberg was aware of these efforts and if he supported them. The Wallenberg Family Archive has never released any documentation about these private initiatives. Jacob Wallenberg's notes, released in 2000, containing the reference about his approach to Walter Schellenberg, consist of a single handwritten page, with no indication from which larger document or archival collection the paper originated.

Some questions also remain about Marcus Wallenberg's contacts with Soviet officials, including his early efforts in 1945 to inquire about Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts with the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm, Alexandra Kollontay. It needs to be clarified how many letters, in fact, were exchanged and when and what Kollontay or other Soviet officials may have responded to these inquiries. It appears that by 1951, Marcus Wallenberg was convinced that Raoul Wallenberg was dead. It remains unclear on what information he based this belief. Of equal importance remain documentation that can shed light on the extensive post-war discussion with various Soviet authorities regarding the conclusion of the Swedish-Soviet Trade Agreement in the autumn of 1946, as well as the complex negotiations about Soviet financial compensation for lost Swedish businesses in the Iron Curtain countries that lasted well into the 1980s.

During the time of the official Swedish-Russian Working Group investigation of Raoul Wallenberg's fate (1991-2000), the politically sensitive issue of Sweden and the Wallenberg family's close economic ties with Nazi Germany during the war, was discussed only fleetingly. The subject would have been quite relevant since Stalin clearly considered these relations part of a broader Allied, anti-Soviet conspiracy.

Some historians have argued that the Wallenberg family's lack of engagement in solving Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance was simply the result of unfortunate circumstances. Among other factors, they cite the chaotic conditions at the end of WWII, the distractions caused by the post-war U.S investigation of Wallenberg business contacts with Nazi Germany, as well as Raoul Wallenberg's position as an 'outsider' in the Wallenberg family in support of this view.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the Wallenbergs were certainly no strangers to Stalin. The Wallenberg controlled ball bearing trust SKF had a presence in the Soviet Union since 1916, with a large ball bearing factory operating in Moscow well into the 1930s. The Soviet Union had, in fact, derived many benefits from the association with the Wallenberg brothers personally and from their business ventures, especially during World War II. In particular Marcus Wallenberg had been instrumental in negotiating a Finnish-Soviet peace agreement in 1944. And SKF had provided crucial wartime deliveries to Moscow. So, why would Stalin decide to secretly detain a member of this family?

At the time of Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance, the bankers Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg were among the most influential decision makers in Sweden, despite the serious problems they faced as a result of the official post-war U.S. investigation into their business dealings with Nazi Germany. However, there is no evidence to indicate that the Wallenberg brothers ever signaled to the Swedish government or to the Soviets that for them Raoul Wallenberg's return was a key priority. This fact is all the more interesting

because the Wallenbergs have a long history of intervening on behalf of their relatives and business associates who require assistance.

The profound passivity of the Wallenberg family in the aftermath of Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance, therefore, continues to raise important questions. It is known that special collections about the wartime business contacts of Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg with both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union exist in several Russian archives, yet only a handful of documents have been declassified and Swedish officials have not insisted on a review.

## **Selected Questions and Research Requests**

What follows is list of the most important unanswered questions and specific research requests on the Swedish side of the Wallenberg case, in particular those that concern Raoul Wallenberg's paternal relatives, the Wallenberg family. The request is formally addressed to the Wallenberg Family Archive (SEHFBF). Even partial answers to these questions could provide important clues needed to solve the mystery of Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in Russia.

Two additional lists of questions and specific research requests will be submitted to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the archives of the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO), the Military Archives of Sweden (Krigsarkivet), the Swedish Defense Radio Establishment (FRA) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST).

The questions are grouped chronologically, according to the three main phases of the Wallenberg investigation:

- Raoul Wallenberg's personal and professional background and his selection for the Budapest humanitarian mission in 1944;
- Raoul Wallenberg's contacts and activities in Hungary in 1944-1945;
- Raoul Wallenberg's arrest and disappearance after January 1945.

**Questions - in black**

**Requests - in mauve**

## **I. Raoul Wallenberg's professional background and his selection for the Budapest humanitarian mission in 1944**

*1. In 1937, Dr. Erich Philippi (1881-1968), a chief engineer for the German electric company AEG, was arrested by the Gestapo in Germany. Raoul Wallenberg immediately began to work for his transfer to Sweden. Wallenberg also founded a company in Stockholm called Specialmetall Föreningen to provide a means of income to Philippi, who - as a foreign national - was unable to own a business. Philippi's application for a Swedish residence permit included references from leading Swedish businessmen, including Hans von Kantzow, a board member of Stockholms Enskilda Banken (SEB), which was owned by the Wallenberg family.<sup>33</sup>*

**What prompted Raoul Wallenberg to assist Dr. Philippi?**

**Was Wallenberg's assistance to Dr. Philippi purely a private effort or was it part of a broader attempt by the Swedish business community and possibly the Wallenberg family to help Jewish refugees and individuals with special technical skills?**

**Please provide all records about Dr. Erich Philippi and Specialmetall Föreningen, as well as all correspondence; correspondence of Hans von Kantzow for 1937.**

*2. In a letter addressed to Jacob Wallenberg (1892-1980) from September 1939, Raoul Wallenberg wrote that Jacob had mentioned during their last meeting that the "war would bring a number of problems" and that Jacob had suggested that he may wish to use Raoul "for their solution."*

**What specific tasks did Jacob Wallenberg refer to?**

**Why did Raoul Wallenberg's letters asking Jacob Wallenberg for employment stop in late 1939, almost two years before he joined Mellaneuropeiska?**

*3. During WWII, the Swedish war economy was almost entirely centralized. A huge consortium comprised of most of Sweden's largest industrial enterprises, Sveriges Utrikes Kompensationsaktiebolag (SUKAB) was founded in 1940. Almost all Swedish trade with occupied territories was conducted via this conglomerate in which Wallenberg businesses were heavily represented. Raoul Wallenberg's uncle, Carl Axel Söderlund (he was married to Raoul's aunt, Nita Wallenberg) was on the Board of Directors. Nils Jenselius, a former Director of SUKAB, stated in the early 1950s that he remembered Raoul Wallenberg "from the time he had been employed there."*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg ever work at SUKAB, possibly informally, during the 1940s?**

**Did Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg groom Raoul Wallenberg for a special, confidential role in international trade and a possibly confidential role in the Wallenberg sphere? (like the one fulfilled by Swedish businessmen Lennart Larsson (1880-1966), Carl Hardeberg and others).**

**Please provide all pertinent records for SUKAB for the years 1940-1945; all correspondence records for SUKAB's Directors, i.e. Rolf von Heidenstam; Hans Mott; Nils Jenselius (1940-1955)**

*4. A former employee of Baltiska Oljeaktiebolag by the name of Gertrud Larsson (1915-2008) has stated that in the early 1940s she was asked by Jacob Wallenberg to travel on confidential business to Estonia and that Raoul Wallenberg accompanied her on this trip.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg ever travel to the Baltic countries in the years 1939 - 1944, on a confidential mission for Jacob Wallenberg?**

**Please provide all records about Gertrud Larsson, Baltiska Oljeaktiebolaget 1940-1944.**

5. *The Swedish economist Per Jacobsson (1894-1963) worked for Swedish intelligence throughout the war. In September 1940, Jacobsson delivered an urgent message to Jacob Wallenberg from Hungarian Jewish business owners who were seeking temporary "Aryanization" of their companies, to protect them from confiscation by Nazi authorities. The message was forwarded by Lipót Ashner, the Director of Hungary's giant electrical concern TUNGSRAM.*

**What was Jacob Wallenberg's reaction to this request and what actions, if any, did he take?**

**Was Jacobsson's request an isolated incident?**

**Did Jacob Wallenberg discuss the issue with others? (i.e. Marcus Wallenberg (1899-1982), Hellmuth Ternberg (1893-1971), Raoul Wallenberg, Kálmán Lauer, Carl Matthiessen or Sven Salén (1890-1969)?)**

**Please provide all records regarding Lipót Ashner; *Tungsrám* for the years 1940-1945; please provide correspondence with Per Jacobsson for 1940-1945**

6. *The Norwegian born businessman Carl Matthiessen apparently was a close acquaintance of both Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg.*

**How was Raoul Wallenberg's contact with Matthiessen established and who had the idea to create Mellaneuropeiska?**

**Please provide all records about Carl Matthiessen for 1940-1941; all correspondence between Matthiessen and Jacob Wallenberg, Marcus Wallenberg; all correspondence with Sven Salén for 1940-1941.**

7. *Carl Matthiessen was an active supporter of the Norwegian resistance. He maintained close contacts with British diplomats and British intelligence representatives in Stockholm during WWII, including the British Minister Victor Mallet and the British Naval Attaché Henry Denham. He also had good contacts with Swedish intelligence officers, including Col. Carl Björnstjerna (1886-1982), head of the Swedish foreign intelligence at the Swedish Defense Staff until 1942. Björnstjerna was married to Sonja Wallenberg, Raoul Wallenberg's aunt.*

**Did Carl Matthiessen discuss Raoul Wallenberg and his mission with Col. Carl Björnstjerna or other members of the Wallenberg family?**

**Please provide access to the correspondence of Col. Carl Björnstjerna 1940-1945**

8. *Mellaneuropeiska's first office was located at Blasieholmsgatan 3, in central Stockholm. This also happened to be the address for Baltiska Oljeaktiebolag. The building was owned by Carl Ljungberg (1873-1975), SEB's long time Personnel Director. Ljungberg had been in charge of transportation and supply issues during WWI.*

**Why was Mellaneuropeiska's office in 1941 initially located at Blasieholmsgatan 3?**

**Did Ljungberg have a role in the creation of Mellaneuropeiska?**

**Please provide all records about Carl Ljungberg; correspondence 1941-1945**

9. *It needs to be clarified what exact role Raoul Wallenberg's company Mellaneuropeiska and associated persons/firms played in Sweden's Defense Readiness program (Rikskommissionen för Ekonomisk Försvarsberedskap) and the National Agency for Reserve Goods (Statens Reservförrådsnämnd) during the 1940s. According to Swedish author Jan Bergman, Mellaneuropeiska served as a cover for a number of foreign intelligence missions, carried out by Raoul Wallenberg, due to his ability to travel throughout occupied Europe.<sup>34</sup> Bergman further argued that the deputy head of C-byrå, Hellmuth Ternberg, played a major role in Wallenberg's recruitment for the humanitarian mission to Budapest in 1944. H. Ternberg's brother, Egon Ternberg (1890-1953), was one of Raoul Wallenberg's godfathers.*

**What were *Mellaneuropeiska's* tasks? Did the company serve as a front for carrying out other tasks, not directly related to business matters?**

**Please provide all correspondence records for Hellmuth and Egon Ternberg 1940-1945; *Mellaneuropeiska* 1941-1945; Sweden's Defense Readiness program (Rikskommissionen för Ekonomisk Försvarsberedskap) and the National Agency for Reserve Goods (Statens Reservförrådsnämnd) 1940-1945; Konjunkturinstitutet 1940-1945**

10. In January 1943, *Mellaneuropeiska* received permission for the delivery of high-speed drilling equipment (worth then about 22,000 SEK, approximately \$55,000 today) from the Swedish electrical concern ASEA - which operated in the Wallenberg business sphere - to Hungary, specifically to the Manfred Weiss Flugzeug und Motorenfabrik A.G. (Duna Aircraft Manufacturing plant). The Duna plant at that time produced planes for the German Luftwaffe.

**How and why did *Mellaneuropeiska* secure this contract? Were there other, still unknown transactions? Please provide all available records**

11. One of *Mellaneuropeiska's* main business partners was the German businessman Ludolph Christensen, an old acquaintance of Kálmán Lauer from the 1930s.

**What kind of transactions and contacts did Christensen and his company, J. Nootbaar Jr. ,facilitate during WWII, in Sweden and with third party contacts abroad, including Hungary and Switzerland?**

**Please provide all records about Ludolph Christensen and his company, J.Nootbaar Jr, for 1940-1945**

12. In a summary report of the Budapest humanitarian mission, written by Lauer after Wallenberg's disappearance, he states that "Raoul's idol was Jacob Wallenberg. [Raoul] was his Private Secretary during his time with Meropa ..."

**Did Raoul Wallenberg work in more formal capacity for Jacob Wallenberg during the 1940s, as an administrative assistant or Private Secretary, as alleged by Kálmán Lauer?**

13. In January 1942, Raoul Wallenberg spent several weeks in Paris, France.

**Were there any aspects to his trip other than the one officially stated , i.e. selling a number of Swedish horses in exchange for a variety of goods to be imported from France?**

**Was Raoul Wallenberg's trip to Paris connected with the arrest of Count Ferdinand Arco auf Valley, Gertrud Wallenberg's former husband, by the Gestapo? Gertrud Wallenberg suffered severe harassment by the Gestapo at the time.**

**Please provide all records regarding Gertrud Wallenberg and Count Ferdinand Arco auf Valley for 1942; including the correspondence of Marcus Wallenberg, Sr. for 1942**

14. In 1943, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not renew Raoul Wallenberg's "Cabinet Passport" (*Kabinettpass*), a special passport that indicated the holder was traveling abroad on official (Swedish) business. Records published in 2000 by the Wallenberg Family archive show several meetings and phone conversations between Raoul Wallenberg and Marcus Wallenberg in 1943.

**What was the content of the discussions between Marcus Wallenberg and Raoul Wallenberg in 1943? Did they concern Raoul Wallenberg's canceled Cabinet Passport?**

**Please provide all records regarding Raoul Wallenberg's application for a "Kabinettpass" in 1941, which was supported by Jacob Wallenberg; as well as all records regarding the refusal to renew the document;**

**correspondence of Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg for 1943.**

15. *Carl Matthiessen had good contacts to Hungary, including with the family of the leading Hungarian industrialist Manfred Weiss. Weiss's nephew, Heinrich von Wahl (1897-1946), moved to Sweden in 1944 and had close ties to Matthiessen, Salén and Lauer.*

**Was there a coordinated effort to protect the assets of the Manfred Weiss family and other wealthy Jewish business owners in Hungary?**

**If so, did Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg actively assist these efforts? Was the company *Svenska Globus* used to protect Wahl and Weiss family assets?**

**Please provide all records about Heinrich von Wahl; *Svenska Globus* for 1942-1945**

16. *In his letters to Raoul Wallenberg in 1944, Kálmán Lauer pointed out the importance of attempting to rescue so-called "people of the future"(Zukunftsmenschen), like the son of the former Hungarian Prime Minister Vilmos Böhm. He also asked Wallenberg to seek out people with special know-how or technical skill who could be useful for the Swedish post-war economy. U.S. archival records show that American officials were especially interested in rescuing about 1,000 employees of the Manfred Weiss Works which had one of the most highly skilled work force in Europe.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg receive a special mandate from Swedish or U.S. officials to rescue highly skilled technicians and other individuals of potential economic or political importance?**

17. *Private correspondence records from the Wallenberg Family Archive show that during the 1940s, Marcus Wallenberg had important business contacts in Hungary. They included the Director of Budapest's Free Harbor, Félix Bornemisza and Joseph Bartha who in 1944 assisted Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest. In 1941, Sven Salén and Félix Bornemisza, a close associate of Miklos Horthy, Jr. , the son of the Hungarian Regent, formed the joint Csepel Hungarian-Swedish Shipping Company Ltd. (Csepel Magyar-Svéd Hajózási RT) In 1943, Kálmán Lauer and Sven Salén had plans to protect Bornemisza's shipping assets. Raoul Wallenberg carried the relevant papers to Budapest. Records published in 2000 by the Wallenberg Family archive show several meetings and phone conversations between Raoul Wallenberg and Marcus Wallenberg in 1943.*

**What was the content of the discussions between Marcus Wallenberg and Raoul Wallenberg in 1943?**

**Did these conversations concern various business projects in Hungary?**

**Did they specifically concern the protection of Bornemisza's business assets?**

**If so, were they part of a broader task to protect the business assets of Wallenberg family business associates during WWII?**

**What other records exist in the Wallenberg family archive regarding contacts with Bornemissza and Bartha in the years 1940-1945?**

18. *Åke Burchardt (1919-1985), a close friend of Raoul Wallenberg and later manager of the Wallenberg owned fruit plantation Clementina in Ecuador, has stated that Wallenberg had a "special task on behalf of the Swedish state" during the 1940s.*

**If true, what exactly was this special task? Was he referring to *Mellaneuropeiska's* role in securing special goods for the Swedish economy or possibly other activities?**

**Please provide all correspondence records for Åke Burchardt for 1940-1945**

19. *Jacob Wallenberg had been involved in a number of Jewish relief efforts, including those supported by his sister, Ebba Bonde.<sup>35</sup> Records also show that she was in contact with the wife of the Hungarian Regent*

Miklós Horthy.

**What exactly were Countess Bonde's contacts in Hungary?**

**How well did Ebba Bonde know Kálmán Lauer?**

**Please provide Ebba Bonde's papers, correspondence records for 1940-1945**

20. *Carl Ca: Bonde (1897-1990), was Chief of Swedish counterintelligence in 1944 and Ebba Bonde's stepson.*

**How well did Raoul Wallenberg know Carl Ca: Bonde?**

**Did Carl Bonde discuss the Budapest humanitarian mission in 1944 with Raoul Wallenberg and other members of the Wallenberg family?**

**Please provide all correspondence for Carl Ca: Bonde 1940-1945**

21. Before Raoul's departure for Hungary, Jacob Wallenberg apparently requested special protection for him from his close acquaintance, the SS-General and head of German Foreign Intelligence in 1945, Walter Schellenberg (1910-1952).

**How was Jacob Wallenberg's request transmitted to Schellenberg?**

**What was Schellenberg's response?**

**Was Raoul Wallenberg aware of Jacob's request?**

**And was there ever any direct or indirect contact between Raoul Wallenberg and Walter Schellenberg?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence for Walter Schellenberg 1940-1945**

22. *The information released in 2000 by the Wallenberg archive, about Jacob's recollection of his approach to Walter Schellenberg, consists of a single handwritten page, a fragment with no indication from which larger document or archival collection the paper originated. The Wallenberg Family archivists state that the note was authored around 1980.*

**Where and when was this page fragment discovered?**

**Why do the archivists assume it was authored in 1980?**

**Are the missing pages preserved?**

**Please provide all available information about the document, including the full context of the original collection.**

23. *In his book *Secret Channel to Berlin: The Masson-Schellenberg Connection and Swiss Intelligence during WWII* (2003), Swiss historian Pierre Braunschweig alleges that Walter Schellenberg and Raoul Wallenberg met in Stockholm in 1943. This meeting would have occurred around the time Abram Hewitt, OSS agent and special envoy of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, visited Sweden to meet with Jacob Wallenberg, as well as Felix Kersten (1898-1960) and Walter Schellenberg.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg ever meet Walter Schellenberg in 1943?**

**Please provide all records about Walter Schellenberg's visit to Sweden in 1943; all correspondence with Abram Hewitt from 1943**

24. *In his book, Braunschweig hints at the possible involvement of members of the Wallenberg family in separate peace discussions involving representatives of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union after 1942. Ivan Serov, former chairman of the KGB, alleged in different drafts of his memoir that either Raoul Wallenberg or members of the Wallenberg family had traveled to Pskov in 1942, to meet with representatives of Nazi Germany, to discuss the possibilities of concluding a separate peace agreement between the Western Allies and Germany.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg or other members of the Wallenberg family ever travel to Pskov or surrounding areas in 1942?**

**Please provide all available records**

25. In 1948, Jacob Wallenberg issued a legal affidavit which was submitted at the war crimes trial of Walter Schellenberg in Germany.<sup>36</sup> In the document, Wallenberg outlined the assistance Walter Schellenberg had provided to him on several occasions, including Schellenberg's intervention on behalf of Jacob Wallenberg's brother-in-law, Count Arco auf Valley. Wallenberg made no reference to Raoul Wallenberg in the document.

**Why did Jacob Wallenberg not mention that he had requested Schellenberg's help to protect Raoul Wallenberg in Hungary in 1944?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence in connection with the drafting of Jacob Wallenberg's affidavit on behalf of Walter Schellenberg**

26. In May 1944, Iver Olsen, the U.S. Financial Attaché in Stockholm, alleged in an official memorandum he sent to the U.S. Treasury Department that over the course of the previous five months, the German Government had obtained large quantities of American dollars (\$5 million, equivalent to about \$50 million today) in occupied areas, including Hungary, at a "discount", through forced sale. In other words, the assets had been forcibly taken from persecuted Jews and other minorities. These dollars were then apparently sold at a premium in Sweden. The Swedish companies and banks that allegedly handled these transactions included SEB, Skandinaviska Banken, ASEA, Electrolux, Nordiska Kompaniet and AGA Baltic; all companies in the Wallenberg business sphere. A member of Swedish intelligence was to have been the "highly secret" source of the report. [\[Doc. 4,5,6,7\]](#)

**Please provide all records related to the German purchase and sale of U.S. dollars, obtained from occupied areas, including Hungary, via Wallenberg owned or controlled businesses and banks in 1944.**

27. According to Iver Olsen, the banking house of P.S. Josephson & Co facilitated many of the currency transactions with occupied territories during WWII.

**Please provide all records about P.S. Josephson & Co.**

**Please provide all correspondence with Per Staffan Josephson (1898 -?)**

28. Iver Olsen was known as one of the sharpest critics of the Wallenberg family's extensive business ties to Nazi Germany.

**What persuaded Olsen to hire Raoul Wallenberg in 1944?**

**Did Raoul Wallenberg's mission serve in any way as a way to help assuage U.S. concerns about the Wallenberg family?**

**Please provide all available records about Iver Olsen, 1944-1945; correspondence with Olsen's superior, the U.S. Minister in Stockholm, Herschel Johnson.**

29. During WWII, the Wallenberg family businesses acted as a front for German industrial assets, including those of the Robert Bosch Company.

**What did Raoul Wallenberg know about the Wallenberg brothers' cloaking of German industrial assets, including those of the Robert Bosch company?**

**What did he know about the Wallenberg controlled SKF's ball bearing trade with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the 1940s?**

30. Jacob Wallenberg maintained contacts with the Germany resistance, including the former Mayor of

*Leipzig and economic advisor to the Robert Bosch Company, Dr. Carl Gördeler*

**What did Raoul Wallenberg know of Jacob's contacts with the German resistance, including Carl Gördeler a.o.?**

**Please provide all available records, including all records, correspondence for Silvius von Albedyll, Deputy German Military Attaché for 1940-1945**

*31. Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg had close contacts with the Soviet Trade Attaché at the Soviet Legation, Mikhail Nikitin.*

**Was Nikitin informed about Raoul Wallenberg's mission?**

**What did Nikitin know about Sweden's ball bearing trade with Germany and the Soviet Union in the years 1942-1945?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence related to Mikhail Nikitin and the Soviet Trade Delegation 1940-1945**

*32. In his memoir, Lt.-Gen. Pavel Sudoplatov, a former high-ranking Soviet intelligence officer during the 1940s, suggests that Russian archives contain information about the Wallenberg family business dealings with the Soviet Union, during and after WWII. In 1942, Soviet payment in platinum for ball-bearings to the Stockholm Enskilda Bank was transported on a Soviet military plane to Sweden. Swedish military and intelligence/counterintelligence authorities should have been involved in granting the Soviet plane permission to land on Swedish territory.*

**What information about these permissions is available in the Wallenberg Family archive?**

**Were there other, still unknown transactions between Wallenberg businesses and Soviet authorities during the years 1940-1945?**

**Please provide all available records about the sale of and payment for Swedish ball bearings to the Soviet Union in 1942-1945**

*33. From September 1941 to August 1943, Boris Rybkin/Yartsev was the Soviet foreign intelligence resident at the Soviet Legation. He participated, in particular, in organizing a payment in platinum to the SEB for ball-bearings bought by the Soviet Union.*

**Please provide all available records about Boris Rybkin/Yartsev; all records related to the sale of ball bearings to the Soviet Union for the time 1941-1943.**

*34. It is widely known that in October 1941, April and September 1942, Waldemar von Oppenheim visited Stockholm as an Abwehr agent, stayed at the Wallenbergs, and used their Anglo-American contacts. During July 23-30, 1942 he also represented the Wallenbergs in negotiations in Paris about the transfer of the sequestered foreign stocks and bonds to the Wallenbergs. Soviet intelligence reported to Moscow about his visits to Stockholm.*

**Was Raoul Wallenberg acquainted with Waldemar von Oppenheim?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence with von Oppenheim for 1940-1945**

*35. In the autumn of 1943, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry official, Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky played a central role in separate peace feelers via Turkey and Great Britain. These discussions also involved Marcus Wallenberg. Raoul Wallenberg traveled to Hungary at the time of these contacts.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg have any connections to these secret contacts and discussions?**

**Please provide all available records, correspondence regarding the separate peace discussions in 1943 via Turkey and Great Britain**

36. On June 21, 1944 Raoul Wallenberg's calendar notes a meeting with "Erdmann".

**Was this a reference to Nils Erdmann of SEB?**

**If so, what did Nils Erdmann and Raoul Wallenberg discuss?**

**Please provide all available records**

## **II. Raoul Wallenberg's contacts and activities in Hungary 1944-45**

*1. In late November 1944 the Jewish Council informed Raoul Wallenberg that 500,000 pengös daily would be required to feed the Jewish population. Wallenberg turned to the Swedish Foreign Office and the Wallenberg Family to transfer a sum of CHF 480,000 (about \$1 million today) through the Swedish Legation in Bern. The Foreign Office was hesitant to involve its Legation in Switzerland and turned to SEB for advice. SEB refused to get involved in the matter. This issue is referenced in an official memorandum by Birger Zotterman from 1946 but is not included in the official publication of the Wallenberg archive regarding Raoul Wallenberg from 2000.<sup>37</sup>*

**Please provide all records regarding this issue and related documentation, including all original correspondence with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially Sven Grafström and Svante Hellstedt.**

*2. During the official Wallenberg Hearings in Stockholm in 1981, Marcus Wallenberg stated that he met Raoul Wallenberg when the latter returned briefly to Stockholm from Budapest in 1944.*

**Did Marcus Wallenberg remember the year correctly? Or did he confuse this with his earlier discussions with Raoul Wallenberg in 1943?**

**Did Raoul Wallenberg return to Stockholm some time after July 1944?**

*4. The Swedish author Iwo Wiklander claims that Raoul Wallenberg knew the Soviet Ambassador Alexandra Kollontay personally and that Wallenberg met with her in a restaurant in Stockholm's Old Town during WWII. Other sources claim that in 1944, Raoul Wallenberg had supposedly told Elisabeth Kemény, the wife of Hungarian Foreign Minister Gabor Kemény, that he had spoken to Ambassador Kollontay on her behalf.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg know Alexandra Kollontay personally?**

**Did he phone the Soviet Ambassador in 1944 on behalf of Mrs. Kemény or did he meet Kollontay in person? Or did someone else, possibly Marcus or Jacob Wallenberg, relay the inquiry for him?**

**Please provide all records about Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg's contacts and correspondence with Ambassador Kollontay in 1944.**

*5. In June 1944, the Swedish section of the World Jewish Congress asked for Jacob Wallenberg's approval of Raoul Wallenberg's mission which he promptly gave.<sup>38</sup>*

**When and why did the World Jewish Congress request Jacob Wallenberg's permission and approval for the project?**

**Is the formal request and Jacob Wallenberg's reply preserved in the Wallenberg family archive?**

**Please provide all available records**

6. While in Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg outlined plans for an extensive post-war organization dedicated to restitution of Jewish property and the reconstruction of Hungary.

**Who first conceived of the idea for such an organization and when?**

**Did Raoul Wallenberg discuss his plans with Jacob or Marcus Wallenberg?**

**Were Wallenberg businesses to be involved in the creation of this organization?**

**Please provide all available records**

7. In 1945, U.S. intelligence in Stockholm reported on a mutual intelligence sharing agreement with Sweden. Sweden would supply economic intelligence, "using representatives of large Swedish commercial and industrial firms which have agencies and representatives in Russia, Baltics and Balkans." [Doc.10]

**Were Wallenberg companies expected to play a role in these plans?**

**Was Raoul Wallenberg aware of these plans?**

**And was the new organization he planned to create in Hungary in 1945 to become part of this and similar efforts?**

**Please provide all available records**

8. Per Jacobsson repeatedly met with Hellmuth Ternberg on his trips abroad. Ternberg and other leading C-byrån officers, in turn, cooperated closely with the Abwehr, German military intelligence and counterintelligence service, including exchanging information about the Soviet Union. Since 1931, Jacobsson had served as an economic advisor to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), located in Basel, Switzerland, which provided him with crucial international contacts. They included, among others, the President of the German Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, and the German diplomat Adam von Trott zu Solz, a leading figure in the anti-Nazi resistance.

**What information did Jacobsson and Ternberg exchange or discuss?**

**And did Jacobsson and Ternberg provide information to Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg?**

**Please provide all correspondence for Per Jacobsson and Hellmuth Ternberg for 1940-1955**

9. In late August 1944, the Eric Björkman, Director of the Skandinaviska Banken and head of the Swedish-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, reported to Gösta Engzell, head of the Legal Department of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about an approach from Hungarian Nazi authorities about a possible deal involving the rescue of a number of selected Jews in exchange for Swedish war materials. The proposal was relayed to Björkman by Edmund von Pirkner, a relation of Ferenc Pirkner, SKF's Director in Budapest. It is not known if and how this offer was pursued further. [Doc. 13]

**Did Erik Björkman inform Marcus or Jacob Wallenberg of von Pirkner's approach?**

**Did Raoul Wallenberg have knowledge of these discussions or was he involved in some way?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence with Erik Björkman, Edmund von Pirkner for 1943-1945.**

10. Swedish companies, especially the Wallenberg family controlled ball bearing trust SKF, maintained close trade ties with Nazi Germany. In September 1944, when Raoul Wallenberg was conducting intense negotiations in Hungary with a number of Nazi representatives about Jewish lives, SKF transferred its complete ball bearing inventories on the European continent to Nazi German authorities. The Swedish author Staffan Thorsell has suggested that the continued transfer of Swedish ball bearings and other war materials may have been partial payment for a group of Swedish businessmen who had been arrested by the Gestapo in Poland in 1942, for aiding the Polish resistance movement.<sup>39</sup> [Doc. 12]

**If Thorsell's theory is correct, were SKF's deliveries to Hungary in 1944 part of this arrangement?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence regarding these transactions; all correspondence with SKF,**

**Budapest, especially Dr. Ferenc Pirkner, SKF's Director in Hungary; and SKF, Gothenburg; Harald Hamberg, SKF's Director in Gothenburg, Sweden for 1944.**

11. In her memoir, Margareta Bauer states that shortly before the Soviet occupation of Budapest, she was asked to burn all records pertaining to SKF. Ivan Danielsson, the Swedish Minister, had ordered the destruction of a number of official records at the time, but it is unclear if his order also included the destruction of the SKF documentation.

**Who instructed Bauer to do so and why?**

**Were Swedish company representatives of SKF or members of the Wallenberg family involved in this decision?**

**Did Raoul Wallenberg have knowledge of these actions?**

**Please provide all records regarding these transactions; all correspondence with the Swedish Legation, Budapest, including Ivan Danielsson, the Swedish Minister; SKF, Budapest, especially Dr. Ferenc Pirkner, SKF's Director in Hungary; and SKF, Gothenburg; Harald Hamberg, SKF's Director in Gothenburg, Sweden for 1944.**

12. Lars Berg stated in a formal letter addressed to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the war that Wallenberg had received "considerable assistance from the wealthy industrial Weiss Family", as well as from "Himmler's Special Representative (the SS-officer Kurt Becher -eds.) and controller of the Weiss family."<sup>40</sup>

**What kind of assistance was Berg referring to?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence for Kurt Becher for 1944; post-war correspondence with Kurt Becher; all correspondence with the Manfred Weiss Company, including Manfred Billitz; Dir.Soor; Konstantin Takácsy; Alfons Weiss; for 1940-1945**

13. When Dr. Lipót Ashner, the founder and Director of the huge electrical company TUNGSRAM, was kidnapped by German Nazi authorities, the U.S. War Refugee Board requested Iver Olsen to contact Wallenberg in Budapest to determine the specific conditions of the ransom demands. The negotiations were handled via Sigfrid Edström, Director of the Swedish company ASEA (controlled by the Wallenberg family) and the Swedish Foreign Ministry. A ransom was eventually paid via Switzerland, securing Ashner's release from the German concentration camp of Mauthausen.<sup>41</sup> [\[Doc.11\]](#)

**What was Raoul Wallenberg's role in these negotiations?**

**Please provide all documentation about the ransom negotiations on behalf of Lipót Ashner; correspondence with Sigfrid Edström for 1944; all correspondence with Dir. Popper, Director of Svenska Orion for 1944**

14. Raoul Wallenberg's personal calendar and addressbook for 1944 contains the name of Alfred Schäfer, Director of the Schweizerischer Bankverein, an old business contact for the Wallenbergs in Switzerland.

**Did Raoul Wallenberg know Alfred Schäfer personally and did he have contact with him in 1944?**

**Please provide all correspondence records for Alfred Schäfer for 1944-1945**

### **III. Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in January 1945 and the official Swedish investigation of his fate**

1. After the war, Marcus Wallenberg joined the Raoul Wallenberg Help Committee, a charitable organization founded in 1945 by K. Lauer to assist Hungarian refugees in Hungary.

**Why did Marcus Wallenberg and not Jacob Wallenberg join the Raoul Wallenberg Help Committee?  
Please provide all records about the Raoul Wallenberg Help Committee for 1945-1947**

2. In 1946, according to U.S. sources, officials at the Soviet Legation, Stockholm indicated to Swedish representatives that Raoul Wallenberg had done several "foolish things" in Budapest.

**Were Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg informed of this remark by Soviet officials in Stockholm?  
Please provide all correspondence with the Soviet Legation, Stockholm 1946-1947**

3. In 1945, Sverker Åström was put in charge of watching and assisting the former German SS General Walter Schellenberg who had found a temporary refuge at the home of Count Folke Bernadotte in Trosa. In August 1945, Marcus Wallenberg proposed to include Åström in a special task force Wallenberg was planning to create to deal with the U.S. investigation of Wallenberg family business ties with Nazi Germany. Åström does not mention or comment on any of these events in his official autobiography.<sup>23</sup> Åström was formally in charge of the Raoul Wallenberg case for many years during the 1950s, including during the crucial months leading up to the release of the Gromyko Memorandum in February 1957. Åström has long been suspected of favoring Soviet interests, although the charges have never been confirmed.

**Did Åström take on the task Marcus Wallenberg proposed in 1945?  
Did Sverker Åström discuss Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance with Marcus or Jacob Wallenberg in the years 1945 and beyond?  
Please provide all records concerning the creation of a special taskforce to deal with the U.S. investigation of Wallenberg family business ties with Nazi Germany in 1945; all correspondence with Sverker Åström for 1945-1947**

4. As early as November 1945, a group of Hungarian businessmen approached the Swedish government with an official proposal to assist in the reconstruction of Hungary. A Hungarian delegation which included several persons who had worked with Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest in 1944 (Hugó Wohl, Vilmos Forgács, M. Fleischmann, Ferenc Pirkner) came to Stockholm help raise \$50 million dollar starting capital for a company in charge of the giant rebuilding project. Ivar Rooth, the Director of the Swedish National Bank, Gunnar Myrdal, Rolf Sohlman and others were involved in the discussions.

**Were Wallenberg family representatives aware or informed of these discussions and did they participate in any form in the deliberations?  
Please provide all available documentation**

5. In late August 1945, Kálmán Lauer, Erik Björkman, the Director of Skandinaviska Banken and Gunnar Lagergren, Raoul Wallenberg's brother-in-law, were preparing to travel Hungary as part of a Swedish Red Cross delegation. At the time, Lauer reported that he had learned from Konstantin Takácsy, the Deputy Director for foreign countries of the Hungarian National Bank and Director of the Manfred Weiss Works who was on a visit to Switzerland, that Raoul Wallenberg was alive. According to Lauer, Takácsy stated that "he [Wallenberg] is in Russian hands, and the Russians need him for a trial, which the Hungarian

*government shall conduct with leading persons in trade and finance, persons who over five years are Germany friendly. Furthermore he indicated an official intervention from the Swedish government would not bring a result, possibly a private initiative could be of use.” [Doc.8]*

**Did Kálmán Lauer or Swedish officials inform Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg of Takácsy's statement?**

**If so, how did the Wallenberg brothers evaluate Takácsy's message?**

**Did they consult with members of the Swedish Foreign Office?**

**Please provide all correspondence with Kálmán Lauer for August 1945 -December 1945; all records related to Konstantin Takácsy.**

*6. Very little is known about how Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg assessed Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in 1945.*

**Did Swedish Foreign Ministry officials in charge at that time have contacts with members of the Wallenberg Family in 1945, to discuss Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance?**

**If so, who was involved in these discussions and what was the content of the exchanges?**

**Do the official registration/visitors' logs at SEB show any meetings with Swedish diplomats in 1945-1947?**

**Please provide the official visitors' logs for SEB for both Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg for 1945-1947.**

*7. Some questions remain about Marcus Wallenberg's contacts with Soviet officials, including his early efforts in April 1945 to inquire about Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts with the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm, Alexandra Kollontay. Kollontay, by that time, had left Stockholm and Marcus Wallenberg's letter was taken to Moscow personally by the Swedish Military Attache, Bengt Åkerren. The Wallenberg Family Archive has claimed that Marcus Wallenberg's letter, dated April 20, 1945, did not receive any answer. However, Ambassador Kollontay did reply, more than one year later, on June 7, 1946. In the letter she explained that she has no longer any influence in Soviet affairs. It should be checked, if there exists any additional correspondence between these two exchanges, because Söderblom stated on June 11, 1946, when he forwarded Kollontay's letter to Stockholm, that “in the matter concerning Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance I carried with me after my last visit home a letter from Marcus Wallenberg, Jr., written on my suggestion, to Mrs. Kollontay.” It had been Åkerren, not Söderblom, who carried the letter, as Söderblom confirmed in his letter to Erik von Post of April 30, 1945. Staffan Söderblom definitely visited Sweden again after April 20, 1945 (when Marcus Wallenberg wrote his letter). It is possible, however, that Söderblom is confusing both the issue and the date.*

**Why does the Wallenberg Family Archive apparently not contain Ambassador Kollontay's reply to Marcus Wallenberg from June 1946?**

**How many letters did Marcus Wallenberg and Alexandra Kollontay exchange and how were they conveyed?**

**When and how exactly did Kollontay or other Soviet officials respond to Marcus Wallenberg's inquiries?**

**Please clarify these issues**

*8. Swedish officials and businessmen had good contacts with high-level Soviet officials, dating from the negotiations of the first Swedish-Soviet Trade Agreement signed in 1940. SKF had a formal representation in Moscow until the 1930s and Rolf Calissendorf, one of SEB's directors, traveled to Russia on several occasions during the 1930s and early 1940s.*

**Why were these contacts apparently not used to inquire about Raoul Wallenberg's fate?**

**Why did Wallenberg family members or their representatives fail to raise the question of Raoul**

**Wallenberg's fate with Soviet officials during the extensive post-war discussion with various Soviet authorities regarding the conclusion of the Swedish-Soviet Trade Agreement in the autumn of 1946?**

9. Yngve Ekmark, the Director of the Swedish Match Company in Zagreb, and the Swedish Minister Ivan Danielsson raised the protection of the interests of the Swedish Match companies in Hungary and other Eastern European countries during their brief stay in Moscow in April 1945 with the Swedish Minister in Moscow, Staffan Söderblom.

**Did Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg discuss Raoul Wallenberg's person or his disappearance with Yngve Ekmark after April 1945?**

**Please provide all correspondence records for Yngve Ekmark for 1944-1947**

10. The text of a Soviet Politburo decision from April 1946 shows that Stalin offered Sweden "favorable considerations" if a Soviet-Swedish Trade Agreement could be concluded quickly.<sup>42</sup> The Soviet Envoy in Stockholm, Il'ya Chernyshev, briefed Swedish officials, including Sweden's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Östen Undén about this offer. Staffan Söderblom was in Stockholm at the time and met with Undén shortly after this conversation.

**Did Swedish Foreign Ministry officials or Soviet representatives inform members of the Wallenberg family of the Soviet government's offer at the time?**

**Please provide all relevant documentation**

11. A \$300 million Swedish-Soviet trade agreement was concluded in October 1946. Only half of the credits were actually used, even though during the years from 1947-1952, the Soviet Union was unable to obtain international credits. A more thorough analysis needs to be made what exactly led to the failure of the trade agreement's implementation. Closely connected to this issue are the complex trade ties between Swedish businesses and the Soviet Union after WWII.

**Did the Swedish side, and in particular Wallenberg owned businesses, intentionally boycott the Swedish-Soviet Trade Agreement after 1946?**

**If so, did the Wallenbergs hope to obtain favorable treatment in their dispute with the U.S. Treasury Department at the time?**

12. Compensation discussions between Sweden's political and business leader with Soviet authorities for lost businesses in the Soviet Union, including the Baltic State began in 1941 and continued after the end of WWII, well into the 1950s and even the 1980s. They also included the settlement of claims resulting from the huge Swedish Match Monopoly throughout Eastern Europe.

**Was the question of Raoul Wallenberg's fate taken up by Wallenberg representatives or other official Swedish representatives during these negotiations? If not, why not?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence related to these discussions, 1940-1954**

13. During the Korean War (1950-1953), U.S. investigators discovered that Soviet tanks were equipped with SKF ball bearings which had found their way to Russia via Swedish exports to other Eastern European countries. The Americans estimated the annual value of ball bearing imports by the Soviet Union via secondary channels at \$20 million (about \$200 million today); a sum large enough for the U.S. Ambassador in Stockholm to convey a formal protest to the Swedish government.

**What documentation about this controversy exists in the Wallenberg family archive and the business archive of SKF?**

**Did Wallenberg family members discuss the issue with U.S., Swedish and Soviet officials?**

**Please provide all available records**

14. *Hellmuth Ternberg remained in close contact with Jacob Wallenberg after WWII. He also made repeated inquiries about Raoul Wallenberg with returning prisoners of war in Germany.*

**On whose behalf did Ternberg make his inquiries? Did Ternberg report his finding to Jacob or Marcus Wallenberg?**

**Please provide all relevant documentation, correspondence with Hellmuth Ternberg for 1945-1965.**

15. *When the Swedish diplomat Arne Lundberg took over the official Wallenberg investigation in 1951, one of the first actions, according to his own account, was to meet with Marcus Wallenberg. It appears that by that time, Marcus Wallenberg was convinced that Raoul Wallenberg was dead.*

**On what information did Marcus Wallenberg base this belief and what were his sources?**

**Please provide all records about Marcus Wallenberg's discussion with Arne Lundberg in 1951**

16. *In 1954, Jacob Wallenberg apparently attempted to contact Soviet authorities via secret channels in Prague, in an effort to learn information about Raoul Wallenberg. Supposedly Jacob stated that he was ready to make "great sacrifices" to ensure Raoul Wallenberg's safe return.*

**What prompted Jacob Wallenberg's actions in 1954?**

**Was there any response from Czech or Soviet contacts/authorities?**

**Was Marcus Wallenberg informed about these contacts?**

**Were there any other attempts by Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg to contact Soviet authorities on Raoul Wallenberg's behalf in the years 1946 -1981?**

**Please provide all relevant documentation**

17. *Hellmuth Ternberg apparently played a central role Jacob's efforts to contact Soviet officials in 1954. So did the Swedish businessman Carl Hardeberg (1912-2005), the Director of Industridiesel. Already during the 1940s, Hardeberg was a close associate of Thorsten Akrell (1913-1980), Special Agent of the Swedish Defense Staff.*

**What exactly was Carl Hardeberg's role in 1954?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence with Carl Hardeberg for 1954**

18. *In 1954, Hardeberg and Ternberg also had the assistance of a Swedish businessman called Ernst Natander (1910-1980).*

**Please provide all records, correspondence with Ernst Natander for 1954**

19. *Swedish Foreign Ministry records show that Jacob Wallenberg was repeatedly involved in tracking a number of witnesses who had provided information about Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance. Witnesses also sometimes approached the Wallenberg family directly (Antti Turunen a.o.). In October 1954, Jacob Wallenberg sent a letter to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs about a message he had received concerning a potential witness for Raoul Wallenberg's presence in Russia. Jacob went so far to privately research the man's background and he asked the UD (First Secretary E.O.G. Vinge) to keep him informed about further developments.*

**Is this information preserved in the Wallenberg family archive?**

**Please provide all documentation**

20. Sverker Åström was formally in charge of the Raoul Wallenberg case for many years during the 1950s, including during the crucial months leading up to the release of the so-called "Gromyko Memorandum" in February 1957. At the time, Soviet officials were trying to conduct secret, behind-the-scenes discussions with Swedish officials via Finland, in preparation of an official statement about the Raoul Wallenberg case. These talks lasted from 1955 - January 1957.

**Were Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg informed about these secret, behind-the-scenes discussions?**

**Please provide all documentation regarding the secret discussions about Raoul Wallenberg via Finland and Turkey during 1955-1957 (Yerzin-Frey-Vladimirov); all correspondence with Georg Gripenberg; Sverker Åström; 1955-1957**

21. In 1961, Professor Nanna Svartz of Sweden reported that her Russian colleague, Professor A. L. Myasnikov, had revealed to her during a meeting that he possessed direct knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet Union. A second physician, Dr. Grigory Danishevsky, was also present during part of the conversation.

**Were members of the Wallenberg family informed of Professor Svartz's statement?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence for Professor Nanna Svartz for 1961-1980**

22. In the early 1960s, Jacob Wallenberg voiced his concerns to Tage Erlander, Sweden's Prime Minister, that the official efforts by the Swedish government had been lacking in conviction.

**What actions did Jacob Wallenberg propose to take, in particular and what was Erlander's reaction?**

23. According to Elisabeth von Seth (Jacob Wallenberg's niece), in 1965 Jacob Wallenberg planned to host a high-ranking Soviet official at his private residence (Malmvik), apparently with the intention of opening a direct channel of communication to the Soviet leadership.

**Who was this Soviet official and did the meeting in fact occur?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence for Elisabeth von Seth for 1945-1980**

24. In 1983, the Swedish Judge Gunnar Linnander was approached by a British intermediary who relayed information provided to him by a man called Alexander Pavlov. Pavlov stated that he had information that Raoul Wallenberg had died some months earlier, outside of Moscow. Another contact of the British intermediary was Henry Wallenberg.

**Did Gunnar Linnander or others inform representatives of the Wallenberg family about this approach?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence for Gunnar Linnander 1983-1986; Henry Wallenberg, 1983-1986; Peter Wallenberg 1983-1987;**

25. It needs to be more fully examined what led to Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev's decision in 1989 to invite Raoul Wallenberg's family to Moscow. Representatives of other foreign governments, especially the U.S. and Germany, also played an important role in promoting a resolution of the Wallenberg case, but few details have emerged about the actual deliberations.

**Did the Swedish government consult with members of the Wallenberg family before the visit of Raoul Wallenberg's next-of-kin to Moscow in 1989, or before the creation of an official Swedish-Russian Working Group in 1991?**

**Did members of the Wallenberg family discuss the official investigation with any Russian representatives, in 1989 and beyond?**

**Please provide all relevant documentation, correspondence with Peter Wallenberg, Erik Belfrage for**

**1989 -1991**

*26. In an interview with the Austrian magazine "Profil" in 2002, Marcus Wallenberg (Peter "Pirre" Wallenberg's son) defended his family's actions in the Raoul Wallenberg case: "What has been rumored publicly and what I have heard in my family make two very different pictures. ...My ancestors certainly supported the many initiatives on Raoul Wallenberg's behalf. More, than it would appear openly."*

**What initiatives or efforts did Marcus Wallenberg refer to?**

**Please provide information about all initiatives taken by members of the Wallenberg Family during the years 1945-2018 to establish the full circumstances of Raoul Wallenberg's fate in Russia.**

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# The Raoul Wallenberg Research Initiative RWI-70

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Formal Request to the Swedish Government and Archival Authorities on the Raoul Wallenberg Case

## GAPS IN THE OFFICIAL RECORD

The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD)




Photo Credit: Raoul Wallenberg's photo on a visa application he filed in June 1943 with the Hungarian Legation, Stockholm.  
Source: The Hungarian National Archives, Budapest.

March 26, 2018

## Introduction

In the years after World War II, the main task of solving the Wallenberg question obviously fell to the Swedish Foreign Office. It remained in charge of the case during the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With hindsight, it is clear that this choice was in many ways a double edged sword, especially when direct access to Russian archives finally became possible. While it provided Swedish diplomats and researchers working through official Swedish channels with the formal status and contacts required to pursue formal inquiries in Russia, it also revealed serious inherent conflicts of interests.

While Raoul Wallenberg's mission to Hungary in 1944 was primarily humanitarian, his work also involved other aspects, ranging from contacts with the anti-Nazi resistance to the support of wartime and post-war Swedish and foreign (U.S. and British) intelligence aims. If and how these additional dimensions of his work contributed to his arrest and possibly to the handling of his case must be determined in greater detail. Given Wallenberg's official status as a Swedish diplomat, these actions would have constituted a serious violation of Swedish neutrality.

Why Swedish officials in general so readily accepted rumors that Raoul Wallenberg had died in Budapest in 1944 when they had credible testimonies that he had been detained by Soviet forces and taken to Moscow, remains a question of central importance. New evidence suggests that in 1946, Stalin had signaled the Swedish government "favorable conditions" if a Swedish-Soviet trade agreement were to be secured in 1946. This fact challenges the prevailing notion among scholars that the Swedish government was simply too afraid to push the Soviet leadership for a clarification of Wallenberg's fate at the time.

Just as important is the question what Wallenberg's colleagues told Soviet officials about Wallenberg's contacts and activities when they themselves were interrogated by officials of the Soviet NKVD. The information would help to clarify whether there was an active attempt at the time to distance themselves and, by implication, the Swedish government from Wallenberg's work and contacts in Budapest.

Many unanswered questions persist about Raoul Wallenberg's relations with his paternal relatives, the Wallenbergs, especially the powerful bankers Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg. New information suggests that Raoul Wallenberg was not as inexperienced and unknown a figure as he has been generally portrayed and that he may have been groomed by both Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg to fulfill a confidential role in the Wallenberg business empire and possibly for the Swedish state. The question why the Wallenberg family and Swedish authorities did not bring their considerable influence to bear on Raoul Wallenberg's behalf therefore continues to loom large.

Most importantly, it must be urgently clarified what information Swedish officials possessed about the interrogation of a Prisoner no. 7 who was interrogated on July 23, 1947 for more than 16 1/2 hours and who, according to FSB archivist was "with great likelihood the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg." There are strong indications that Russian officials intentionally withheld the information from the Swedish-Russian Working Group that included Professor Guy von Dardel, Raoul Wallenberg's brother. It must be determined if Swedish officials were possibly aware of this information already then and why they did not insist on access to key documentation when they learned of its existence.

Closely related to this is the question whether the Swedish and Russian governments in the early 1990s actually intended to solve the Wallenberg case completely or if the main aim of the inquiry was to resolve the issue just enough to remove it from the two countries' political agenda. In particular, it needs to be clarified if an official Swedish-Russian Working Group that investigated the Wallenberg case for ten years (1991-2000) intentionally kept the Wallenberg investigation within certain limited parameters, (avoiding sensitive subjects, like the economic contacts of the Wallenberg family with Nazi Germany during WWII or the

Swedish government's support of Western intelligence aims during the Cold War), even though the documentation could have yielded important clues for researchers.

For reasons that continue to remain unclear, Swedish officials repeatedly did not push for disclosure of specific Soviet foreign and military intelligence records that could have provided important background information in the Wallenberg case. These include details about the Wallenberg family and their business activities during WWII, as well as Soviet intelligence reports from Budapest regarding the activities and contacts of Swedish diplomats in Hungary in 1944-1945, including those of Raoul Wallenberg.

An additional problem is posed by the fact that foreign governments can request to keep certain information related to the Wallenberg inquiry secret. One such example has been documented in the case of Israel, which in the early 1980s asked for certain witness testimonies not be shared, for fear that the information could reveal the Israeli government's extensive espionage operations in Eastern Europe. Other countries may well have made similar requests. Sweden, in turn, may have asked these governments for equal discretion regarding specific (Swedish) issues. It should be clarified in greater detail, for example, what discussions Swedish and Russian officials held before the visit by Raoul Wallenberg's family to Moscow in 1989 and the creation of the Swedish-Russian Working Group in 1991. Similarly, it remains unclear to what degree Swedish officials consulted members of the Wallenberg business family at the time about the planned investigation.

Surprisingly few Swedish foreign and military intelligence records have been released since 1945. As a result, researchers have very little information about what internal and inter-agency considerations guided Swedish decision makers in their approach to the Wallenberg case over the years. Events such as the account of Swedish Professor Nanna Svartz about her conversation with a Soviet colleague who allegedly told her in 1961 that Raoul Wallenberg was alive, the arrest of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerström as a Soviet agent in 1963 and subsequently, the sudden emergence of new witnesses in 1979 that led to a formal reopening of the Wallenberg case (after it had lain dormant for a full fifteen years) should have given rise to at least some comment and assessment by Swedish intelligence personnel; as should have Guy von Dardel's lawsuit against the Soviet Union in 1984 and the 1989 visit by Raoul Wallenberg's next-of-kin to Moscow, on direct invitation by Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev. However, very few such documentation has ever been presented.

A related question is whether ideological consideration affected Sweden's official approach to the Wallenberg case. In his recently published diaries, the former Legal Advisor to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Bo Theutenberg, raises the question how much influence still unknown KGB and Stasi infiltrators may have had on the decision making process in official Swedish institutions during the Cold War years.<sup>16</sup> Aside from failing to make effective use of the arrest of Stig Wennerström, the Swedish government also passed up a seemingly golden opportunity in 1981, when a Soviet submarine (U-137/S-363) ran aground in the waters outside of Karlskrona, in the immediate vicinity of one of Sweden's most highly advanced naval bases.

Just as important is the question what internal and external considerations continue to play a role for the Wallenberg inquiry today. It can be assumed that thanks to modern advances in surveillance technology, Swedish officials may well possess information about Wallenberg's fate that they have not shared with his family or the public.

## Selected Questions and Research Requests

What follows is a list of the most important unanswered questions on the Swedish side of the Wallenberg case, in particular information that should be contained in the archives of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD). Even partial answers to these questions could provide important clues needed to solve the mystery of Wallenberg's disappearance in Russia.

Swedish authorities should attempt to answer these questions and, if necessary, obtain the required information from foreign governmental and archival sources.

Two additional lists of questions and specific research requests will be submitted to different Swedish archives: the Wallenberg Family Archive (SEHFBF) as well as the archives of the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO), the Military Archives of Sweden (Krigsarkivet), the Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST).

The questions are grouped chronologically, according to the three main phases of the Wallenberg investigation:

- Raoul Wallenberg's personal and professional background and his selection for the Budapest humanitarian mission in 1944;
- Raoul Wallenberg's contacts and activities in Hungary in 1944-1945;
- Raoul Wallenberg's arrest and disappearance after January 1945.

**Questions** - in black

**Requests** - in mauve

## **I. Raoul Wallenberg's professional background and his selection for the Budapest humanitarian mission in 1944**

1. *Raoul Wallenberg appears not to have been as unknown a figure to the Swedish Foreign Ministry officials as has been generally stated. It has become clear that Wallenberg and his company, Mellaneuropeiska, fulfilled an important role in the Swedish wartime economy, obtaining crucial supplies of food and other vital goods (i.e. fuel) from abroad. During the 1940s, he regularly socialized with people like Cabinet Secretary Erik Boheman, the head of the Swedish Trade Ministry, Nils Ihre, a.o.*

**What contacts did Raoul Wallenberg have with Swedish government officials during the 1940s?  
Did these contacts influence the decision to send Wallenberg to Budapest in June 1944?**

2. *Åke Burchardt, a close friend of Raoul Wallenberg, has stated that Wallenberg had a "special task on behalf of the Swedish state" during the 1940s.*

**If true, what exactly was this special task? And what Swedish entity assigned this task to Raoul Wallenberg?**

**Was he referring to *Mellaneuropeiska's* role in securing special goods for the Swedish economy or other activities?**

3. *In 1943, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not renew Raoul Wallenberg's "Cabinet Passport" (Kabinettspass), a special passport that indicated the holder was traveling abroad on official (Swedish) business.*

**What precise concerns prompted the decision not to renew Wallenbergs "Kabinettspass"?  
Please provide all available records**

4. *Raoul Wallenberg's regular passport for 1943 has not been recovered.*

**What happened to Raoul Wallenberg's regular Swedish passport from 1943?  
On what passport did Raoul Wallenberg travel to Hungary in 1943?**

**Please provide all available records**

5. *Both Per Anger and Raoul Wallenberg maintained ties to U.S. and British intelligence representatives in Stockholm. The contacts included, among others, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) representative Iver Olsen, R. Taylor Cole, the head of the U.S. Secret Intelligence in Stockholm and Andor Gellért, a Hungarian journalist who worked at the Hungarian Legation, Stockholm. Gellért later joined the OSS Budapest City Team.*

**What did Per Anger know about Raoul Wallenberg's contacts to U.S. and British intelligence representatives?**

**What did he report about this issue to the Swedish Foreign Office?**

**What did Anger know about Wallenberg's contacts with Swedish intelligence representatives?**

**Did Anger himself have a formal or informal role with Swedish intelligence?**

**Please provide all available records**

6. *In his letters to Raoul Wallenberg in 1944, Kálmán Lauer pointed out the importance of attempting to rescue so-called "people of the future" (Zukunftsmenschen), like the son of the former Hungarian Prime Minister Vilmos Böhm. He also asked Wallenberg to seek out people with special know-how or technical skill who could be useful for the Swedish post-war economy. U.S. archival records show that American*

*officials were especially interested in rescuing about 1,000 employees of the Manfred Weiss Works which had one of the most highly skilled work force in Europe.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg receive a special mandate from Swedish or U.S. officials to rescue highly skilled technicians and other individuals of potential economic or political importance?**

*7. In 1942, Soviet payment in platinum for ball-bearings to the Stockholms Enskilda Bank was transported on a Soviet military plane to Sweden. Swedish military and intelligence/counterintelligence authorities should have been involved in granting the Soviet plane permission to land on Swedish territory.*

**What did Swedish Foreign Ministry representatives know about the Wallenbergs' deal with the Soviet Union regarding ball bearings and the payment in platinum in 1944?**

**Please provide all available records**

*8. After WWII, Gösta Engzell, head of the Legal Department of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, refused compensation claims from Hungarian nationals who had provided financial support to Raoul Wallenberg's rescue action with the argument that "Wallenberg's mission was not conceived by the Swedish state."*

**What exactly did Engzell mean by this statement?**

**Who conceived Raoul Wallenberg's mission, according to Engzell?**

**Please provide all relevant records**

## **II. Raoul Wallenberg's contacts and activities in Hungary 1944-45**

*1. In August 1944, Per Anger returned to Stockholm from Budapest for consultations.*

**Do any memoranda or reports exist about these discussions?**

**Please provide all available records**

*2. Minister Danielsson apparently made the acquaintance of Mikhail Kutuzov-Tolstoy, a White Russian national (with a Belgian passport) as early as 1943.*

**How did the two men meet and what information did Danielsson share with Kutuzov-Tolstoy?**

**Did Raoul Wallenberg know Kutuzov-Tolstoy from earlier trips to Hungary?**

**Please provide all available records**

*3. In 1944, the Swedish Legation, Budapest hired Hermann Grosheim-Krysko (Thomsen) as a translator, allegedly on the request of the Hungarian Police Chief Nandor Batisfalvy. Grosheim-Krysko had been working in Hungary since 1941, for the German Wirtschaftsdienst (the German Economic Administration). After his release from Soviet imprisonment in 1953, Grosheim-Krysko filed a request for compensation with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was granted.*

**What were the reasons and conditions for Grosheim-Krysko's employment?**

**What exactly were the terms of Grosheim-Krysko's compensation agreement with the Swedish Foreign Ministry in 1954?**

**Please provide all available records**

4. According to Jan Bergman, a man called "Enderlein" was also employed at the Swedish Legation, Budapest. "Enderlein's" profile fits that of Grosheim-Krysko.

**Was "Enderlein" identical with Grosheim-Krysko? If not, who was "Enderlein"?**

**Please clarify the issue. Please provide all available records about the man called "Enderlein"**

5. Edward Engeström, a Swedish businessman who resided in Hungary and Rumania during the war, was considered an agent for German interests in Hungary. He apparently reported on Raoul Wallenberg's activities and that of the Swedish Legation, Budapest for German and Hungarian Nazi authorities.<sup>43</sup>

**What exactly did Engeström report about Wallenberg and to whom?**

**What were the consequences of his reports?**

**Please provide all records about Edward Engeström**

6. The relationship between Raoul Wallenberg and Valdemar Langlet, the official Swedish Red Cross representative in Hungary, was seriously strained.

**What exactly were the points of the conflict between the two men?**

**What caused the strains between Langlet and the other members of the Swedish Legation?**

7. In the autumn of 1944, rumors of a possible separate peace agreement between Nazi Germany and British/U.S. allies were rampant in both Stockholm and Budapest. Raoul Wallenberg was clearly aware of these rumors and discussions and sent requests to Stockholm to ensure that Hungary's persecuted Jews received adequate protection under any arrangement struck.

**What was the reaction of Swedish and U.S. officials to Raoul Wallenberg's request?**

8. In late August 1944, the Eric Björkman, Director of the Skandinaviska Banken and head of the Swedish-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, reported to Gösta Engzell, head of the Legal Department of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about an approach from Hungarian Nazi authorities for a possible deal involving the rescue of a number of selected Jews in exchange for Swedish war materials. The proposal was relayed to Björkman by Edmund von Pirkner, a relative of Ferenc Pirkner, SKF's Director in Budapest. It is not known if and how this offer was pursued further. [\[Doc.13\]](#)

**Did Raoul Wallenberg have knowledge of these discussions or was he involved in some way?**

**Was German businessman Otto Braun, Veessenmayer's close associate, involved in this offer?**

**Was this proposal in any way connected to the approach suggested by Hungarian businessman Eugene Bogdanffy to the U.S. War Refugee Board in 1944, to use Otto Braun for the rescue of a number of Hungarian Jews?**

**Please provide all available records**

9. Swedish companies, especially the Wallenberg family controlled ball bearing trust SKF, maintained close trade ties with Nazi Germany. In September 1944, when Raoul Wallenberg was conducting intense negotiations in Hungary with a number of Nazi representatives about Jewish lives, SKF transferred its complete ball bearing inventories on the European continent to the Nazi German authorities. The Swedish author Staffan Thorsell has suggested that the continued transfer of Swedish ball bearings and other war materials may have been a partial payment for the group of Swedish businessmen who had been arrested by the Gestapo in Poland in 1942, for aiding the Polish resistance movement.<sup>44</sup> [\[Doc. 12\]](#)

**If so, were SKF's deliveries to Hungary part of this arrangement?**

**Were Raoul Wallenberg and his colleagues aware of these negotiations and were they somehow**

involved?

**Were other deals struck by Raoul Wallenberg and his colleagues in Budapest with Hungarian and German Nazi representatives that involved the transfer of Swedish war materials?**

**Please provide all available records**

10. In her memoir, Margareta Bauer states that shortly before the Soviet occupation of Budapest, she was asked to burn all records pertaining to SKF. Ivan Danielsson, the Swedish Minister, had ordered the destruction of a number of official records at the time, but it is unclear if his order also included the destruction of the SKF documentation.

**Who instructed Bauer to destroy all records related to SKF and why?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

11. Lars Berg stated in a formal letter addressed to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the war that Wallenberg had received "considerable assistance from the wealthy industrial Weiss Family", as well as from "Himmler's Special Representative (the SS-officer Kurt Becher -eds.) and controller of the Weiss family."<sup>45</sup>

**What kind of assistance was Berg referring to, exactly?**

**Please provide all available records**

12. When Dr. Lipót Ashner the founder and Director of the huge electrical company TUNGSRAM, was kidnapped by the German Nazi authorities, the U.S. War Refugee Board requested Iver Olsen to contact Wallenberg in Budapest to determine the specific conditions of the ransom demands. The negotiations were handled via the Swedish company ASEA (controlled by the Wallenberg family) and the Swedish Foreign Ministry. A ransom was eventually paid via Switzerland, securing Ashner's release from the German concentration camp of Mauthausen.<sup>46</sup> [\[Doc.11\]](#)

**What was Raoul Wallenberg's exact role in these negotiations?**

**Please provide all available records about the ransom negotiations for Lipót Ashner**

13. In one of his reports to the Swedish Foreign Ministry from August 1944, Raoul Wallenberg indicated that he planned to use his contact with the German businessman Ludolph Christensen to "to probe the highest German circles for future developments". Christensen's brother-in-law was the Nazi SS General Karl Wolff. Christensen traveled to Budapest in July 1944, to assist Raoul Wallenberg in his efforts to protect K. Lauer's relatives. During his stay, Christensen had contact with members of the Swedish Legation, especially Per Anger.

**What did Wallenberg mean by his statement that he would "probe the highest German circles for future developments"?**

**Did these plans refer solely to the subject of Jewish deportations from Hungary?**

**Or did they also refer to broader issues, such as how to find a quick end to the war, through possible separate peace agreements (between Germany and the Allies)?**

**Please provide all reports, documentation about Christensen's trip to Hungary from July - September 1944.**

14. Several witnesses have claimed that Raoul Wallenberg participated in high-level meetings of the Hungarian resistance, especially those of the Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom (MFM). He supposedly regularly met with Dr. Géza Soos, the leader of the MFM<sup>47</sup>; Guyla Ambrozy, head of the Hungarian Regent's Cabinet Office; Miklós ("Miki") Horthy, Jr., the son of the Hungarian Regent; Marquis György Pallavicini, Jr., a lawyer and businessman, a.o.

**What information did Swedish diplomats possess about Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with the Hungarian resistance and the circle around the Hungarian Regent, including other Hungarian aristocrats?  
How did they assess these contacts?**

*15. Some members of the Hungarian resistance have claimed that Raoul Wallenberg was involved in efforts to document Soviet atrocities committed in Hungary in 1944-1945. In addition, Vilmos Bondor, a former Hungarian Army officer, has claimed that Raoul Wallenberg had received and stored documents about the execution of thousands of Polish officers by Soviet NKVD operatives at the Soviet village of Katyn in 1940.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg and his colleagues at the Swedish Legation document Soviet war crimes?  
If so, how was the information stored and what has happened to it?  
What did Swedish government representatives know about these activities?**

**Please provide all relevant documentation**

*16. The Swedish historian Gellert Kovacs discovered that, apparently, Swedish diplomats played a significant role in providing Western Allies with intelligence collected by the Hungarian resistance. For this, a radio transmitter was used that was supposedly located in the Swedish Legation, Budapest. Information from Budapest was then allegedly passed on to the Allied air forces deployed on the island of Malta and was used for bombing barges on the Danube River carrying vital oil supplies for the German Wehrmacht. In addition, Kovacs cites reports about Raoul Wallenberg's alleged use of his diplomatic car for the transportation of weapons and ammunition for the resistance. There are also indications that Wallenberg assisted in the efforts to rescue Allied pilots whose planes had been downed in hostile territory. The involvement of official Swedish diplomatic personnel, especially Raoul Wallenberg and Per Anger, in covert operations would have constituted a serious breach of Swedish neutrality.*

**Was a secret radio transmitter located at the Swedish Legation, Budapest?  
Were Swedish officials aware of these activities? And if so, what did they know?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

*17. After the war, Géza Soos claimed that the Swedish Legation had helped him to forward at least two formal messages from the Hungarian resistance (MFM) to the Soviet government, on October 23 and October 25, 1944, respectively. Per Anger was to have handled the transmission of these communications.<sup>48</sup>*

**What was the content of the alleged messages allegedly transmitted by Per Anger? [Doc.17]  
How and when were they delivered? By whom where they delivered and to whom?  
Were these communications sent via the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Stockholm or in some other way?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

*18. Members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest, including Per Anger and Raoul Wallenberg, maintained contact with the Dutch Director of the Philips electronics concern in Hungary and Rumania, Lolle Smit. Smit reported to British Intelligence during WWII and was honored with an OBE for his contributions.<sup>49</sup> The Legation also had contact to a number of Dutch officers who had escaped from German prisoner of war camps and who aided the Hungarian resistance. One of these Dutch officers, Lt. Gerit van der Waals, was detained by Soviet military counterintelligence units. He died in Soviet imprisonment in 1947.*

**What exactly did the contacts with Lolle Smit and the Dutch officers involve and what were their aims?**

*19. Raoul Wallenberg had contact with members of a Hungarian resistance group referred to as "Achilles" that had ties to British intelligence.<sup>50</sup> At least one of its members, the Hungarian lawyer Dr. Karolyi Schandl,*

spent years in Soviet imprisonment. During the 1950s, he was held for some years as a numbered prisoner in Vladimir Prison.

**What did Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with the so-called "Achilles" group involve?  
Did his colleagues at the Swedish Legation, Budapest know about these contacts?**

20. Otto Prade, who worked as a driver at the Swedish Legation, Budapest, testified that he had been interrogated by a Soviet officer in 1945.<sup>51</sup> The officer wanted to know to what extent "the Swedes had collaborated with the Hungarians and with the Germans, and especially what the British had been doing at the Legation." Franz R. Gfrorner - an Abwehr agent with contacts to Allied Intelligence in Budapest during the 1940s - stated to Soviet interrogators that "Sweden, along with other foreign Legation worked for Anglo-American Intelligence, directly or as couriers."<sup>52</sup>

**What British contacts did the Swedish Legation, Budapest maintain?  
Who were the couriers Gfrorner referred to (other than Thorsten Akrell and Per Anger)?**

**Please provide all available records**

21. The Soviet officer who questioned Otto Prade also alleged that Raoul Wallenberg "had delivered Jews to the Gestapo" and asked how much Heinrich Himmler had paid [Wallenberg] for this work. The officer also claimed that Raoul Wallenberg "would never see Hungary or Sweden again."

**How did Swedish authorities assess this report?  
Did Raoul Wallenberg have any direct or indirect contacts to Heinrich Himmler (possibly via Kurt Becher or Walter Schellenberg)?  
Who was the Soviet officer who interrogated Prade?**

**Please provide all available records**

22. In late November 1944 the Jewish Council informed Raoul Wallenberg that 500,000 pengös daily would be required to feed the Jewish population. Wallenberg turned to the Swedish Foreign Office and the Wallenberg Family to transfer the sum of 480,000 CHF (\$1 million today) through the Swedish Legation in Bern. The Foreign Office was hesitant to involve its Legation in Switzerland and turned to SEB for advice. SEB refused to get involved in the matter.<sup>53</sup>

**Please provide all records regarding this issue and related documentation, including all original correspondence with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially Sven Grafström and Svante Hellstedt.**

23. While in Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg outlined plans for an extensive post-war organization dedicated to restitution of Jewish property and the reconstruction of Hungary.

**Who first conceived of the idea for such an organization and when?  
Were Swedish Foreign Ministry officials informed about these plans? If so, how did they assess them?**

24. The Swedish Legation, Budapest stored valuables, including jewelry and art belonging to Hungarian as well as German citizens in the main Legation building and associated houses. It is documented, that the Swedish Legation, Tokyo also stored so called "country deposits"(gold bars). The Legation had obtained the gold as payment from the Japanese government for specific services, a.o.<sup>54</sup>

**Aside from the "private deposits" of valuables like jewelry and paintings, did the Swedish Legation, Budapest also maintain a storage of "country deposits"(gold bars), as is documented about the Swedish Legation in Tokyo in 1945?**

**Please provide all available records**

25. Hungarian photographer Tamás Veres reported after the war that he, on Raoul Wallenberg's orders, took photographs of advancing Soviet troops in late 1944 and early 1945.

**What was the purpose behind Wallenberg's instruction?**

**What happened to Veres's photos?**

26. CIA records cite reports from Budapest that at the end of 1944, Raoul Wallenberg placed himself "under the protection of the German SS".

**Is this assertion true or false?**

**If true, how did Swedish officials assess this information?**

**Were Swedish Foreign Ministry officials aware of Jacob Wallenberg's request in 1944 to German SS General Walter Schellenberg, to seek protection for Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest?**

27. After the war, there were unconfirmed rumors that Raoul Wallenberg and the Swedish Legation may have provided Nazi German and Hungarian authorities with special information (about U.S. and British plans for separate peace negotiations; about Soviet troop movement; and other information regarding the Soviet Union). Similarly, there were allegations that Wallenberg's organization had provided protective papers to Nazi officials, possibly in exchange for favors connected to the Swedish rescue action.

**Do Swedish officials possess any information to confirm or dismiss these rumors?**

### **III. Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in January 1945 and the official Swedish investigation of his fate**

1. In 1945, the Swedish Minister in Budapest, Carl Danielsson, appointed Mikhail Kutuzov-Tolstoy as Swedish chargé d'affaires. Kutuzov-Tolstoy worked with the Swedish Red Cross in Hungary in 1944.

**Why was Raoul Wallenberg not given adequate formal (diplomatic) protection in 1945 when his diplomatic passport expired in December 1944?**

**Why did Minister Danielsson not appoint Wallenberg as chargé d'affaires?**

2. According to several different sources, Raoul Wallenberg carried certain unidentified documents and possibly valuables, i.e. cash and jewelry, with him on his trip to Debrecen in January 1945. In an interview after the war, Tamás Veres stated that Raoul Wallenberg regularly carried large sums of cash and gold with him in his car.

**What kind of documents and valuables did Raoul Wallenberg carry with him on his way to Debrecen in January 1945?**

**What has happened to the items and to his car?**

**Why did he apparently leave other valuables behind, such as diamonds and a package containing cash and an engagement ring Wallenberg had custom made?**

3. In May 1945, the U.S. General William Key reported to the U.S. Department of State that the two Swiss diplomats, Max Meier and Harald Feller, who were also detained by Soviet authorities in Hungary in January 1945, were suspected of collaboration with Nazi authorities. According to the Swiss historian

*Shraga Elam, Meier and Feller had knowledge of a special fund maintained by representatives of German heavy industry during the 1930s and 40s. This fund, referred to as the "Ruhrschatz" or "Ruhrfond", was to have valued up 1,6 billion Goldmark (about CHF 1 billion). According to the statements of a German Jewish émigré, J. Ganz, who testified in Switzerland in 1945, this fund "was moved to Switzerland with the assistance of the Swiss Legation Secretary Harald Feller." Parts of the money was also to have been transferred via Hungary. Bert Wyler, communist Swiss journalist, repeated these charges against Feller in the Swiss press, raising questions whether the claim originated in the Soviet Union.*

**Did such a special fund of German industry ever exist?**

**If so, was Harald Feller involved in the handling of this fund in any way?**

**Did Raoul Wallenberg and his colleagues have knowledge of this fund?**

**Did Swedish Foreign Ministry officials have knowledge of this fund?**

*4. Valdemar Langlet helped to protect several Hungarian officials, including members of the Hungarian resistance, such as István Ujszászi, the Hungarian Regent's Intelligence and Security Chief. The Swedish Legation also provided assistance in hiding the whereabouts of former Hungarian Prime Minister István Bethlen.<sup>55</sup>*

**What information did Valdemar and Nina Langlet provide to Soviet authorities about these efforts, as well as the work of the Swedish Legation, Budapest and that of Raoul Wallenberg when they were questioned by Soviet military representatives in 1945?**

**Why was Valdemar Langlet released while the other Swedish Legation personnel was transferred to Moscow?**

**What did Swedish officials learn about these issues in 1945?**

**Please provide all available documentaton. It is known that István Bethlen's investigation file is at least partially preserved in the archives of the Russian State Security Service (FSB). Swedish officials should request direct access to his file contained in a so-called "operative correspondence" of the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MGB) for 1946-1947(PF-9653).**

*5. On March 9, 1945, the Swedish Minister Danielsson made a formal request to meet with the Soviet Major General Ivan Pavlov. At the time, General Pavlov commanded the Directorate of NKVD Troops Guarding the Rear of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ukrainian Front. In his letter, Danielsson stated that he wished to discuss the activities of the Swedish Legation, Budapest, as they related to Sweden's official representation of Soviet interests in Hungary.<sup>56</sup>*

**Was the timing of the request a coincidence? It occurred the day after Hungary's Radio Kossuth - which was broadcast from Moscow at the time - had announced that Raoul Wallenberg had been murdered by the Gestapo.**

**What exactly did Minister Danielsson tell General Pavlov about the contacts and activities of the Swedish Legation, and Raoul Wallenberg in particular?**

**Please provide all available records.**

*6. In early 1945, the Kossuth Radio station transmitted its information from Moscow, and Zoltan Szanto was editor-in-chief.<sup>57</sup>*

**Were Swedish officials aware in March 1945 of the fact that the Radio Kossuth information came from Moscow, and not from Budapest?**

*7. In early 1945, Per Anger and Lars Berg were interrogated by representatives of the Soviet NKVD in Hungary.*

**What did Anger and Berg tell Soviet officials about the work of the Swedish Legation, Budapest in 1944-1945 and Raoul Wallenberg's actions in particular?**

**What did they, as well as Ivan Danielsson, report to Staffan Söderblom, the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, in April 1945?**

**Please provide all available records. Information and reports about the interrogations of Raoul Wallenberg's colleagues with Soviet NKVD officials are available in Russian foreign and military intelligence archives. Swedish officials should request a copy of these records.**

*8. The Swedish historian and archivist Göran Rydeberg has argued that the increased Swedish-Soviet tensions in the Baltic countries at the end of WWII raised the specter of Soviet blackmail. "If there were Swedish fears of Soviet aggression, it would conceivably have led to a wish to distance the Swedish personnel from Wallenberg's activities", Rydeberg wrote in 2000.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg's colleagues distance themselves from Wallenberg's activities during their interrogations by Soviet representatives?**

**Was Raoul Wallenberg left to take the blame for any real or perceived transgressions committed by him and/or the Swedish Legation, Hungary? These supposedly included the neglect of Soviet prisoners of war under the care of Legation officials; secret support of British and American intelligence projects aimed at curtailing future Soviet influence in Hungary; the maintaining of economic relations with Nazi Germany; as well as the provision of Swedish protection papers to a number of German and Hungarian Nazi officials.**

*9. Raoul Wallenberg's diplomatic colleagues returned to Stockholm in April 1945.*

**What information did they provide to Swedish officials about Raoul Wallenberg's work and contacts in Budapest?**

**Were the Swedish Legation members formally debriefed? If so, where are the full reports?**

**Why did Minister Danielsson initially refuse to meet with Raoul Wallenberg's mother, Maj von Dardel?**

*10. In April 1945, Christian Günther was Sweden's Foreign Minister.*

**What did he learn about the events in Budapest in 1944-45 from Wallenberg's colleagues?**

*11. According to several sources, U.S. officials were eager to retrieve Raoul Wallenberg's papers from Budapest in 1945. A few pages of this material were later included and referenced in Jenö Levai's account of Raoul Wallenberg's work in Budapest (1947). Some of the papers have since disappeared.*

**What happened to Wallenberg's personal papers files?**

**How were these files organized and how were they stored in Budapest in 1944?**

**What information did they contain?**

*12. The actions of the Swedish Envoy in Moscow in 1945-46, Staffan Söderblom remain of considerable interest.*

**Did Söderblom receive any specific instructions from his superiors during his three trips home to Sweden in 1945-1946?**

**Why did he suddenly accuse Raoul Wallenberg of "sneaking over" to the Russian side in April 1945, when it is clear that Wallenberg had specifically requested Swedish Minister Danielsson's permission to contact Soviet military authorities?**

**Why was this false impression allowed to persist after 1945, even though Per Anger had clarified Wallenberg's actions after his return to Stockholm?**

13. Before his discussions with the Soviet diplomat Abramov in December 1945, Staffan Söderblom apparently discussed the question of Raoul Wallenberg's with Alexandra Kollontay in Moscow. According to his report, Söderblom stated to Abramov that Ambassador Kollontay agreed that Söderblom should approach Abramov with a specific request for Soviet authorities to issue a statement that Raoul Wallenberg had died in Budapest some months earlier. Söderblom's memo seems to suggest that his approach to Abramov was well prepared and not a spur-of-the moment decision.

**What was the content of the discussions between Ambassador Kollontay and Staffan Söderblom in November-December 1945?**

**Did Söderblom brief his superiors in Stockholm about his conversations with Kollontay?**

**Please provide all available records**

14. In 1946, according to U.S. sources, officials at the Soviet Legation, Stockholm indicated to Swedish representatives that Raoul Wallenberg had done several "foolish things" in Budapest.<sup>58</sup>

**Who at the Swedish Foreign Ministry was aware of these remarks at the time?**

**How did Swedish officials assess these comments?**

**Please provide all available records**

15. In May 1945, General William Key, the U.S. Representative of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, was informed by his Soviet counterpart, Major General Lyovushkin, head of the ACC Headquarters, that Raoul Wallenberg "almost certainly" had been detained by Soviet military forces.<sup>59</sup>

**Was the information General Key received from General Lyovushkin forwarded to Swedish authorities?**

**If so, how was it transmitted and when and to whom?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

16. The role of Swedish diplomat Sverker Åström, should be examined in greater detail. Åström was one of the first Swedish diplomats on the scene in Moscow, after Wallenberg's was detained in January 1945. Åström had been selected to accompany the Soviet Ambassador Alexandra Kollontay home to Moscow when she was relieved of her duties in March 1945. Åström was apparently in still in Moscow when the members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest came through, on their way home to Stockholm.

**Did Åström at this time discuss the events in Hungary or the fact that Raoul Wallenberg was missing with Staffan Söderblom?**

**What did Åström report about his stay in Moscow to his superiors in Stockholm?**

**Please provide all available records about Åström's trip to Moscow in March 1945**

17. Upon his return to Sweden, Åström was put in charge of watching and assisting the German SS General Walter Schellenberg who had found a temporary refuge at the home of Count Folke Bernadotte in Trosa. In August 1945, Marcus Wallenberg proposed to include Åström in a special task force Wallenberg was planning to create to deal with the U.S. investigation of Wallenberg family business ties with Nazi Germany. Åström does not mention or comment on any of these events in his official autobiography.<sup>23</sup>

**Please provide all records about Marcus Wallenberg's apparent request to include Sverker Åström in a special taskforce dealing with the U.S. investigation of Wallenberg family business contacts during WWII.**

**Please provide all available documentation about Sverker Åström's contacts and discussions with the SS General Walter Schellenberg in 1945; all records for Erik von Post for 1944-1945.**

18. Swedish diplomats submitted no less than 17 formal inquiries on behalf of the Swedish journalist Eduard af Sandeberg, who was arrested in Berlin at the end of May 1945 and had been detained in the Soviet Union from June 1945 to April 1946.

**Why did Swedish officials make considerably less inquiries for Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, from 1945-47, than for af Sandeberg from June 1945-April 1946?**

19. In late August 1945, Kálmán Lauer and Gunnar Lagergren, Raoul Wallenberg's brother-in-law, were preparing to travel Hungary as part of a Swedish Red Cross delegation. Lauer reported that he had learned from Konstantin Takácsy, the Deputy Director for foreign countries of the Hungarian National Bank and Director of the Manfred Weiss Works who was on a visit to Switzerland, that Raoul Wallenberg was alive. According to Lauer, Takácsy stated that "he [Wallenberg] is in Russian hands, and the Russians need him for a trial, which the Hungarian government shall conduct with leading persons in trade and finance, persons who over five years are Germany friendly. Furthermore he indicated an official intervention from the Swedish government would not bring a result, possibly a private initiative could be of use." [Doc. 8]

**How did Swedish officials assess Konstantin Takácsy's message?**

**Did they discuss the content of his message with members of Raoul Wallenberg's immediate family or other representatives of the Wallenberg business family?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

20. Lauer's information was immediately passed to the U.S. State Department. Swedish officials apparently stated in their message to U.S. officials that "even if [Takácsy's] information is true, the Soviets will never produce Wallenberg alive." [Doc.9]

**On what information did Swedish officials base this remark?**

**Why were Swedish officials so ready to accept the often confusing and contradictory reports that Raoul Wallenberg had died in Hungary, when they had several reports indicating that he had been taken into Soviet custody?**

**Please provide all available records**

21. The role and attitudes of Swedish Foreign Minister Östen in the Wallenberg case require additional examination.

**Why did Undén refuse to raise the question of Wallenberg's fate with Soviet officials during meetings at the U.N. in 1946; the negotiations for a Swedish-Russian Trade Agreement; or in connection with the repatriation of thousands of Soviet prisoners of war held in Norway via Swedish territory that same year?**

**Why did Undén never make a direct inquiry about Raoul Wallenberg to high-level Soviet government officials like Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov a.o.?**

22. On April 30, 1946, Staffan Söderblom reported to Stockholm that during a meeting with the Soviet diplomat Abramov, the latter had clearly linked the case of Lydia Makarova (a young Soviet girl detained in Sweden) with that of Raoul Wallenberg.

**Why did Undén not respond to this apparent linking of the two cases by a high-ranking Soviet diplomat?**

23. Very little is known about how Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg assessed Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in 1945.

**Did Swedish Foreign Ministry officials in charge of the Raoul Wallenberg case at that time consult with**

**members of the Wallenberg Family regarding Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance?  
If so, who were the Swedish officials involved and what was the content of these discussions?  
Please provide all available records**

24. Some questions remain unanswered about Marcus Wallenberg's contacts with Soviet officials, including his early efforts in April 1945 to inquire about Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts with the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm, Alexandra Kollontay. Kollontay, by that time, had left Stockholm and Marcus Wallenberg's letter was taken to Moscow personally by the Swedish Military Attache, Bengt Åkerren. The Wallenberg Family Archive has claimed that Marcus Wallenberg's letter, dated April 20, 1945, did not receive any answer. However, Ambassador Kollontay did reply, more than one year later, on June 7, 1946. In the letter she explained that she has no longer any influence in Soviet affairs. It should be checked, if there exists any additional correspondence between these two exchanges, because on June 11, 1946, when Söderblom forwarded Kollontay's letter to Stockholm, he stated, that "in the matter concerning Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance, I carried with me after my last visit home a letter from Marcus Wallenberg, Jr., written on my suggestion, to Mrs. Kollontay." It had been Åkerren, not Söderblom, who carried the letter, as Söderblom confirmed in his letter to Erik von Post of April 30, 1945. Staffan Söderblom definitely visited Sweden again after April 20, 1945 (when Marcus Wallenberg wrote his letter). It is possible, however, that Söderblom is confusing both the issue and the date.

**How many letters did Marcus Wallenberg and Alexandra Kollontay exchange and how were they conveyed?**

**When and how exactly did Ambassador Kollontay or other Soviet officials respond to Marcus Wallenberg's inquiries?**

**Please clarify the issue**

25. In his memoir, Lt.-Gen. Pavel Sudoplatov, a former high-ranking Soviet intelligence officer during the 1940s, suggests that Russian archives contain information about the Wallenberg family business dealings with the Soviet Union, during and after WWII. The information is referenced in the diary of Zoya Voskresenskaya.<sup>60</sup>

**What did the Swedish officials know about secret payments made by the Soviet Union to Sweden and the Wallenberg Family during the 1940s, for the delivery of ball bearings?**

**Were there other, still unknown transactions?**

**Did they possibly influence the official handling of the Raoul Wallenberg inquiry?**

**Please provide all available records**

26. The text of a Soviet Politburo decision from April 1946 shows that Stalin offered Sweden "favorable considerations" if a Soviet-Swedish Trade Agreement could be concluded quickly.<sup>61</sup> The Soviet Envoy in Stockholm, Il'ya Chernyshev, briefed Swedish officials in May 1946, including Sweden's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Östen Undén about this offer. Staffan Söderblom was in Stockholm at the time and met with Undén shortly after this conversation.

**What did Undén tell Söderblom about his discussions with Soviet representatives and did the Soviet offer in any way influence the handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case by Swedish officials?**

**Did Swedish officials inform members of the Wallenberg family, especially Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg, of Stalin's offer at the time?**

**Please provide all available records**

27. In late 1947, Sven Grafström remarked in his diary that the Soviet government was, in fact, "afraid" of Sweden at the time, in the sense that Swedish political leaders would seek a stronger political alliance with the U.S. and other Western governments.

**Why did the Swedish government not take advantage of this position, especially in light of Stalin's offer from April/May 1946, and then August 1947, when Sweden finally received an official reply from the Soviet Union to inquiries about Raoul Wallenberg (the Vyshinky note)?**

**Why did Swedish diplomats fail to raise the question of Raoul Wallenberg's fate with Soviet officials during the extensive discussions with various Soviet authorities regarding the conclusion of the Swedish-Soviet Trade Agreement in the autumn of 1946?**

*28. Swedish diplomats and businessmen had good contacts with high-level Soviet officials, dating from the negotiations of the first Swedish-Soviet Trade Agreement signed in 1940. SKF had a formal representation in Moscow until the 1930s and Rolf Calissendorf, one of SEB's directors, traveled to Russia on several occasions during the 1930s and early 1940s.*

**Did Swedish Foreign Ministry officials ever consider using these channels to the Soviet leadership to inquire about Raoul Wallenberg's fate?**

*29. Compensation discussions between Sweden's political and business leaders with Soviet authorities for lost businesses in the Soviet Union, including the Baltic State began in 1941 and continued after the end of WWII, well into the 1950s and even the 1980s. They also included the huge Swedish Match Monopoly throughout Eastern Europe.*

**Did Swedish diplomats ever use these channels to inquire about Raoul Wallenberg's fate?**

*30. As early as November 1945, a group of Hungarian businessmen approached the Swedish government with an official proposal to assist in the reconstruction of Hungary. A Hungarian delegation which included several persons who had worked with Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest in 1944 (Hugó Wohl, Vilmos Forgács, M. Fleischmann, Ferenc Pirkner) came to Stockholm help raise \$50 million dollar starting capital for a company in charge of the giant rebuilding project. Ivar Rooth, the Director of the Swedish National Bank, Gunnar Myrdal, Rolf Sohlman and others were involved in the discussions.*

**What was the outcome of these discussions?**

**Did they in any way affect the official Swedish approach to Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

*31. A \$300 million Swedish-Soviet trade agreement was concluded in October 1946. Only half of the credits were actually used, even though during the years from 1947-1952, the Soviet Union was unable to obtain international credits. A more thorough analysis needs to be made what exactly led to the failure of the trade agreement's implementation. The complex trade ties between Swedish businesses and the Soviet Union after WWII are closely connected to this issue.*

**Did the Swedish side, and in particular Wallenberg owned businesses, boycott the Swedish-Soviet Trade Agreement after 1946?**

**If so, did the Wallenbergs and possible the Swedish government, hope to obtain favorable treatment in their dispute with the U.S. Treasury Department at the time?**

**Did it impact the official Swedish handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case?**

*32. During the Korean War (1950-1953), U.S. investigators discovered that Soviet tanks were equipped with SKF ball bearings which had found their way to Russia via Swedish exports to other Eastern European countries. The Americans estimated the annual value of ball bearing imports by the Soviet Union via secondary channels at \$20 million (about \$200 million today); a sum large enough for the U.S. Ambassador in Stockholm to convey a formal protest to the Swedish government.*

**Did Swedish officials discuss the matter with SKF representatives and members of the Wallenberg family at the time?**

**How extensive was official and secret Swedish-Soviet trade, conducted directly or via third parties and intermediaries, in the years 1945-1991?**

**Did it affect the official Swedish handling of the Wallenberg case?**

*33. When the Swedish diplomat Arne Lundberg took over the official Wallenberg investigation in 1951, one of the first actions, according to his own account, was to meet Marcus Wallenberg. It appears that by that time, Marcus Wallenberg was convinced that Raoul Wallenberg was dead.*

**Did Lundberg author an official report or memorandum about this meeting?**

**Please provide all available records**

*34. Sverker Åström was formally in charge of the Raoul Wallenberg case for many years during the 1950s, including during the crucial months leading up to the release of the so-called "Gromyko Memorandum" in February 1957. At the time, Soviet officials were trying to conduct secret, behind-the-scenes discussions with Swedish officials via Finland, in preparation of an official statement about the Raoul Wallenberg case. These talks lasted from 1955 - January 1957.*

**Why did Sverker Åström order the suspension of all behind-the-scenes talks via Finland with Soviet representatives regarding the Wallenberg case in January 1957, three weeks before the release of the "Gromyko Memorandum"?**

**Did Swedish Foreign Ministry officials inform the Wallenberg family of these discussions?**

**Please provide all available records**

*35. Sverker Åström has long been suspected of favoring Soviet interests, although the charges have never been confirmed.*

**Have the allegations against Sverker Åström been confirmed or not?**

**Please provide all available records**

*36. In March 1957, just a month after issuing the Gromyko Memorandum, the Soviet leadership disclosed the arrest of several [Swedish] Baltic agents seven years earlier.*

**How did this disclosure affect official Swedish attitudes towards the Raoul Wallenberg investigation?**

*36. Many unsolved questions persist regarding several behind-the-scenes discussions conducted by different individuals in Sweden and abroad, with or without the involvement of Swedish diplomatic representatives, to seek an exchange of Raoul Wallenberg or full clarification of his fate. They include:*

Staffan Söderblom - I.G. Sysoyev - A.N. Abramov	1946
Jacob Wallenberg - confidential contacts in Prague	1954
Pavel Yezin - Åke Frey- Viktor Vladimirov	1955-1957
Nanna Svartz - Alexander Myasnikov - Danishevsky	1961-1965
Stig Wennerström	1963
Wolfgang Vogel – Carl Gustav Svingel - Otto Danielsson	1965-1974
Gunnar Linnander – ‘Alexander Pavlov’	1983-1985

**The documentation concerning all of these discussions remains incomplete in both Swedish and Russian archives.**

**Please make all records concerning these discussions available to researchers.**

37. In 1954, the prominent Swedish Social Democratic politician and former mayor of Stockholm, Hjalmar Mehr, raised the Wallenberg case with the famous Soviet author Ilya Ehrenburg.

**What exact information did Mehr provide to Soviet authorities and what was he told in return?  
What information did Mehr report to Swedish authorities?**

38. The Swedish Ambassador to Moscow, Rolf Sohlman, and Foreign Minister Östen Undén told Soviet officials in 1955 and 1956, respectively, that all Sweden required was a declaration by the Soviet government that "Beria and his consorts" were to blame for Wallenberg's fate.

**Why did Undén and Sohlman suggest this wording to Soviet officials, instead of insisting on the full facts about Wallenberg's disappearance?**

**Please provide all available records**

39. In August 1956, an employee of L.M.Ericsson, Anatole Ericsson, was arrested as a Soviet agent. He was convicted of stealing vital technical information related to the newly emerging radar technology. Ericsson was quickly sentenced to twelve years hard labor in October 1956.

**Why did Swedish officials apparently not use Ericsson's arrest to press for clarity about Raoul Wallenberg's fate, even though Ericsson's arrest occurred shortly after Prime Minister Tage Erlander's official visit to the Soviet Union?**

**Please provide all available records**

40. In 1963, the Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerström was arrested as a Soviet agent.

**Why did Swedish officials not use Wennerström's arrest more effectively to seek clarity about Wallenberg's fate?**

**Why did Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, explicitly inform his Soviet counterpart in 1964 that Sweden "does not link the two issues" (Wennerström/Wallenberg)?**

41. There have long existed suspicions that Stig Wennerström was aided by one or more Swedish officials or military officers.

**Have these suspicions been confirmed or dismissed?**

**If they have been confirmed, who are the individuals in question and were they involved, directly or indirectly, in the inquiry about Raoul Wallenberg's fate?**

**Please provide all available records**

42. Colonel Wennerström was apparently already a Soviet asset at the time of Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in 1945.

**What did Stig Wennerström know about Raoul Wallenberg and what did he report to Soviet officials from 1945-1963?**

**What did Swedish officials learn about the information Wennerström may have passed to his Soviet handlers about the Wallenberg case, after Wennerström's arrest in 1963?**

**Please provide all available records**

43. In late 1963, Swedish officials received the testimony of a former prisoner in Vladimir prison, the U.S. student Marvin Makinen, who notified Swedish authorities upon his release that he had been told by a cellmate about a secret Swedish prisoner being imprisoned there some time before his own prison term

(1961-1963).

**Was a Swedish national or citizen held in the Vladimir Prison some time during the 1950s?**

**If so, what was the identity of this/these prisoner/s?**

**What did Swedish officials know about this issue?**

**Please provide all available records**

44. In 1961, Professor Nanna Svartz of Sweden reported that her Russian colleague, Professor A. L. Myasnikov, had revealed to her during a meeting that he possessed direct knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet Union. A second physician, Dr. Grigorii Danishevsky, was also present during part of the conversation.

**Why did Swedish officials never request to meet with Professor Danishevsky in the years 1961-1965?**

45. In the early 1960s, Jacob Wallenberg voiced his concerns to Tage Erlander that the official efforts by the Swedish government had been lacking in conviction.

**What actions did Jacob Wallenberg propose to take, in particular and what was Erlander's reaction?**

46. Just before the visit of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to Sweden in 1964, Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador to Moscow, told Soviet officials that the Swedish government "did not doubt the [Smoltsov] note from 1957." He added that the Swedish request should simply be considered "a completing check ... that could yield the same result as 1957."

**Why did Gunnar Jarring make this suggestion to Soviet officials in 1964, barely a year after Stig Wennerström's arrest, and in the wake of the statements by Professor Nanna Svartz?**

**Please provide all available records**

47. In 1965, Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander met with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. After this meeting, Sweden decided to formally close the active Raoul Wallenberg investigation. In June 1965, Swedish diplomat Anders Thunborg (an International Secretary of the Social Democratic Party and later Ambassador to the U.N.) met the KGB 'rezident' in Stockholm, Streltsov. Streltsov told him that "it was disagreeable that the [Swedish] Prime Minister once more had brought up the Wallenberg case", during his recent meeting with Soviet Premier Kosygin.<sup>62</sup>

**What was the full reasoning behind Erlander's decision to close the Wallenberg case in 1965?**

**Were there other efforts by Soviet intelligence officials before and after Erlander's visit to influence the official Swedish handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

48. To what degree ideological factors are to blame for the failure to fully resolve the Wallenberg case remains an important question. Aside from Sverker Åström, questions persist about Rolf Sohlman, the Swedish Ambassador to Moscow (1947-1964), former U.N. Ambassador Pierre Schori a.o.

**Did the well-known pro-Soviet/pro-Russian orientation of modern-day Swedish decision makers - many of whom ascended to key positions in the Swedish government during the last three decades - prevent a more effective handling of the core questions?**

49. The Wallenberg case was formally reopened only in 1979, when new witnesses emerged, including Abraham Kalinski, who claimed that he knew Raoul Wallenberg to have been imprisoned in Vladimir Prison during the 1950s. Swedish author Ingrid Carlberg describes in her 2012 Wallenberg biography that the CIA

*had intentionally used and promoted Kalinski's testimony, as part of its propaganda war against the Soviet Union.*

**What did Swedish officials know about this CIA strategy?**

**Did Kalinski lie outright or did he simply repeat widespread rumors that a secret foreign prisoner, possibly a Swede, was held in Vladimir Prison?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

*50. It has never been fully established how many Swedish citizens and nationals were imprisoned in the Soviet Union after 1945, and in which prisons and camps exactly they were held. It remains unclear exactly how many Swedish agents were sent on intelligence missions to the Iron Curtain countries after WWII. It is also not clear how many Swedish citizens living abroad were detained by Soviet authorities abroad, during and after WWII.*

**Please provide a comprehensive list of all Swedish citizen who were imprisoned in the Soviet Union from 1940-1991.**

*51. Questions also persist about other Swedish officials or persons representing official Swedish interests who, according to formal testimonies contained in the archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, were detained in Eastern Europe in 1944/45. These include questions about Swedish personnel who were allegedly detained in Sofia in 1944 when they were overseeing the transfer of German and Italian diplomats to the Soviet Union.*

**Who, for example, was the Swedish Prisoner "Eriksson" who was imprisoned in Vladimir Prison in 1950, according to the German witness Ludwig Hunoldt?**

**Who were "Eriksson's" two colleagues who were allegedly arrested together with him in Eastern Europe in 1944-1945?**

*52. In September 1944, Swedish representatives of the Swedish Legation, Sofia (Bulgaria) accompanied a train of German and Italian diplomats who had been interned by Soviet authorities, to the border with Turkey. According to the Swedish journalist Agne Hamrin, two Swedish representatives were detained by Soviet authorities. These arrests have not been officially confirmed.*

**Did Soviet authorities detain Swedish representatives in Bulgaria in 1944?**

**If so, who were the men and what happened to them?**

*53. In a diary entry from 1947, Sven Grafström claimed that "a Swedish citizen, who had been held for two years in a concentration camp, and whose existence was unknown to us" was permitted to return to Sweden.<sup>63</sup>*

**Who is the Swedish citizen Grafström note referred to in his note?**

**What did he mean when he wrote that the man's "existence was unknown to us?" To him personally or to Swedish Foreign Ministry officials in general?**

**How many 'unknown' Swedish citizens were held in Soviet imprisonment after 1945?**

*54. In October 1981, Swedish officials rejected the proposal and recommendation of Bo Theutenberg, the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Legal Advisor, to use the incident of a Soviet submarine that had been stranded in Swedish waters to press the Soviet authorities for full clarification of Raoul Wallenberg's fate.*

**Who made this decision and why?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

55. In 1984, Raoul Wallenberg's brother, Guy von Dardel, sued the Soviet Union.

**What were the deliberations and assessment of Swedish Foreign Ministry officials about von Dardel's action?**

**Did they seek the input and advice of Swedish intelligence officials regarding this lawsuit?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

56. It needs to be more fully examined what led to Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev's decision in 1989 to invite Raoul Wallenberg's family to Moscow. Representatives of other foreign governments, especially the U.S. and Germany, also played an important role in promoting a resolution of the Wallenberg case at the time, but few details have emerged about the actual deliberations.

**What considerations guided internal deliberations of Swedish officials and the discussions with their Soviet counterparts?**

**What, if any, preconditions were set for the visit of Raoul Wallenberg's family to Moscow?**

**Did the Swedish government consult with members of the Wallenberg family before the visit of Raoul Wallenberg's next-of-kin to Moscow in 1989, or before the creation of an official Swedish-Russian Working Group in 1991?**

**Did members of the Wallenberg family discuss the official investigation with any Russian representatives, in 1989 and beyond? If so, were Swedish Foreign Ministry officials informed about these discussions?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

57. The Swedish Foreign Ministry's Raoul Wallenberg case file contains some internal correspondence and case memoranda that shows how Swedish officials assessed the case over the years. Generally, however, it includes few documents that outline the internal deliberations among officials or illustrate the reasoning behind specific policy approaches taken in the Wallenberg question. This also applies to the work of the Swedish Working Group (1991-2000).

**What instructions did Swedish diplomats seek and/or receive regarding the Wallenberg investigation during the years 1985-2000?**

**Please provide all internal correspondence records pertaining to the Wallenberg inquiry during these years.**

58. The Swedish Foreign Ministry must have consulted with different Swedish intelligence agencies in connection with the work of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, the presentation of an official report on the Group's work in 2000, as well as the extensive inquiry into the official Swedish handling of the Wallenberg question by the so-called Eliasson Commission in 2003.

**What information and advice did Swedish intelligence professionals provide to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Raoul Wallenberg case from 1985 -2003?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

59. In 1991, a group of Swedish and Russian forensic experts examined the so-called "Smoltsov Report" - the note presumably authored on July 17, 1947, by the head of the Medical Section of Moscow's Internal (Lubyanka) Prison, Alexandr L. Smoltsov. With the note, Smoltsov informed the MGB Minister of State Security, Viktor Abakumov, that Raoul Wallenberg had died of a heart attack in his prison cell.

**Why did Swedish officials not request an independent forensic analysis of the Smoltsov Report in 1991?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

60. In 1992 a special Commission headed by Nikolai Arzhannikov, deputy chair of the Committee on Human Rights at the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, conducted its own inquiry in the Raoul Wallenberg case. The Commission issued a two-volume report. Unfortunately, the original report was destroyed in 1993, as a result of a fire in the Russian "White House" that started after Russian tanks shelled the building. **Please provide a copy of the two-volume Arzhannikov Commission report from 1992-1993**

61. The discussions between the Office of Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt and the government of Russian President Boris Yeltsin led to a formal agreement in 1993 to probe a number of unsolved historical issues between Sweden and the Soviet Union.<sup>64</sup>

**What conditions, if any, were set for the discussions?**

**What were the precise tasks of the various Working Groups and what instructions did Swedish officials receive regarding the inquiries conducted?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

62. Swedish diplomats supplemented the official Working Group inquiry with a number of parallel discussions with Russian officials, including members of the Russian intelligence service. Little information has emerged what exactly was learned in these conversations. Swedish diplomats also may have been provided access to documentation that was not shared with other members or consultants to the Working Group. The main examples are: the interrogation registers of the Internal (Lubyanka) Prison and Lefortovo Prison for the years 1945 -1947; the investigative documentation for Wallenberg's long time cell mate, the German diplomat Willy Rödel; as well as a number of [Russian] investigation files for individuals with close links to the Wallenberg case.

**What information exactly did Russian authorities provide to Swedish officials in the course of the ten-year Working Group inquiry that was not shared in the full Working Group?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

63. Ambassador Hans Magnusson, former Chairman of the Swedish side of the Working Group, stated that in 1991 he was permitted to review all registers (of interrogations as well as prisoners' belongings) of the Internal (Lubyanka) and Lefortovo prisons for the years 1945-1949. [\[Doc.16\]](#)

**What pages was Ambassador Magnusson allowed to review in the registers in question?**

**Why did he not notice the entry of Prisoner no. 7 on July 23, 1947 and the 16 1/2 hours long interrogation of Vilmos Langfelder and Sandor Katona, Langfelder's cellmate?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

64. During the time of the Working Group (1991-2000), Russian officials informed the Swedish side that Vilmos Langfelder had been interrogated for more than 16 hours on July 23, 1947 (by providing a typed list of Langfelder's dates of interrogation). They never provided a copy of the entry in the Lubyanka prison registers for July 23, 1947.

**Why did the Swedish side not insist on a full page copy of the July 23, 1947 interrogation registers during the ten-year Working Group investigation?**

65. In 2009, archivists of the Russian Federal Security Services (FSB) informed two researchers (Birstein/Berger) that a previously unidentified Prisoner no. 7 had been interrogated for 16 1/2 hours on July 23, 1947, together with Vilmos Langfelder, Raoul Wallenberg's driver and Sandor Katona, Langfelder's cellmate. The FSB archivists concluded that Prisoner no. 7 was "with great likelihood" Raoul Wallenberg.

**Why did Swedish officials not immediately insist on direct access to the Lubyanka interrogation**

registers?

**What internal discussions took place among Swedish officials when they learned of Prisoner no. 7?  
Why did neither the Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt or the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt take up the issue directly with Russia's President Vladimir Putin during their personal meetings in November 2009 and March 2010?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

66. It must be determined what exactly guided the actions of both Swedish and Russian officials over the years in the Wallenberg investigation during the 1990s.

**What discussions did Swedish and Russian officials conduct prior to the visit of Raoul Wallenberg's family to the Soviet Union in 1989 and the creation of the Swedish-Russian Working Group in 1991?  
Did Swedish and Russian officials intentionally keep the Raoul Wallenberg investigation within limited parameters (to avoid sensitive issues)?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

67. *Over the years, Swedish officials had a chance to obtain information from a variety of contacts and sources. In addition, top Swedish government officials such as the Prime Minister, the Swedish Foreign Minister a.o. have the highest security clearance, meaning they are cleared to review all information subject to the highest degree of classification.*

**What exactly do Swedish intelligence officials and diplomats know about Wallenberg's fate?  
More specifically, who among Swedish officials learned precisely what information and when?  
Do they possess knowledge today they have not shared with the public?  
What internal and external considerations continue to play a role for the Wallenberg question today?**

68. *During the 1990s, U.S and Swedish officials closely coordinated their approaches in the Wallenberg case. Few details of these deliberations have emerged so far.*

**What discussions did Swedish and U.S. officials conduct prior to the visit of Raoul Wallenberg's family to the Soviet Union in 1989 and the creation of the Swedish-Russian Working Group in 1991?  
Did U.S. officials consult Sweden before the release of U.S. intelligence records during the 1990s?  
Did Swedish officials request that some information regarding the Raoul Wallenberg case remain classified?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

69. *In 2000, the Swedish government issued a formal apology to Raoul Wallenberg's family for the failures of the official Swedish handling of Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance during the crucial years 1945-1947. Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson delivered the apology to Wallenberg's family during a phone call in January 2000. In the early 1990s Evald Hallisk, a former Swedish intelligence operative (T-Kontoret) who had been imprisoned in the Soviet Union for fifteen years, had requested and received financial compensation from the Swedish government for his ordeal.*

**What exact deliberations and considerations by Swedish officials prompted Persson's apology?  
Please provide all records, including all internal and inter-agency correspondence regarding Prime Minister Göran Persson's official apology in 2001**

70. *As part of the official Wallenberg inquiry, Swedish officials sought consultations with foreign representatives and agencies in Great Britain, the U.S., Finland, Germany, Hungary and Israel. The discussions covered a wide range of topics, including the identification and evaluation of witnesses in the case, interviews with Soviet defectors and requests for documentation from foreign archival repositories.*

**Please provide all available documentation**

71. In 1981, the Swedish Foreign Ministry consulted with a number of foreign governments about its planned release of documentation in the Raoul Wallenberg case. The Israeli government at the time asked for certain records regarding witness statements to be withheld, for fear that these records could provide insight into Israel's extensive intelligence network behind the Iron Curtain. [\[Doc. 14,15\]](#)

**What documentation have foreign governments asked the Swedish government to keep confidential during the years 1945-2018, regarding the Raoul Wallenberg investigation?**

**What requests have Swedish officials made to foreign governments regarding the release of information in the Wallenberg case?**

**Has Sweden requested other governments, including the Soviet Union/Russia and the U.S., to keep specific records classified? If so, which ones?**

**Please provide all available documentation for the years 1945-2018**

72. Some important information remains classified in the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Raoul Wallenberg case file. This includes interviews with former employees of the Soviet State Security Services who testified to the Swedish Working Group.

**Please allow qualified researchers and members of Raoul Wallenberg's family full and direct access to this collection**

73. Since 2000, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has received additional testimonies from witnesses in the Raoul Wallenberg case. Some of these statements have been included in the official Swedish Foreign Ministry's Raoul Wallenberg Database. Others remain unknown.

**Please provide a complete list of all witness statements received by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 2000 and provide copies of these statements.**

74. Since 1945, Swedish officials formally recorded/taped statements given by witnesses in the Raoul Wallenberg case. Only a few of such recordings have been made public.<sup>65</sup>

**Where and how are these recordings currently archived?**

**Please provide a complete list of all recordings made with witnesses in the Raoul Wallenberg case.**

75. In 2009, the FSB Central Archive released information to two researchers (Birstein/Berger), indicating that an as yet unidentified Prisoner no. 7 was interrogated on July 23, 1947 in the Internal (Lubyanka) Prison in Moscow. Raoul Wallenberg's driver, Vilmos Langfelder, was also questioned along with Prisoner no. 7. The FSB archivists concluded that Prisoner no 7. was "with great likelihood the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg."

**How did Swedish officials react to this statement?**

**Please provide all internal communications of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish Embassy, Moscow, including inter-departmental exchanges, as well as interagency and foreign correspondence for the year 2009 -2012.**

76. In 2012, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt ordered a formal review of the Raoul Wallenberg case. Ambassador Hans Magnusson was in charge of the inquiry.

**Please provide all available records**

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# The Raoul Wallenberg Research Initiative RWI-70

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Formal Request to the Swedish Government and Archival Authorities on the Raoul Wallenberg Case

## GAPS IN THE OFFICIAL RECORD

The Military Archives of Sweden (Krigsarkivet); The Swedish Security Police (SÄPO); The National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA); The Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST)




Photo Credit: Raoul Wallenberg's photo on a visa application he filed in June 1943 with the Hungarian Legation, Stockholm.  
Source: The Hungarian National Archives, Budapest.

March 26, 2018

## Introduction

Many records needed to shed light on the questions below were either destroyed or continue to be missing in the archives of Swedish intelligence, including those of C-Byrån (a secret intelligence agency under Swedish Armed Forces, 1939-1946; succeeded by T-konkoret), and the IB (a secret domestic intelligence agency within the Swedish Armed Forces), as a result of several post-war scandals. However, most observers question the idea that all relevant documentation has been lost.

While Raoul Wallenberg's mission to Hungary in 1944 was primarily humanitarian, his work also involved other aspects, ranging from contacts with the anti-Nazi resistance, the support of Swedish and foreign intelligence aims, to the pursuit of wartime as well as post-war business interests. If and how these additional dimensions of his work contributed to his arrest and possibly to the handling of his case must be determined in greater detail. Given Wallenberg's official status as a [Swedish] diplomat, these actions would have constituted a serious violation of Swedish neutrality.

It remains unclear how Swedish intelligence professionals and diplomats assessed some of the major developments in the Wallenberg case, especially in recent years. Events such as the arrest of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerström as a Soviet agent in 1963, and subsequently, the sudden emergence of new witnesses in 1979 that led to a formal reopening of the Wallenberg case (after it had lain dormant for a full fifteen years) should have given rise to at least some comment and assessment by Swedish intelligence personnel; as should have Guy von Dardel's lawsuit against the Soviet Union in 1984 and the 1989 visit by Raoul Wallenberg's next-of-kin in Moscow. However, no such documentation has ever been presented. As a result, researchers have very little information about what internal and inter-agency considerations guided Swedish decision makers in their approach to the Wallenberg case over the years. Of some interest also remains the question of the involvement of Swedish intelligence officers in espionage operations in Eastern and Central Europe, during and after WWII.

Swedish authorities have never provided a comprehensive list of all Swedish citizens held in Soviet imprisonment after 1945. It is possible that some individuals remain unaccounted for.

At the same time, improved means of data and intelligence collections after WWII suggests that more information may well be available to Swedish officials than has been released to researchers and the public. What exactly did Swedish officials know about Raoul Wallenberg's fate after 1945 and when did they know it? And, more specifically, *who* among both Swedish and Russian representatives knew precisely *what* and *when*?

To what degree ideological preferences are to blame for the failure to fully resolve Wallenberg case remains a serious issue as well. Future research will have to solve the question if the well-known pro-Soviet/pro-Russian orientation of modern-day Swedish decision makers - many of whom ascended to key positions in the Swedish government during the last three decades - prevented a more effective handling of the inquiry.

## Selected Questions and Research Requests

What follows is a list of the most important unanswered questions on the Swedish side of the Wallenberg case, in particular information that should be contained in the archives of different Swedish intelligence agencies: the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO), the Military Archive of Sweden (Krigsarkivet), the Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST).

**Swedish authorities should attempt to answer these questions and, if necessary, obtain the required information from foreign governmental and archival sources.**

Even partial answers to these questions could provide important clues needed to solve the mystery of Wallenberg's disappearance in Russia. Two additional lists of questions and specific research requests will be submitted to the Wallenberg Family Archive (SEHFBF) and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD).

The questions are grouped chronologically, according to the three main phases of the Wallenberg investigation:

- Raoul Wallenberg's personal and professional background and his selection for the Budapest humanitarian mission in 1944;
- Raoul Wallenberg's contacts and activities in Hungary in 1944-1945;
- Raoul Wallenberg's arrest and disappearance after January 1945.

**Questions** - in black

**Requests** - in mauve

**Questions and Requests that are addressed exclusively to specific archives are marked as follows below:**

The Swedish Security Police (SÄPO) - "S"

The Military Archive of Sweden (Krigsarkivet) "K"

The Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) - "F"

The Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) - "M"

## **I. Raoul Wallenberg's professional background and his selection for the Budapest humanitarian mission in 1944**

1. *A former employee of Baltiska Oljeaktiebolag by the name of Gertrud Larsson (1915-2008) has stated that in the early 1940s she was asked by Jacob Wallenberg to travel on confidential business to Estonia/Baltic region and that Raoul Wallenberg accompanied her on this trip.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg ever travel to the Baltic countries in the years 1939 - 1944, on a confidential mission?**

**Did Gertrud Larsson ever travel to Estonia/the Baltic region in the early 1940s?**

**Please provide all available information about *Baltiska Oljeaktiebolag* for 1939-1944; Gertrud Larsson (1915-2008) for the years 1939-1944**

2. *The Swedish economist Per Jacobsson worked for Swedish intelligence throughout the war. In September 1940, he delivered an urgent message to Jacob Wallenberg from Hungarian Jewish business owners who were seeking temporary "Aryanization" of their companies, to protect them from confiscation by Nazi authorities. The message was forwarded by Lipót Ashner, the Director of Hungary's giant electrical concern TUNGSRAM.*

**What did Per Jacobsson report to his colleagues in Swedish intelligence about the matter?**

**Please provide all available records**

3. *In 1941, Mellaneuropeiska's first office was located at Blasieholmsgatan 3, in central Stockholm. This also happened to be the address for Baltiska Oljeaktiebolag. The building was owned by Carl Ljungberg Stockholms Enskilda Banken's (SEB) long time Personnel Director. Ljungberg had been in charge of transportation and supply issues during WWI.*

**Did Carl Ljungberg have contacts or affiliations with Swedish intelligence?**

**Please provide all available information about Carl Ljungberg (1873-1975)**

4. *It needs to be clarified what exact role Raoul Wallenberg's company Mellaneuropeiska and associated persons/firms played in Sweden's Defense Readiness program (Rikskommissionen för Ekonomisk Försvarsberedskap) and the National Agency for Reserve Goods (Statens Reservförrådsnämnd) during the 1940s. According to Swedish author Jan Bergman, Mellaneuropeiska served as a cover for a number of foreign intelligence missions, carried out by Raoul Wallenberg, due to his ability to travel throughout occupied Europe.<sup>66</sup>*

**Did Mellaneuropeiska serve as a front for carrying out tasks not directly related to business matters?**

**Please provide all records about *Mellaneuropeiska* for the years 1941-1945; *Mellaneuropeiska's* contacts and work with the Sweden's Defense Readiness program (Rikskommissionen för Ekonomisk Försvarsberedskap) and the National Agency for Reserve Goods (Statens Reservförrådsnämnd), 1941-1945.**

5. *Bergman further argued that the deputy head of C-byrå, Hellmuth Ternberg, played a major role in Wallenberg's recruitment for the humanitarian mission to Budapest in 1944. Ternberg's brother, Egon Ternberg, was one of Raoul Wallenberg's godfathers.*

**Did members of the Swedish Army and the Swedish Defense Staff, including Hellmuth Ternberg, discuss Raoul Wallenberg's selection for the Budapest humanitarian mission with other Swedish, U.S. or British**

**officials in 1944?**

**Did they discuss his selection with members of the Wallenberg family?**

**Was the military training Raoul Wallenberg had received in the Swedish Home Guard (Hemvärnet) a factor in his selection for the job?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence for Hellmuth Ternberg; Egon Ternberg for 1940-1945**

*6. So far, investigators have only been able to conduct a partial review of the records contained in the archives of the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO) concerning various Swedish companies and businesses active during and after WWII.*

**Did a SÄPO dossier ever exist for *Mellaneuropeiska*?**

**Please provide all available information for the following companies for the years 1940-1945 (S)**

*Specialmetall Föreningen*

*Banankompaniet*

*Mellaneuropeiska*

*Svenska Globus*

*Baltiska Oljeaktiebolag*

*J. Nootbaar Jr (Hamburg, Germany)*

*P.S. Josephson & Co*

*The Pacific Trading Company*

*The Swedish Trading Company*

*AB Transfer*

*SUKAB*

*Baltiska Skinnkompaniet*

*7. The Norwegian born Carl Matthiessen (1886-1951) was an active supporter of the Norwegian resistance. He maintained close contacts with British diplomats and British intelligence representatives in Stockholm during WWII, including the British Minister Victor Mallet and the British Naval Attaché Henry Denham. He also had good contacts with Swedish intelligence officers, including Col. Carl Björnstjerna, head of the Swedish foreign intelligence at the Swedish Defense Staff until 1942. Björnstjerna was married to Sonja Wallenberg, Raoul Wallenberg's aunt.*

**Did Carl Matthiessen or his businesses provide any information or assistance to Swedish intelligence or Allied intelligence during WWII?**

**Please provide all records about Carl Matthiessen for 1941-1945; papers and correspondence of Col. Carl Björnstjerna 1939-1942**

*8. In 1942, Mellaneuropeiska was included on the British Statutory List. This official "Black List" of the British government included companies that were perceived as aiding Axis interests. Kálmán Lauer subsequently told the British diplomat Leslie Barber that Mellaneuropeiska would conduct business in "the most loyal way."*

**What did Swedish intelligence officials know about *Mellaneuropeiska*'s blacklisting by the British government in 1942?**

**Were Swedish intelligence representatives aware of Kálmán Lauer's remark that Mellaneuropeiska would conduct business "in the most loyal way"? If so, what was their reaction/assessment of this statement?**

**Please provide all records regarding the British Statutory List for 1942; all records for British diplomat Leslie Barber for 1941-1944**

*9. In April 1942, Lt. Thorsten Akrell, a special agent of the Swedish Defense Staff, requested a complete background check of Kálmán Lauer.*

**Why did Akrell order such a review in 1942?**

**Was the request made in connection with the blacklisting of Mellaneuropeiska?**

**What was the result of this check and where are the records?**

**Please provide all records associated with the official review of Kálmán Lauer ordered by Thorsten Akrell in 1942**

*10. Kálmán Lauer's papers indicate several contacts between Captain (Major) Cyril Cheshire, the British SIS Chief in Stockholm, and Mellaneuropeiska.*

**What did Swedish intelligence know about the purpose of the contacts between Cyril Cheshire and Mellaneuropeiska during the 1940s?**

**Please provide all available information about the person and contacts of Cyril Cheshire 1941 -1945**

*11. One of Mellaneuropeiska's main business partners was the German businessman Ludolph Christensen (1903 - 1983), an old acquaintance of Kálmán Lauer from the 1930s.*

**What kind of transactions and contacts did Christensen and his company, J. Nootbaar Jr., facilitate during WWII, in Sweden and with third party contacts abroad, including Hungary and Switzerland?**

**Please provide all information about Ludolph Christensen and his company, J.Nootbaar Jr., 1939-1945**

*12. In January 1942, Raoul Wallenberg spent several weeks in Paris, France.*

**Were there any aspects to his trip other than the one officially stated , i.e. selling a number of Swedish horses in exchange for a variety of goods to be imported from France?**

**Gertrud Wallenberg was seriously harrassed by the Gestapo at the time.**

**Was Raoul Wallenberg's trip to Paris connected with the arrest of Count Ferdinand Arco auf Valley, Gertrud Wallenberg's former husband, by the Gestapo?**

*13. In 1943, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not renew Raoul Wallenberg's "Cabinet Passport" (Kabinettpass), a special passport that indicated the holder was traveling abroad on official (Swedish) business.*

**What precise concerns prompted the decision not to renew Wallenberg's "Kabinettpass"?**

**Were Swedish intelligence officials consulted about this decision?**

**Please provide all available records**

*14. Raoul Wallenberg's regular passport for 1943 has not been recovered.*

**What happened to Raoul Wallenberg's regular Swedish passport from 1943?**

**On what passport did Raoul Wallenberg travel to Hungary in 1943?**

*15. During WWII, Swedish businessmen traveling abroad often reported to Swedish intelligence representatives what they had seen.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg report to the Swedish intelligence representatives about his travels in the years 1941-1944?**

*16. In the years 1943-1944, Hellmuth Ternberg traveled to Hungary on at least two occasions*

**What was the purpose of Ternberg's trips?**

**Who were C-Byrån's sources in Hungary in 1941-1945?** (aside from Nils Horney)

**Please provide all available records**

16. *Carl Matthiessen had good contacts to Hungary, including with the family of the leading Hungarian industrialist Manfred Weiss. Weiss's nephew, Heinrich von Wahl, moved to Sweden in 1944 and had close ties to Matthiessen, Salén and Lauer.*

**Was there a coordinated effort to protect the assets of the Manfred Weiss family and other wealthy Jewish business owners in Hungary?**

**Was the company Svenska Globus used to protect Wahl and Weiss family assets?**

**Please provide all available records about Heinrich von Wahl; Manfred Weiss, Svenska Globus for 1940-1945**

17. *In June 1944, von Wahl participated in discussions between Iver Olsen and Raoul Wallenberg, in preparation of the Budapest Hungarian mission.*

**What was von Wahl's role in these discussions and what kind of assistance did he offer Raoul Wallenberg and Olsen?**

**Did von Wahl have contact to members of Swedish intelligence in 1944?**

**Please provide all available records**

18. *In his letters to Raoul Wallenberg in 1944, Kálmán Lauer pointed out the importance of attempting to rescue so-called "people of the future"(Zukunftsmenschen), like the son of the former Hungarian Prime Minister Vilmos Böhm. He also asked Wallenberg to seek out people with special know-how or technical skill who could be useful for the Swedish post-war economy. U.S. archival records show that American officials were especially interested in rescuing about 1,000 employees of the Manfred Weiss Works which had one of the most highly skilled work force in Europe.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg receive a special mandate from Swedish or U.S. officials to rescue highly skilled technicians and other individuals of potential economic or political importance?**

19. *Åke Burchardt, a close friend of Raoul Wallenberg, has stated that Wallenberg had a "special task on behalf of the Swedish state" during the 1940s.*

**If true, what exactly was Raoul Wallenberg's special task?**

**Was Burchardt referring to Mellaneuropeiska's role in securing special goods for the Swedish economy?**

**Please provide all records for Åke Burchardt, 1940-1945**

20. *In his book Secret Channel to Berlin: The Masson-Schellenberg Connection and Swiss Intelligence during WWII (2003), Swiss historian Pierre Braunschweig alleges that Walter Schellenberg and Raoul Wallenberg met in Stockholm in 1943. This meeting would have occurred around the time Abram Hewitt, OSS agent and special envoy of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, visited Sweden to meet with Felix Kersten and Walter Schellenberg.*

**What did the Swedish Security Police authorities learn about these meetings?** (S)

**Did Raoul Wallenberg ever meet Walter Schellenberg in 1943?**

**Please provide all available records for Walter Schellenberg and his visit to Stockholm in 1943; all records for Abram Hewitt**

21. In his book, Braunschweig hints at the possible involvement of members of the Wallenberg family in separate peace discussions involving representatives of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union after 1942. Ivan Serov, former chairman of the KGB, alleged in different drafts of his memoir that either Raoul Wallenberg or members of the Wallenberg family had traveled to Pskov in 1942, to meet with representatives of Nazi Germany, to discuss the possibilities of concluding a separate peace agreement between the Western Allies and Germany.

**Did Swedish intelligence have any information about such discussions? If so, which persons were involved?**

**Please provide all available records**

22. In 1945, Walter Schellenberg found temporary refuge at the house of Count Folke Bernadotte in Trosa, Sweden. Schellenberg's dossier in the archive of the Swedish Security Police is either incomplete or inexplicably thin, an indication that it remains only partially accessible. It would be important to know what Schellenberg knew about Raoul Wallenberg. (S)

**Was Schellenberg ever formally interviewed by the Swedish authorities during his stay in Sweden in 1945?**

**Please provide all available records about Walter Schellenberg; Folke Bernadotte's interactions with Schellenberg during 1944-1946**

23. Both Per Anger and Raoul Wallenberg maintained ties to U.S. and British intelligence representatives in Stockholm. The contacts included, among others, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) representative Iver Olsen, R. Taylor Cole, the head of the U.S. Secret Intelligence in Stockholm and Andor Gellért, a Hungarian journalist who worked at the Hungarian Legation, Stockholm. Later Gellért joined the OSS Budapest City Team.

**What did Swedish intelligence know about Per Anger's and Raoul Wallenberg contacts to U.S. and British intelligence representatives?**

**Did Anger himself have a formal or informal role with Swedish intelligence?**

**Did Raoul Wallenberg have a formal or informal role with Swedish intelligence?**

**Please provide all records for Per Anger 1940-1945**

24. During the 1940s, the Swedish Home Guard served as an important source of recruitment for Swedish intelligence. Raoul Wallenberg was a highly effective and popular instructor in the Home Guard.

**Did Swedish intelligence agencies recruit Raoul Wallenberg for their services or did they ask him to assist in their work during the years 1939-1945?**

**Please provide all available records**

25. While Wallenberg's mission was clearly humanitarian, it also involved other aspects. In his memoir, R. Taylor Cole, the U.S. head of Secret Intelligence in Stockholm in 1944, suggests Wallenberg's mission also aimed to assist broader U.S. interests, during and after WWII.

**Did Cole meet Raoul Wallenberg personally?**

**What guidelines or specific instructions did Raoul Wallenberg receive from both U.S. and Swedish intelligence officials?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence for R. Taylor Cole, 1942-1945**

26. In a cable dated July 1, 1944, OSS representative Richard Helms (who later headed the CIA) stated that, given Raoul Wallenberg's "personal history", Wallenberg was not suitable for formal recruitment. As

*Swedish historian Vilhelm Agrell has pointed out, Helms was apparently briefed about Raoul Wallenberg's personal background. It is unclear if the information cannot be located or if it remains classified.*

**Did Swedish officials request some information/documentation to be withheld prior to the release of CIA records in the Raoul Wallenberg case during the 1990s?**

**Please provide all information about discussions between Swedish officials and U.S. authorities prior to the release of the CIA Raoul Wallenberg case file in 1993**

*27. The Swedish Security Police Archive contains personal dossiers of a number of known OSS agents of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) who were active in Sweden during WWII, including Bruce Hopper a.o. There appears to be no dossier for Iver Olsen who arrived in Sweden in early 1944.*

**Was a Swedish Security Police file ever created for Iver Olsen? (S)**

**Did C-Byrån ever create a personal dossier for Iver Olsen?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence for Iver Olsen**

*28. In June 1944, Iver Olsen informed the OSS headquarters in Washington that "the Baltic operations authorized by the War Refugee Board are also getting under way, as are certain projects in Hungary. In all .. matters the facilities of the OSS have been used and it is expected that the OSS will reap some advantage ...."<sup>67</sup>*

**What exactly were the "Hungarian operations" Olsen was referring to?**

**Please provide all records regarding Swedish intelligence operations in Hungary 1940-1945**

*29. The Norwegian historian Tore Pryser has pointed out that Iver Olsen's rescue operations in the Baltic countries may have involved individuals who cooperated with Swedish and German Nazis in establishing secret anti-Soviet organizations<sup>68</sup>. This cooperation apparently also laid the groundwork for post-war Swedish-US-British cooperation and espionage missions in the Baltic countries.*

**Did Swedish-U.S. intelligence cooperation in the Baltic countries during and after WWII affect the official Swedish handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case?**

**Did Swedish officials fear public exposure of these contacts and activities?**

*30. Aside from his duties for the OSS and as Attaché for Refugees, representing the U.S. War Refugee Board (WRB), Olsen was also the official Financial Attaché at the U.S. Legation, Stockholm in 1944-45. In a detailed memorandum written in January 1944, Olsen requested from his superiors to be in full control of: "I. (a) Any matters in which the [U.S.] Legation is involved concerning the financing of underground movements in the occupied countries, ... III. (a) The trade and capital movements in Axis and occupied countries. ... III. (e) Information concerning whereabouts, activities and resources of important bankers, industrialists and other persons of significance in Axis or occupied countries ... Any specific information regarding Axis looting in occupied countries." [Doc. 3]*

**Did Olsen seek to obtain this kind of information from Raoul Wallenberg or from Swedish intelligence representatives?**

**Please provide all available records regarding the U.S. Safehaven program for 1944-45**

*31. In May 1944, Iver Olsen alleged in an official memorandum he sent to the U.S. Treasury Department that over the course of the previous five months, the German Government had obtained large quantities of American dollars (\$5 million, equivalent to about \$50 million today) in occupied areas, including Hungary, at a "discount", through forced sale. In other words, the assets had been forcibly taken from persecuted Jews and other minorities. These dollars were then apparently sold at a premium in Sweden. The Swedish*

*companies and banks that allegedly handled these transactions included SEB, Skandinaviska Banken, ASEA, Electrolux, Nordiska Kompaniet and AGA Baltic; all companies in the Wallenberg business sphere. A member of Swedish intelligence was to have been the "highly secret" source of the report. [Doc.4,5,6,7]*

**Who in Swedish intelligence provided this information to Iver Olsen?**

**And where is the documentation about such foreign currency transactions involving occupied territories in WWII in Swedish intelligence collections?**

**Please provide all available records**

32. According to Iver Olsen, the banking house of P.S. Josephson & Co facilitated many of the currency transactions with occupied territories during WWII.

**Please provide all records about P.S. Josephson & Co.**

**Please provide all records about Per Staffan Josephson (1898 -?)**

33. *Iver Olsen was known as one of the sharpest critics of the Wallenberg family's business extensive ties to Nazi Germany.*

**Did Olsen discuss the hiring of Raoul Wallenberg with Swedish intelligence officials?**

**Did Raoul Wallenberg's mission serve in any way as a way to help assuage U.S. concerns about Sweden and the Wallenberg family?**

34. *Researchers have not been allowed to review the records of SÄPO's surveillance of several foreign Legations/Embassies during and after WWII, including the Soviet, American and British Legations in Stockholm.*

**Please provide access to the following dossiers, 1940-1948**

**The Soviet Trade Delegation**

**The Soviet Embassy**

**The U.S. Legation**

**The British Legation**

**The German Legation**

35. *Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg had close contacts with the Soviet Trade Attaché at the Soviet Legation, Mikhail Nikitin.*

**What did Nikitin know about Sweden's ball bearing trade with Germany and the Soviet Union?**

**Was Nikitin informed about Raoul Wallenberg's humanitarian mission to Budapest?**

36. *In 1944, Soviet payment in platinum for ball-bearings to the Stockholm Enskilda Bank was transported on a Soviet military plane to Sweden. Swedish military and intelligence/counterintelligence authorities should have been involved in granting the Soviet plane permission to land on Swedish territory.*

**What information about these permissions is available in the archives of those services?**

**What did Swedish intelligence/counterintelligence as well as Swedish government representatives know about the Wallenbergs/Soviet deal regarding ball bearings and the payment in platinum in 1944?**

**Please provide all available records**

37. *From September 1941 to August 1943, Boris Rybkin/Yartsev was the Soviet foreign intelligence resident at the Soviet Legation. He participated, in particular, in organizing a payment in platinum to the SEB for ball-bearings bought by the Soviet Union.*

**What information about him did Swedish intelligence/counterintelligence possess?**

**Please provide all available records about Boris Rybkin/Yartsev; all records related to the sale of ball bearings to the Soviet Union for the time 1941-1943.**

*38. It is widely known that in October 1941, April and September 1942, Waldemar von Oppenheim visited Stockholm as an Abwehr agent, stayed at the Wallenbergs, and used their Anglo-American contacts. During July 23-30, 1942 he also represented the Wallenbergs in negotiations in Paris about the transfer of the sequestered foreign stocks and bonds to the Wallenbergs. Soviet intelligence reported to Moscow about his visits to Stockholm.*

**What information about him, his business deals with the Wallenbergs and his negotiations with Anglo-American representatives did Swedish intelligence/counterintelligence possess?**

**Was it known if Raoul Wallenberg was acquainted with him?**

**Please provide all available records**

*39. In the autumn of 1943, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry official, Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky played a central role in separate peace feelers via Turkey and Great Britain. These discussions also involved Marcus Wallenberg. Raoul Wallenberg traveled to Hungary at the time of these contacts. As the historian Dr. Vadim Birstein has pointed out, the Soviets may have strongly suspected Raoul Wallenberg's involvement in separate peace negotiations. In 1946, the head of the Soviet MGB's Foreign Intelligence section, Fedotov, promised "to report to Molotov on the reasons of Wallenberg's detention." This information is contained in a memorandum written by A. Plakhin head of the 5th European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1952. Plakhin attached a footnote to this statement which cited the testimony of a former prisoner of war, Nikolaus von Maasburg who in 1947 had claimed that "the Russians detained Wallenberg because they wanted to find out details of the negotiations he conducted with the British regarding the capitulation of Hungary at an earlier stage."*

**What knowledge did C-Byrån have about separate peace initiatives, involving Hungary and representatives of the Wallenberg family in the years 1940-1945?**

*40. In September 1943, Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky was appointed as the Hungarian Minister to Stockholm. He had close contact to U.S. intelligence representatives, including R. Taylor Cole, Francis Cunningham and Andor Gellért.*

**What information did Swedish intelligence officials have about these contacts?**

**What contacts existed between Ullein-Reviczky as well as other members of the Hungarian Legation and C-Byrån, especially Hellmuth Ternberg?**

**Please provide all available records about Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky**

*41. During 1944, Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky repeatedly petitioned the Swedish government to take an active role in protecting Hungary's Jews. Ullein-Reviczky was a personal acquaintance of both Miklos Horthy, Jr. and Heinrich von Wahl. Ullein-Reviczky and his wife also attended the welfare dinner for Raoul Wallenberg before his departure for Budapest in July 1944.*

**What role did Ullein-Reviczky play in Raoul Wallenberg's appointment in 1944?**

## II. Raoul Wallenberg's contacts and activities in Hungary 1944-45

1. In August 1944, Per Anger returned to Stockholm from Budapest for consultations. During his stay, he met with Iver Olsen and Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky.

**Do any memoranda or reports exist about these discussions?**

**Did Anger meet with Swedish intelligence representatives at the time?**

**Please provide all available records**

2. In 1944, the Swedish Legation, Budapest hired Hermann Grosheim-Krysko (Thomsen) as a translator, allegedly on the request of the Hungarian Police Chief Nandor Batisfalvy. Grosheim-Krysko had been working in Hungary since 1941, for the German Wirtschaftsdienst (the German Economic Administration). After his release from Soviet imprisonment in 1953, Grosheim-Krysko filed a request for compensation with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was granted.

**What were the reasons for Grosheim-Krysko's employment?**

**What did Swedish intelligence representatives know about the reasons and the terms of Grosheim-Krysko's compensation agreement with the Swedish Foreign Ministry in 1954?**

3. According to Jan Bergman, a man called "Enderlein" was also employed at the Swedish Legation, Budapest. "Enderlein's" profile fits that of Grosheim-Krysko.

**Is "Enderlein" identical with Grosheim-Krysko? If not, who is "Enderlein"?**

4. During the official Wallenberg Hearings in Stockholm in 1981 Marcus Wallenberg stated that he met Raoul Wallenberg when the latter returned briefly to Stockholm from Budapest in 1944.

**Did Raoul Wallenberg return to Stockholm some time after July 1944?**

5. The Swedish author Iwo Wiklander claims that Raoul Wallenberg knew the Soviet Ambassador Alexandra Kollontay personally and that Wallenberg met with her in a restaurant in Stockholm's Old Town during WWII. Other sources claim that in 1944, Raoul Wallenberg had supposedly told Elisabeth Kemény, the wife of Hungarian Foreign Minister Gabor Kemény, that he had spoken to Ambassador Kollontay on her behalf.

**Do Swedish intelligence records contain any information that Raoul Wallenberg knew Alexandra Kollontay personally?**

**Did he phone the Soviet Ambassador in 1944 on behalf of Mrs. Kemény or did he meet Kollontay in person? Or did someone else relay the inquiry for him? If so, who carried out this task?**

**Please provide all available records**

6. In April 1945, Kálmán Lauer explained in a letter to Marcus Wallenberg that he felt that Raoul Wallenberg was not in any danger. "The Russians should not let anything happen to him," Lauer wrote, "since he personally as well as his mission enjoyed their strongest sympathies."

**When did Kálmán Lauer discuss Raoul Wallenberg's humanitarian mission to Budapest with Soviet representatives? With whom did Lauer speak?**

7. In his letters to Raoul Wallenberg in 1944, Kálmán Lauer mentions negotiations with the Soviet Trade delegation in Stockholm. He suggests that if Raoul Wallenberg cannot return in time, he should travel via

*Moscow, "to conduct some research there." He also refers to documentation about the negotiations that he forwarded along with the letter to Raoul Wallenberg.*

**What did the negotiations with the Soviet Trade Delegation involve that Lauer mentioned in his letters to Raoul Wallenberg in 1944?**

**Where are the copies of the documents Lauer forwarded to Wallenberg about these discussions?**

**Why exactly did Lauer want Wallenberg to travel via Moscow and with whom was Wallenberg to conduct discussions?**

**Which issues were discussed or negotiated between Mikhail Nikitin and Mellaneuropeiska while Wallenberg was in Budapest?**

**What did Swedish intelligence/counterintelligence know about these negotiations?**

**Please provide all available records**

8. The archive of C-Byrån does not include any records from World War II operations in Hungary.

**What has happened to the documentation?**

*9. Carl Ca: Bonde, Chief of Swedish counterintelligence and stepson of Raoul Wallenberg's aunt, Ebba Bonde.*

**How well did Raoul Wallenberg know Carl Ca: Bonde?**

**Did Bonde and Raoul Wallenberg discuss the Budapest humanitarian mission in 1944?**

**Was Carl Ca: Bonde ever interviewed by Swedish authorities about his contacts with Raoul Wallenberg?**

*10. Carl Bonde's top deputy was Lt. Thorsten Akrell, special agent of the Swedish Defense Staff. According to Raoul Wallenberg's calendar, he and Akrell met in September 1944 in Budapest.*

**What did Raoul Wallenberg know about the wireless sets/radio receivers delivered by Akrell to Budapest in September 1944?**

**What was the reason for their meeting and what did they discuss?**

*11. Peter Akrell, Thorsten Akrell's son, has stated that his (Peter's) mother wrote a letter to Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander about Raoul Wallenberg after he disappeared.*

**What was the content of this letter?**

**How well did Thorsten Akrell and Raoul Wallenberg know each other during the 1940s?**

**Was Akrell ever interviewed by Swedish authorities about Raoul Wallenberg?**

*12. In the autumn of 1944, rumors of a possible separate peace agreement between Nazi Germany and British/U.S. allies were rampant in both Stockholm and Budapest. Raoul Wallenberg was clearly aware of these rumors and discussions and sent requests to Stockholm to ensure that persecuted Jews received adequate protection under any arrangement struck.*

**What was the reaction of Swedish and U.S. officials/intelligence representatives to Raoul Wallenberg's request?**

*13. In one of his reports to the Swedish Foreign Ministry from August 1944, Raoul Wallenberg indicated that he planned to use his contact with Ludolph Christensen to "to probe the highest German circles for future developments". Christensen's brother-in-law was the Nazi SS General Karl Wolff.*

**What did Wallenberg mean by this statement?**

**Did these plans refer solely to the subject of Jewish deportations from Hungary?**

**Or did they also refer to broader issues, like how to find a quick end to the war, through possible separate peace agreements (between Germany and the Allies)?**

**Please provide all records for Nazi SS General Karl Wolff, 1944-1945**

*14. Several witnesses have claimed that Raoul Wallenberg participated in high-level meetings of the Hungarian resistance, Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom (MFM), including Dr., Géza Soos the leader of the MFM<sup>69</sup>; Guyla Ambrozy, head of the Hungarian Regent's Cabinet Office; Miklós ("Miki") Horthy, Jr., the son of the Hungarian Regent; Marquis György Pallavicini, Jr., a lawyer and businessman a.o.*

**What information did Swedish and Allied intelligence possess about Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with members of the Hungarian resistance and the Hungarian Regent's inner circle?**

**Please provide all available records (list of names to be provided separately)**

*15. Some members of the Hungarian resistance have claimed that Raoul Wallenberg was involved in efforts to document Soviet atrocities committed in Hungary in 1944-1945. In addition, Vilmos Bondor, a former Hungarian Army officer, has claimed that Raoul Wallenberg had received and stored documents about the execution of thousands of Polish officers by Soviet NKVD operatives at the Soviet village of Katyn in 1940.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg and his colleagues at the Swedish Legation, Budapest document Soviet war crimes? If so, how was the information stored and what has happened to it?**

**What did Swedish intelligence/counterintelligence and Swedish government representatives know about these activities?**

**Please provide all available records; all records regarding the documentation of Soviet war crimes in Hungary in 1944**

*16. Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky was a close friend of Tibor Eckhardt, the leader of the Hungarian Smallholders Party, who moved to the United States in October 1941 and became an advisor to the American President Roosevelt. Eckhardt had close ties to a U.S. military officer called John Grombach who headed a little known and highly secret U.S. intelligence organization called "The Pond". It operated completely separately from the wartime OSS (Office of Strategic Services), the precursor of the CIA. Formed in 1942, its existence was known to only a few high level officials around President Roosevelt, and it reported only to a select group of individuals in the U.S. War and State Departments.*

**Was Raoul Wallenberg aware of this organization and did he have direct or indirect contacts to any of the "Pond's" representatives in Hungary or Sweden?**

**Please provide all records about the U.S. intelligence agency "The Pond"; John Grombach; Tibor Eckhardt for 1940-1945**

*17. Ferenc Bágyoni, a Hungarian diplomat and intelligence officer, worked closely with the Hungarian military officer Otto Hatz in 1944. Both Bágyoni and Hatz maintained contacts with the Jewish Agency, as well as U.S. and German intelligence representatives in Hungary. In September 1944, Bágyoni, traveled to Stockholm, supposedly on the direct request of the SS-Officer Wilhelm Höttl, the head of German intelligence in Central Europe, to obtain information about future Allied war plans in Stockholm. As part of these inquiries, he was to establish contact with the Hungarian Minister, Antal Ullein-Reviczky. Bágyoni was quickly arrested and extensively interrogated by the Swedish Security Police.*

**What information did Swedish intelligence officials possess about Bágyoni?**

**What details did he provide about the work of Swedish diplomats in Budapest?**

**Did Raoul Wallenberg and his colleagues have any information about Bágyoni's mission?**

**Please provide all available records about Bágyoni?**

18. An OSS Telegram from August 1944 outlines contact between Swedish intelligence officials (Ternberg) and the Hungarian resistance, including the planned use of a special 'signal plan', created by Swedish intelligence, to usher in an uprising against Hungarian Nazi authorities.

**Did Hellmuth Ternberg have direct contact with the MFM leader, Dr. Géza Soos?**

**How and when was the contact established?**

**What role exactly did Raoul Wallenberg and Per Anger have in these activities?**

**Please provide all available records**

19. The Swedish historian Gellert Kovacs discovered that, apparently, Swedish diplomats played a significant role in providing Western Allies with intelligence collected by the Hungarian resistance. For this, a radio transmitter supposedly located in the Swedish Legation, Budapest, was used. Information from Budapest was passed on to the Allied air forces deployed on the island of Malta and was used for bombing barges on the Danube River carrying vital oil supplies for the German Wehrmacht. In addition, Kovacs cites reports about Raoul Wallenberg's alleged use of his diplomatic car for the transportation of weapons and ammunition for the resistance. There are also indications that Wallenberg assisted in the efforts to rescue Allied pilots whose planes had been downed in hostile territory. The involvement of official Swedish diplomatic personnel, especially Raoul Wallenberg and Per Anger, in covert operations would have constituted a serious breach of Swedish neutrality.

**Were Swedish intelligence officials aware of these activities? And if so, what did they know?**

**Was there a secret radio transmitter located at the Swedish Legation, Budapest?**

20. After the war, Géza Soos claimed that the Swedish Legation, Budapest had helped him to forward at least two formal messages from the Hungarian resistance (MFM) to the Soviet government, on October 23 and October 25, 1944. Per Anger was to have handled the transmission of these communications.<sup>70</sup>

**What was the content of the alleged messages allegedly transmitted by Per Anger?**

**How and when were they delivered? By whom where they delivered and to whom?**

**Were these communications sent via the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Stockholm or in some other way?**

**Please provide all available documentation, including all available records about Dr. Géza Soos; the MFM**

21. Members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest, including Per Anger and Raoul Wallenberg, maintained contact with Lolle Smit, the Dutch Director of the Philips electronics concern in Hungary and Rumania. Smit reported to British Intelligence during WWII and was honored with an OBE for his contributions.<sup>71</sup> The Legation also had contact to a number of Dutch officers who had escaped from German prisoner of war camps and who aided the Hungarian resistance. One of these Dutch officers, Lt. Gerit van der Waals, was detained by Soviet military counterintelligence units. He died in Soviet imprisonment in 1947.

**What exactly did the contacts with Lolle Smit and the Dutch officers involve and what were their aims?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence for Lolle Smit**

22. Raoul Wallenberg had contact with members of Hungarian resistance group called "Achilles" that had ties to British intelligence.<sup>72</sup> At least one of its members, the Hungarian lawyer Dr. Karolyi Schandl, spent years in Soviet imprisonment. During the 1950s, he was held for some years as a numbered prisoner in Vladimir Prison.

**What information did Swedish intelligence officials possess about Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with the so-called "Achilles" group?**

23. Otto Prade, who worked as a driver at the Swedish Legation, Budapest, testified that he had been interrogated by a Soviet officer in 1945.<sup>73</sup> The officer wanted to know to what extent "the Swedes had collaborated with the Hungarians and with the Germans, and especially what the British had been doing at the Legation." Franz R. Gfrorner - an Abwehr agent with contacts to Allied Intelligence in Budapest during the 1940s - stated to Soviet interrogators that "Sweden, along with other foreign Legation worked for Anglo-American Intelligence, directly or as couriers."<sup>74</sup>

**What British contacts did the Swedish Legation, Budapest maintain?  
Who were the couriers Gfrorner referred to (other than Thorsten Akrell)?**

24. The Soviet officer who questioned Otto Prade also alleged that Raoul Wallenberg "had delivered Jews to the Gestapo" and asked how much Heinrich Himmler had paid [Wallenberg] for this work. The officer also alleged that Raoul Wallenberg "would never see Hungary or Sweden again."

**How did Swedish authorities assess this report?  
What direct or indirect contacts did Raoul Wallenberg have to Heinrich Himmler (possibly via Kurt Becher, Walter Schellenberg )?  
Who was the Soviet officer who interrogated Prade?  
Please provide all available information about Otto Prade**

25. In his memoir, William Casey, the former head of the CIA, describes how in 1944 the OSS launched a new economic intelligence program, aimed at obtaining intelligence information from "the leading industrial centers of Europe ... as they emerge from the wringer of occupation".<sup>75</sup> Businessmen from neutral countries were to play a central role in this effort.

**What did Swedish intelligence officers know about this program?  
Was Raoul Wallenberg's mission in any way connected to these plans?**

26. While in Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg outlined plans for an extensive post-war organization dedicated to restitution of Jewish property.

**Who first conceived of the idea for such an organization and when?  
Were Swedish intelligence representatives informed about these plans? If so, were Swedish intelligence officials to be involved in the creation of this organization?  
Please provide all available records**

27. In 1945, U.S. intelligence in Stockholm reported on a mutual intelligence sharing agreement with Sweden. Sweden would supply economic intelligence, "using representatives of large Swedish commercial and industrial firms which have agencies and representatives in Russia, Baltics and Balkans." [Doc.10]

**Who created program and who were the Swedish participants?  
Was Raoul Wallenberg aware of these plans?  
And was his planned post-war organization to become part of this and similar efforts?**

28. Per Jacobsson repeatedly met with Hellmuth Ternberg on his trips abroad. Ternberg and other leading C-byrå officers, in turn, cooperated closely with the Abwehr, German military intelligence and counterintelligence service, including exchanging information about the Soviet Union. Since 1931, Jacobsson had served as an economic advisor to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), located in Basel, Switzerland, which provided him with crucial international contacts. They included, among others, Hjalmar Schacht, President of the German Reichsbank and Adam von Trott zu Solz, a German diplomat and

leading figure in the German anti-Nazi resistance.

**What information did Jacobsson and Ternberg exchange or discuss?**

**To whom did Ternberg report the information he had learned?**

**Please provide all available records**

29. In late August 1944, the Eric Björkman, Director of the Skandinaviska Banken and head of the Swedish-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, reported to Gösta Engzell, head of the Legal Department of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about an approach from Hungarian Nazi authorities about a possible deal involving the rescue of a number of selected Jews in exchange for Swedish war materials. The proposal was relayed to Björkman by Edmund von Pirkner, relation of Ferenc Pirkner, SKF's Director in Budapest. It is not known if and how this offer was pursued further. [\[Doc. 13\]](#)

**Did Raoul Wallenberg have knowledge of these discussions or was he involved in some way?**

**Was German businessman Otto Braun, Veessenmayer's close associate, involved in this offer?**

**Was this proposal connected to the approach suggested by Hungarian businessman Eugene Bogdanffy to the U.S. War Refugee Board in 1944, to use Otto Braun for the rescue of a number of Hungarian Jews?**

**Please provide all available records; Otto Braun; Transdanubia; Edmund Veessenmayer; Edmund von Pirkner 1940-1945**

30. Swedish companies, especially the Wallenberg family controlled ball bearing trust SKF, maintained close trade ties with Nazi Germany. In September 1944, when Raoul Wallenberg was conducting intense negotiations in Hungary with a number of Nazi representatives about Jewish lives, SKF transferred its complete ball bearing inventories on the European continent to Nazi German authorities. The Swedish author Staffan Thorsell has suggested that the continued transfer of Swedish ball bearings and other war materials may have been partial payment for a group of Swedish businessmen who had been arrested by the Gestapo in Poland in 1942, for aiding the Polish resistance movement.<sup>76</sup> [\[Doc. 12\]](#)

**If so, were SKF's deliveries to Hungary part of this arrangement?**

**Were Swedish intelligence officials informed or aware of the transfer?**

**Were Raoul Wallenberg and his colleagues aware of these negotiations and were they somehow involved?**

**Did Raoul Wallenberg and his Swedish colleagues in Budapest strike other secret deals with Hungarian and German Nazi representatives that so far remain unknown?**

**Please provide all available records**

31. In her memoir, Margareta Bauer states that shortly before the Soviet occupation of Budapest, she was asked to burn all records pertaining to SKF. Ivan Danielsson, the Swedish Minister, had ordered the destruction of a number of official records at the time, but it is unclear if his order also included the destruction of the SKF documentation.

**Who instructed Bauer to do so and why?**

**Please provide all available information about Margareta Bauer; communications with Curt Kempff**

32. Lars Berg stated in a formal letter addressed to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the war that Wallenberg had received "considerable assistance from the wealthy industrial Weiss Family", as well as from "Himmler's Special Representative (the SS-officer Kurt Becher -eds.) and controller of the Weiss family."<sup>77</sup>

**What kind of assistance was Berg referring to?**

**Please provide all available records about Kurt Becher; Manfred Billitz, manager of the Manfred Weiss**

## works, 1944-1946

33. When Dr. Lipót Ashner, the founder and Director of the huge electrical company TUNGSRAM, was kidnapped by German Nazi authorities, the U.S. War Refugee Board requested Iver Olsen to contact Wallenberg in Budapest to determine the specific conditions of the ransom demands. The negotiations were handled via by Sigfrid Edström, Director of the Swedish company ASEA (controlled by the Wallenberg family) and the Swedish Foreign Ministry. A ransom was eventually paid via Switzerland, securing Ashner's release from the German concentration camp of Mauthausen.<sup>78</sup> [Doc.11]

**What did Swedish intelligence officials know about these negotiations?**

**What was Raoul Wallenberg's role in the efforts to free Ashner?**

**Please provide all available records**

34. Hungarian photographer Tamás Veres reported that he, on Raoul Wallenberg's orders, took photographs of advancing Soviet troops in late 1944 and early 1945.

**What was the purpose behind Wallenberg's instruction?**

**What happened to Veres's photos?**

## III. Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in January 1945 and the official Swedish investigation of his fate

1. Valdemar Langlet helped to protect several Hungarian officials, including members of the Hungarian resistance, such as István Ujszászi, the Hungarian Regent's Intelligence and Security Chief. The Swedish Legation also provided assistance in hiding the whereabouts of former Hungarian Prime Minister István Bethlen.

**What information did Swedish intelligence possess about these actions to protect leading Hungarian political figures?**

**Please provide all available records**

2. On March 8, 1945 the official Hungarian State Radio (Radio Kossuth, which broadcasted from Moscow) aired the content of an interview with Valdemar Langlet in which he is named as the source for the assertion that in January 1945, Wallenberg had fallen victim to an attack by Gestapo agents, on the way to Debrecen.

**Is it known from whom did Langlet obtain this information?**

**When and how was Langlet interviewed?**

**What did Swedish intelligence know about the March 8, 1945 Radio Kossuth broadcast?**

**Please provide all records**

3. On March 9, 1945, the Swedish Minister Danielsson made a formal request to meet with the Soviet Major General Ivan Pavlov. At the time, General Pavlov commanded the Directorate of NKVD Troops Guarding the Rear of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ukrainian Front. In his letter, Danielsson stated that he wished to discuss the

*activities of the Swedish Legation, Budapest, as they related to Sweden's official representation of Soviet interests in Hungary.*<sup>79</sup>

**What exactly did Minister Danielsson tell General Pavlov about the contacts and activities of the Swedish Legation, and Raoul Wallenberg in particular?**

**Was Danielsson interviewed by Swedish intelligence officials after his return to Sweden?**

**Please provide all available records**

*4. Per Anger and Lars Berg were interrogated by representatives of the Soviet NKVD in Hungary in early 1945.*

**What did Anger and Berg tell Soviet officials about the work of the Swedish Legation, Budapest in 1944-1945 and Raoul Wallenberg's actions in particular?**

**What did they, as well as Ivan Danielsson, report to Staffan Söderblom, the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, in April 1945?**

**Were Per Anger and the other members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest interviewed by Swedish intelligence officials after their return to Sweden?**

**Please provide all available records**

*5. The Swedish historian and archivist Göran Rydeberg has argued that the increased Swedish-Soviet tensions in the Baltic countries at the end of WWII raised the specter of Soviet blackmail. "If there were Swedish fears of Soviet aggression, it would conceivably have led to a wish to distance the Swedish personnel from Wallenberg's activities", Rydeberg wrote in 2000.*

**Did Raoul Wallenberg's colleagues distance themselves from Wallenberg's activities during their interrogations by Soviet representatives?**

**Was Raoul Wallenberg left to take the blame for any real or perceived violations committed by him and/or the Swedish Legation, Hungary? These included the neglect of Soviet prisoners of war under the care of Legation officials; secret support of British and American intelligence projects aimed at curtailing future Soviet influence in Hungary; the maintaining economic relations with Nazi Germany; as well as the provision of Swedish protection papers to a number of German and Hungarian Nazi officials.**

**Please provide all available records**

*6. In April 1945, Christian Günther was Sweden's Foreign Minister.*

**What did he and Swedish intelligence representatives learn about the events in Budapest in 1944-45 from Wallenberg's colleagues?**

*7. According to a number of sources, U.S. officials were eager to retrieve Raoul Wallenberg's papers from Budapest in 1945.*

**What information did Raoul Wallenberg's personal files contain?**

**How and where were they stored in Budapest?**

**What happened to Wallenberg's papers after January 1945?**

**What information did Swedish intelligence have about these papers?**

*7. In 1946, according to U.S. sources, officials at the Soviet Legation, Stockholm indicated to Swedish representatives that Raoul Wallenberg had done several "foolish things" in Budapest.*

**What exactly did Ambassador Kollontay mean by this remark?**

**What information did Swedish intelligence officials possess about this matter?**

8. In May 1945, General William Key, the U.S. Representative of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, was informed by his Soviet counterpart, Major General Lyovushkin, head of the ACC Headquarters, that Raoul Wallenberg "almost certainly" had been detained by Soviet military forces.<sup>80</sup>

**Was the information General Key received from General Lyovushkin forwarded to Swedish authorities? If so, what channels were used to transmit this information?**

**Please provide all available records**

9. The role of Swedish diplomat Sverker Åström, should be examined in greater detail. Åström was one of the first Swedish diplomats on the scene in Moscow, after Wallenberg's arrest in January 1945. Åström had been selected to accompany the Soviet Ambassador Alexandra Kollontay home to Moscow when she was relieved of her duties in March 1945. Åström was in still in Moscow when the members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest came through, on their way home to Stockholm.

**What did Sverker Åström report about his stay in Moscow to his superiors in Stockholm and possibly to Swedish intelligence officials after his return in 1945?**

**Please provide all available information about Sverker Åström's stay in Moscow in March 1945; as well as all information about Ambassador Kollontay's return to the Soviet Union**

10. In late August 1945, Kálmán Lauer and Gunnar Lagergren, Raoul Wallenberg's brother-in-law, were preparing to travel Hungary as part of a Swedish Red Cross delegation. Lauer reported that he had learned from Konstantin Takácsy, the Deputy Director for foreign countries of the Hungarian National Bank and Director of the Manfred Weiss Works who was on a visit to Switzerland, that Raoul Wallenberg was alive. According to Lauer, Takácsy stated that "he [Wallenberg] is in Russian hands, and the Russians need him for a trial, which the Hungarian government shall conduct with leading persons in trade and finance, persons who over five years are Germany friendly. Furthermore he indicated an official intervention from the Swedish government would not bring a result, possibly a private initiative could be of use." [\[Doc.8\]](#)

**From whom did Director Takácsy obtain this information?**

**How did Swedish intelligence officials evaluate this message?**

**Please provide all available records; all records about Director Konstantin Takácsy 1940-1945**

11. Lauer's information was immediately passed to the U.S. State Department. Swedish officials apparently stated in their message to U.S. officials that "even if [Takácsy 's] information is true, the Soviets will never produce Wallenberg alive." [\[Doc.9\]](#)

**On what information did Swedish officials base this message?**

12. Very little is known about how Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg assessed Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in 1945.

**What kind of contacts did Swedish intelligence officials in charge at that time have with members of the Wallenberg Family in 1945 and beyond?**

**Did they discuss Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance and if so, with whom and what was the content of these discussions?**

**Do the official registration/visitors' logs at SEB show any meetings with Swedish Intelligence officials in 1945-1947?**

**Please provide all available records**

13. In his memoir, Lt.-Gen. Pavel Sudoplatov, a former high-ranking Soviet intelligence officer during the 1940s, suggests that Russian archives contain information about the Wallenberg family business dealings

*with the Soviet Union, during and after WWII.*

**What did the Swedish officials know about secret payments made by the Soviet Union to Sweden and the Wallenberg Family during the 1940s, for the delivery of ball bearings?**

**Were there other, still unknown transactions?**

**And did these events/transactions possibly influence the official handling of the Raoul Wallenberg inquiry?**

**Please provide all available records**

*14. As early as November 1945, a group of Hungarian businessmen approached the Swedish government with an official proposal to assist in the reconstruction of Hungary. A Hungarian delegation which included several persons who had worked with Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest in 1944 (Hugó Wohl, Vilmos Forgács, M. Fleischmann, Ferenc Pirkner) came to Stockholm help raise \$50 million dollar starting capital for a company in charge of the giant rebuilding project. Ivar Rooth, the Director of the Swedish National Bank, Gunnar Myrdal, Rolf Sohlman and others were involved in the discussions.*

**Were Swedish intelligence officials aware of these discussions?**

**What was the outcome of the Hungarian proposal?**

**Did the plans in any way affect the official Swedish approach to Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance?**

*15. The text of a Soviet Politburo decision from April 1946 shows that Stalin offered Sweden "favorable considerations" if a Soviet-Swedish Trade Agreement could be concluded quickly.<sup>81</sup> The Soviet Envoy in Stockholm, Il'ya Chernyshev, briefed Swedish officials, including Sweden's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Östen Undén about this offer. Staffan Söderblom was in Stockholm at the time and met with Undén shortly after this conversation.*

**Were Swedish intelligence officials aware of the Soviet approach?**

**Did Swedish Foreign Ministry officials discuss the matter with Swedish intelligence representatives or members of the Wallenberg family, especially Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg, at the time?**

**Please provide all available records**

*16. A \$300 million Swedish-Soviet trade agreement was concluded in October 1946. Only half of the credits were actually used, even though during the years from 1947-1952, the Soviet Union was unable to obtain international credits. A more thorough analysis needs to be made what exactly led to the failure of the trade agreement's implementation. Closely connected to this issue are the complex trade ties between Swedish businesses and the Soviet Union after WWII.*

**What did Swedish intelligence know of the matter?**

**Did the Swedish side, and in particular Wallenberg owned businesses, boycott the Swedish-Soviet Trade Agreement after 1946?**

**If so, did the Wallenbergs hope to obtain favorable treatment in their dispute with the U.S. Treasury Department at the time?**

**How did Swedish intelligence assess the U.S. investigation of Wallenberg businesses for its relationship with Nazi Germany during WWII?**

**Did it impact the official Swedish handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case?**

**Please provide all available records**

*17. During the Korean War (1950-1953), U.S. investigators discovered that Soviet tanks were equipped with SKF ball bearings which had found their way to Russia via Swedish exports to other Eastern European countries. The Americans estimated the annual value of ball bearing imports by the*

*Soviet Union via secondary channels at \$20 million (about \$200 million today); a sum large enough for the U.S. Ambassador in Stockholm to convey a formal protest to the Swedish government.*

**What was the assessment of Swedish intelligence of the U.S. complaint?**

**What kind of considerations guided Sweden's economic relationship with the Soviet Union since 1945?**

**How extensive was Swedish-Soviet trade, conducted directly or via third parties and intermediaries, in the years 1945-1985?**

**Please provide all available records**

*18. Hellmuth Ternberg remained in close contact with Jacob Wallenberg after the war. He also made repeated inquiries about Raoul Wallenberg with returning prisoners of war in Germany.*

**On whose request did Ternberg make these inquiries and to whom did Ternberg report?**

**Please provide all available records**

*19. In 1954, Jacob Wallenberg apparently attempted to contact Soviet authorities via secret channels in Prague, in an effort to learn information about Raoul Wallenberg. Supposedly Jacob stated that he was ready to make 'great sacrifices' to ensure Raoul's safe return.*

**What prompted Jacob Wallenberg to take this step?**

**Was there any response from Czech or Soviet contacts/authorities?**

**Were Swedish intelligence officials aware of this approach?**

**Please provide all available records**

*20. Hellmuth Ternberg apparently played a key role Jacob's efforts to contact Soviet officials in 1954. So did the Swedish businessman Carl Hardeberg, the Director of Industriediesel. Already during the 1940s, Hardeberg was a close associate of Thorsten Akrell.*

**What exactly was Carl Hardeberg's role in 1954?**

**Was Hardeberg associated in some form with Swedish intelligence. If so, in what capacity?**

**Please provide all available records**

*21. In 1954, Hardeberg and Ternberg also had the assistance of a Swedish businessman called Ernst Natander (1910-1980).*

**Please provide all records, correspondence with Ernst Natander for 1954**

*22. Swedish author Johanna Parikka Altenstedt has suggested that the so-called wartime intelligence operation "Stella Polaris" - the large scale transfer in September 1944 of Finnish signal intelligence personnel and key records to Sweden - may have directly impacted the Wallenberg inquiry. Soviet authorities repeatedly demanded the return of the documentation and the extradition of "the Finnish war criminals."*

**Did Swedish officials ever consider to use of the "Stella Polaris" material in their efforts to seek information about Raoul Wallenberg's fate?**

**Did the "Stella Polaris" affair influence the official Swedish handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case in any way?**

*23. Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerström was already a Soviet asset at the time of Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in 1945.*

**What did Stig Wennerström know about Raoul Wallenberg and what did he report to Soviet officials**

**from 1945-1963?**

**Please provide all available records**

*24. During the early 1950s, Wennerström informed the Soviet government about Sweden's signal intelligence program aimed at the Soviet Union (conducted with the cooperation of U.S. and British intelligence agencies)*

**How did the shoot-down of a DC-3 aircraft with an eight men crew by a Soviet fighter plane in June 1952 affect the Raoul Wallenberg investigation?**

**What considerations guided the assessment of Swedish intelligence officials?**

**Please provide all available records**

25. According to Swedish technical experts, Swedish signal intelligence was capable of monitoring the cockpit conversations of the DC-3 reconnaissance plane that was shot down by a Soviet fighter plane over the Baltic Sea in June 1952.

**Did Swedish intelligence officials learn if any of the crew members survived?**

**If so, did Swedish officials know if some of the crew were picked up by Soviet forces and where they were imprisoned?**

*26. Sverker Åström was formally in charge of the Raoul Wallenberg case for many years during the 1950s, including during the crucial months leading up to the release of the so-called "Gromyko Memorandum" in February 1957. At the time, Soviet officials were trying to conduct secret, behind-the-scenes discussions with Swedish officials via Finland, in preparation of an official statement about the Raoul Wallenberg case. These talks lasted from 1955 -January 1957.*

**Why did Sverker Åström order the suspension of the behind-the-scenes talks via Finland with Soviet representatives regarding the Wallenberg case in January 1957, three weeks before the release of the "Gromyko Memorandum"?**

**Were Swedish intelligence officials aware of these behind-the-scenes discussions?**

**Please provide all documentation regarding the secret discussions about Raoul Wallenberg via Finland and Turkey during 1955-1957 (Yerzin-Frey-Vladimirov)**

*27. Sverker Åström has long been suspected of favoring Soviet interests, although the charges have never been confirmed.*

**Is there any evidence to suggest that Åström ever acted on behalf of Soviet interests?**

**Does the dossier of Sverker Åström in the archives of the Swedish Security Police or other Swedish intelligence archives clarify the suspicions against him?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

*28. In March 1957, just one month after issuing the Gromyko Memorandum, the Soviet leadership disclosed the arrest of several [Swedish] Baltic agents seven years earlier.*

**How did Swedish intelligence officials react to this disclosure?**

**How did it affect official Swedish attitudes towards the Raoul Wallenberg investigation?**

*29. Many unsolved questions persist regarding several behind-the-scenes discussions conducted by different individuals in Sweden and abroad, with or without the involvement of Swedish diplomatic representatives, to seek an exchange of Raoul Wallenberg or full clarification of his fate. They include:*

Staffan Söderblom - I.G. Sysoyev - A.N. Abramov	1946
Jacob Wallenberg - confidential contacts in Prague	1954
Pavel Yerzin - Åke Frey- Viktor Vladimirov	1955-1957
Nanna Svartz - Alexander Myasnikov - Danishevsky	1961-1965
Stig Wennerström	1963
Wolfgang Vogel – Carl Gustav Svingel - Otto Danielsson	1965-1974
Gunnar Linnander – ‘Alexander Pavlov’	1983-1985

**The documentation concerning all of these discussions remains incomplete in both Swedish and Russian archives.**

**The Swedish intelligence archives should make all available records concerning these discussions available to researchers.**

*30. In 1974, Carl Persson, the former Chief of Sweden's National Police (Rikspolis), removed several important papers from the Raoul Wallenberg dossier to his home. These concerned the discussions with Carl-Gustav Svingel, a Swedish citizen living in Berlin, and East German attorney Wolfgang Vogel for the years 1965 - 1974, about an alleged approach by Soviet officials regarding a possible exchange of Stig Wennerström, for information about Wallenberg's fate. Other high ranking officials, including the late Per Gunnar Vingé, the former head of SÄPO, have privately confirmed that they, too, occasionally had stored official records at their private residences.<sup>82</sup>*

**Has the material removed by Carl Persson in 1974 been recovered?**

**Please provide all available records**

*31. Surprisingly, SÄPO's archive contains no dossiers for either Carl-Gustav Svingel or Wolfgang Vogel.*

**Were such personal files ever created for these two persons by the Swedish Security Police?**

**If so, what has happened to the documentation?**

**Please provide all records for Carl-Gustav Svingel; all records, correspondence for Wolfgang Vogel**

*32. In 1954, the prominent Swedish Social Democratic politician and former mayor of Stockholm, Hjalmar Mehr, raised the Wallenberg case with the prominent Soviet author Ilya Ehrenburg.*

**What information did Mehr relay to Soviet authorities and what was he told in return?**

**What information did Mehr report back to Swedish authorities?**

*33. In August 1956, an employee of L.M.Ericsson, Anatole Ericsson, was arrested as a Soviet agent. He was convicted of stealing vital technical information related to the newly emerging radar technology. Ericsson was quickly sentenced to twelve years hard labor in October 1956.*

**Why did Swedish officials apparently not use Ericsson's arrest to press for clarity about Raoul Wallenberg's fate, especially since Ericsson's arrest occurred shortly after Prime Minister Tage Erlander's official visit to the Soviet Union?**

*34. In 1963, the Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerström was arrested as a Soviet agent.*

**Why did Swedish officials not use Wennerström's arrest more effectively to seek clarity about Wallenberg's fate?**

**Why did the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, Gunnar Jarring, explicitly inform his Soviet counterpart in 1964 that Sweden "does not link the two issues" (Wennerström/Wallenberg)?**

*35. There has long been suspicions that Stig Wennerström was aided by one or more Swedish officials or*

military officers.

**Have these suspicions been confirmed or dismissed?**

**If they have been confirmed, who are the individuals in question and were they involved, directly or indirectly, in the inquiry about Raoul Wallenberg's fate?**

**Please provide all available records**

36. In late 1963, Swedish officials had also received the testimony of a former prisoner in Vladimir prison, Marvin Makinen, a U.S. university student who had studied in West Germany in 1960 and who had been arrested on a trip to the Soviet Union. Makinen notified Swedish authorities upon his release that he had been told by a cellmate about a secret Swedish prisoner being imprisoned in Vladimir prison some time before his own prison term (1961-1963).

**What did Swedish intelligence officers know about Makinen's statement?**

**Was a Swedish prisoner held in the Vladimir Prison some time during the 1950s?**

**And if so, what was the identity of this prisoner?**

**Please provide all available records**

37. In 1961, Professor Nanna Svartz of Sweden reported that her Russian colleague, Professor A. L. Myasnikov, had revealed to her during a meeting that he possessed direct knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet Union. A second physician, Dr. Grigorii Danishevsky, was also present during part of the conversation.

**How did Swedish intelligence officials assess Professor Svartz's report?**

**Why did Swedish officials never request to meet with Professor Danishevsky?**

**Please provide all available records about Professor Nanna Svartz; all records, information about Professor A.L. Myasnikov for 1961-1965**

38. In 1965, Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander met with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. After this meeting, Sweden decided to formally close the active Raoul Wallenberg investigation. In June 1965, Swedish diplomat Anders Thunborg (an International Secretary of the Social Democratic Party and later Ambassador to the U.N.) met the KGB 'rezident' in Stockholm, Streltsov. Streltsov told him that "it was disagreeable that the [Swedish] Prime Minister once more had brought up the Wallenberg case", during his recent meeting with Soviet Premier Kosygin.<sup>83</sup>

**What was the full reasoning behind Erlander's decision to close the Wallenberg case in 1965?**

**Were there other efforts by Soviet intelligence officials before and after Erlander's visit to influence the official Swedish handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case?**

**Please provide all available records**

39. Olof Palme, the former Swedish Prime Minister (1969-1976; 1982-1986), served as Tage Erlander's Private Secretary during the 1950s. Before that, he had been a protégé of Birger Elmér, Thede Palm's successor at T-Kontoret (later the IB).

**Did Palme possess specific, currently unknown information about the Wallenberg case?**

39. The Wallenberg case was only formally reopened in 1979 when new witnesses emerged, including Abraham Kalinski, who claimed that he knew Raoul Wallenberg to have been imprisoned in Vladimir Prison during the 1950s. Swedish author Ingrid Carlberg describes in her 2012 Wallenberg biography that the CIA had intentionally used and promoted Kalinski's testimony, as part of its propaganda war against the Soviet Union.

**What did Swedish intelligence officials know about this U.S. strategy in the Wallenberg case?  
Did Kalinski lied outright or did he simply repeat widespread rumors of a secret foreign prisoner,  
possibly a Swede, held in Vladimir Prison?**

**Please provide all available records, correspondence about Abraham Kalinski**

*40. Through the years, Swedish intelligence had a chance to obtain information from a variety of contacts and sources. In addition, top Swedish government officials , past and present, such as the Prime Minister, the Swedish Foreign Minister a.o. possessed/possess the highest security clearance, meaning they are authorized to review information subject to the highest degree of secrecy classification.*

**What exactly do Swedish intelligence officials know about Wallenberg's fate?  
More specifically, who among Swedish officials learned precisely what information and when?  
Do they possess knowledge today they have not shared with the public?  
What internal and external considerations continue to play a role for the Wallenberg question today?**

*41. It has never been fully established how many Swedish citizens and nationals were imprisoned in the Soviet Union after 1945, and in which prisons and camps exactly they were held. It remains unclear exactly how many Swedish agents were sent on intelligence missions to the Iron Curtain countries after WWII. It is also not clear how many Swedish ex-patriots were detained by Soviet authorities abroad, during and after WWII. Some of these individuals' identities may remain unknown.*

**Please provide a comprehensive list of all Swedish citizen who were imprisoned in the Soviet Union from 1940-1991.**

*42. Questions also persist about other Swedish officials or persons representing official Swedish interests who, according to official testimonies contained in the archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, were detained in Eastern Europe in 1944/45. These include questions about Swedish personnel who were allegedly detained in Sofia in 1944 when they were overseeing the transfer of German and Italian diplomats to the Soviet Union.*

**Who, for example, was the Swedish Prisoner "Eriksson" who was imprisoned in Vladimir in 1950,  
according to the German witness Ludwig Hunoldt?**

**And who were his two colleagues who were allegedly arrested together with "Eriksson"?**

**Please provide all available documentation**

*43. In a diary entry from 1947, Sven Grafström claimed that "a Swedish citizen, who had been held for two years in a concentration camp, and whose existence was unknown to us" was permitted to return to Sweden.<sup>84</sup>*

**Who is the Swedish citizen Grafström note referred to in his note?**

**What did he mean when he wrote that the man's "existence was unknown to us?" To him personally or to Swedish Foreign Ministry officials in general?**

**How many 'unknown' Swedish citizens were held in Soviet imprisonment after 1945?**

*44. In October 1981, Swedish officials rejected the proposal and recommendation of Bo Theutenberg, the Swedish Foreign Ministry's own Legal Advisor, to use the incident of a Soviet submarine that had been stranded in Swedish waters to press the Soviet authorities for full clarification of Raoul Wallenberg's fate.*

**Who made this decision and why?**

**Were Swedish intelligence officials consulted in the matter?**

**Please provide all available records**

*45. In 1981, the Swedish Foreign Ministry consulted with a number of foreign governments about its planned release of documentation in the Raoul Wallenberg case. The Israeli government at the time asked for certain records regarding witness statements to be withheld, for fear that these records could provide insight into Israel's extensive intelligence network behind the Iron Curtain. [Doc. 14,15]*

**What documentation have foreign governments asked the Swedish government to keep confidential during the years 1945-2018, regarding the Raoul Wallenberg investigation?**

**What requests have Swedish officials made to foreign governments regarding the release of information in the Wallenberg case?**

**Has Sweden requested other governments, including the Soviet Union/Russia and the U.S., to keep specific records classified? If so, which ones?**

**Please provide all available documentation for the years 1945-2018**

*46. In 1983, the Swedish Judge Gunnar Linnander was approached by a British intermediary who relayed information provided to him by a man called Alexander Pavlov. Pavlov stated that he had information that Raoul Wallenberg had died some months earlier, outside of Moscow. Another contact of the British intermediary was Henry Wallenberg.*

**Did Gunnar Linnander or others inform representatives of the Wallenberg family about this approach?**

**Please provide all records, correspondence for Gunnar Linnander 1983-1986; Henry Wallenberg, 1983-1986; Peter Wallenberg 1983-1987**

*47. In 1984, Raoul Wallenberg's brother, Guy von Dardel, sued the Soviet Union.*

**What were the deliberations and assessment of Swedish Foreign Ministry officials about this actions. Did they seek the input and advice of Swedish intelligence officials regarding this lawsuit?**

**Please provide all available records**

*48. It needs to be more fully examined what led to Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev's decision in 1989 to invite Raoul Wallenberg's family to Moscow. Representatives of other foreign governments, especially the U.S. and Germany, also played an important role in promoting a resolution of the Wallenberg case, but few details have emerged about the actual deliberations.*

**What considerations guided internal deliberations of Swedish officials and the discussions with their Soviet counterparts in 1989?**

**What, if any, preconditions were set for the visit of Raoul Wallenberg's family to Moscow?**

**Did the Swedish government or intelligence officials consult with members of the Wallenberg family before the visit of Raoul Wallenberg's next-of-kin to Moscow in 1989, or before the creation of an official Swedish-Russian Working Group in 1991?**

**Please provide all available records**

*49. In 1992 a special Commission headed by Nikolai Arzhannikov, deputy chair of the Committee on Human Rights at the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, conducted its own inquiry in the Raoul Wallenberg case. The Commission issued a two-volume report. Unfortunately, the original report was destroyed in 1993, as a result of a fire in the Russian "White House" that started after Russian tanks shelled the building.*

**Please provide a copy of the two-volume Arzhannikov Commission report from 1992-1993**

50. *The Swedish Foreign Ministry must have consulted the Swedish intelligence services in connection with the work of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, the presentation of an official report on the Group's work in 2000, as well as the extensive inquiry into the official Swedish handling of the Wallenberg question by the so-called Eliasson Commission in 2003.*

**What information and advice did Swedish intelligence professionals provide to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Raoul Wallenberg case from 1985 -2003?**

**Please provide all available records**

51. *The discussions between the Office of Prime Minister Carl Bildt and the government of Boris Yeltsin led to a formal agreement in 1993 to probe a number of unsolved historical issues between Sweden and the Soviet Union.*

**What conditions, if any, were set for the discussions?**

**What were the precise tasks and instructions of the various Working Groups and what instructions did Swedish officials receive regarding the inquiries conducted?**

**Please provide all available records**

52. *Swedish diplomats supplemented the official Working Group inquiry with a number of parallel discussions with Russian officials, including members of the Russian intelligence service. Little information has emerged what exactly was learned in these conversations. Swedish diplomats also may have been provided access to documentation that was not shared with other members or consultants to the Working Group. The main examples are: the interrogation registers of the Internal (Lubyanka) Prison and Lefortovo Prison for the years 1945 -1947; the investigative documentation for Wallenberg's long time cell mate, the German diplomat Willy Rödel; as well as a number of [Russian] investigation files for individuals with close links to the Wallenberg case.*

**What information exactly did Russian authorities provide to Swedish officials in the course of the ten-year Working Group inquiry that was not shared in the full Working Group?**

**Please provide all available records**

53. *It must be determined what exactly guided the actions of both Swedish and Russian officials over the years.*

**Did the Swedish and Russian governments intentionally keep the result of the inquiry within limited parameters? What internal and external considerations continue to play a role for the Wallenberg question today?**

54. *To what degree are ideological preferences to blame for the failure to fully resolve the Wallenberg case remains an important question. Aside from Sverker Åström, questions persist about Rolf Sohlman, the Swedish Ambassador to Moscow (1947-1964) a.o.*

**Did the well-known pro-Soviet/pro-Russian orientation of modern-day Swedish decision makers - many of whom ascended to key positions in the Swedish government during the last three decades - prevent a more effective handling of the Wallenberg case?**

55. *During the 1990s, U.S and Swedish officials closely coordinated their approaches in the Wallenberg case. Few details of these deliberations have emerged so far.*

**Did U.S. officials consult Sweden before the release of U.S. intelligence records during the 1990s?**

**Did Swedish officials request that some information regarding the Raoul Wallenberg case remain**

classified?

**What considerations have guided official Swedish and U.S. actions in the Raoul Wallenberg case during the years 1985-2000?**

**Please provide all available records**

*56. In 2000, the Swedish government issued a formal apology to Raoul Wallenberg's family for the failures of the official Swedish handling of Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance during the crucial years 1945-1947. Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson delivered the apology to Wallenberg's family during a phone call in January 2000. In the early 1990s Evald Hallisk, a former Swedish intelligence operative (T-Kontoret) who had been imprisoned in the Soviet Union for fifteen years, had requested and received financial compensation from the Swedish government for his ordeal.*

**What exact deliberations and considerations by Swedish officials prompted Persson's apology?**

**Please provide all available records**

*57. As part of the Wallenberg inquiry, Swedish officials sought consultations with foreign representatives and agencies in Great Britain, the U.S., Finland, Germany, Hungary and Israel. The discussions covered a wide range of topics, including the identification and evaluation of witnesses in the case, interviewing Soviet defectors and to request documentation from foreign archival repositories.*

**Please provide all available documentation**

*58. In 2009, the FSB Central Archive released information to two researchers (Birstein/Berger), indicating that an as yet unidentified Prisoner no. 7 was interrogated on July 23, 1947 in the Internal (Lubyanka) Prison in Moscow. Raoul Wallenberg's driver, Vilmos Langfelder, was questioned along with Prisoner no. 7, on the same day. The FSB archivists concluded that Prisoner no 7. was "with great likelihood the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg."*

**How did Swedish officials react to this statement?**

**Please provide all internal communications of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish Embassy, Moscow, including inter-departmental exchanges, as well as interagency and foreign correspondence for the year 2009 -2012.**

*59. In 2012, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt ordered a formal review of the Raoul Wallenberg case. Ambassador Hans Magnusson was in charge of the inquiry.*

**Please provide all available records**

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Evabritta Wallberg, "Att undvika offentlighetsprincipen", Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, 1/2005, Pp. 61-72

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Leni Yahil, "Raul Wallenberg—His Mission and His Activities in Hungary." *Yad Vashem Studies*, Vol. 15 (1983)

Marat Zubko, "The fate of the captured sailors", *Izvestiya*, December 9, 1991

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Politburo decision P50/83, dated April 5, 1946: "[It is necessary] to make a move towards the Swedes and recognize the need to take the course for improving our relations with Sweden. For this purpose: 1. Charge Com.[rade] Chernyshev I. S. [Soviet Envoy to Stockholm] to make it clear to Minister for Foreign Affairs [Östen] Undén that in case of the successful development of the negotiations about the credit, favorable conditions for further positive political Soviet-Swedish relations will be created. [..]" Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI, Moscow). Fond/Collection 17 Opis'/Inventory 162. Delo/Inventory 38. Listy/Pages 37-38. The decision was briefly referenced but not fully cited in the Eliasson Commission Report *Ett Diplomatiskt Misslyckande (2003)*. A full citation is found in O. Ken, A. Rupasov, and L. Samuelson. *Shvetsiya v politike Moskvyy. 1930-1950-e gody [Sweden in Moscow's Politics: Years 1930s-1950s]* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005), 353-54 (in Russian). See also Maxim Korobochkin, "Soviet views on Sweden's neutrality and foreign policy, 1945-50," in Helene Carlback, Alexey Komarov and Karl Molin, eds., *Peaceful Coexistence? Soviet Union and Sweden in the Khrushchev Era* (Moscow: Ves' mir, 2010), pp. 81-112. Korobochkin's article is also referenced in Peter Ruggenthaler, *The Concept of Neutrality in Stalin's Foreign Policy, 1945-1953*, The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series, 2015.

<sup>2</sup> See "Raoul Wallenberg: Report of the Swedish-Russian Working Group", Stockholm, 2000; available at <http://www.government.se/information-material/2000/01/raoul-wallenberg---report-of-the-swedish-russian-working-group-copy/>; and "Ett diplomatiskt misslyckande: Fallet Raoul Wallenberg och den svenska utrikesledningen", *Statens offentliga utredningar* (SOU) 2003: 18 (Stockholm: Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 29, available at <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/108/a/1455>

<sup>3</sup> One notable exception was to have been the just mentioned Eliasson Commission of 2003. In that investigation, too, however, the Swedish government and its Foreign Office maintained important control of the proceedings.

<sup>4</sup> The two men had been detained along with Raoul Wallenberg in 1945 and were released in January 1946, in exchange for a number of Soviet citizens held in Switzerland. See Johan Matz, "All Signs Indicate that Gestapo Agents Murdered Him: Soviet Disinformation, the Katyn Massacre and the Raoul Wallenberg Case", *International History Review*, vol. 38, issue 1, 2016, 148-173. Matz cites the extensive security around Wallenberg's person from the beginning of his detention in January 1945. However, it is far from clear if Wallenberg's isolation was exceptional or if it was part of a relatively routine procedure followed by the Soviet officers of *Smersh* ("Death to Spies", Soviet military counterintelligence). Also, the exchange of the two Swiss diplomats is remarkable if one takes into consideration that at the time, the Soviet Union and Switzerland did not have formal diplomatic relations.

<sup>5</sup> For additional information see Vadim Birstein and Susanne Berger. *Raoul Wallenberg, Gaps in the official record. Formal Request to the Russian Government and Archival Authorities*. September 2016

<sup>6</sup> See, for instance, Ingrid Carlberg, *Raoul Wallenberg*, translated from the Swedish by Ebba Segerberg. NY: MacLehose Press, 2015; and Bengt Jangfeldt. *The Hero of Budapest*, translated by Harry D. Watson and Bengt Jangfeldt. London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2014

<sup>7</sup> Gert Nylander and Anders Perlinge. *Raoul Wallenberg in Documents, 1927-1947*. Stockholm: The Foundation For Economic History Research Within Banking And Enterprise, 2000. Some of the documentation of interest that has not been presented may not include easily searchable terms like "Raoul Wallenberg", "Mellaneuropeiska" or "Kálmán Lauer".

<sup>8</sup> Many of these records are found in Riksarkivet, UD 20 års dossier system, R18 (Rättsavdelning), HP 80 B, HP 80 B sf 6/6 (Klagomål och krav med anledning av krig och oroligheter 1991-05-28 -- 2008-11-30).

<sup>9</sup> Information about Swedish nationals in Soviet imprisonment during and after WWII can be found in Russian archive collections, including the Russian State Military Archive. However, the documentation is incomplete. Умершие и репатриированные военнопленные и интернированные Швеции периода II мировой войны – 0,123 тыс. Записей

<sup>10</sup> This process is known as "gallring".

<sup>11</sup> The IB was the top secret *Intelligence Bureau* within the Swedish Defense Staff, headed by the Social Democrat Birger Elmér. The existence of the IB and its activities were first publicly disclosed by the Swedish journalists Peter Bratt and Jan Guillou in 1973, in the Swedish magazine *Folket i Bild/Kulturfront*

<sup>12</sup> Bilaga 2, till justitiekanslerns skrivelse den 27 November 1981, P.M., "Angående vissa utländska synpunkter och önskemål beträffand utlämnande av handlingar rörande Raoul Wallenberg.", Archive of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>13</sup> During an interview on Swedish Television, Johan Stålhånd, the former Executive Director of the Wallenberg Foundation, argued that of course "Professors and Phds" were welcome to study the Foundation's holdings. The fact that von Dardel (who was sitting next to him), aside from being Raoul Wallenberg's next-of-kin, was a Professor of

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Physics, with an appointment at Switzerland's renowned nuclear laboratory CERN, and a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science, did not seem to make a noticeable impression.

<sup>14</sup> See Riksarkivet, Kálmán Lauer's Private Papers

<sup>15</sup> See Paul Levine's review of Marcus Wallenberg's correspondence (E I, 1942), in preparation for the final report of the official Swedish Commission that investigated lost Jewish property during World War II, "Sverige och judarnas tillgångar (13 May 1998)." SOU 1999: 20. A copy of Levine's notes are in possession of the authors.

<sup>16</sup> Also noteworthy with respect to Germany is the fact that its "Informationsfreiheitsgesetz" (Freedom of Information Law) from 2006 explicitly exempts the country's Secret Services. They still are required to comply, however, with Germany's Federal Archive Law. The German Constitutional Court recently rejected Weber's claim, but ordered lower courts to revisit the subject and issue a formal ruling on these practices.

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2017/10/lars-ilshammar-utredning-ny-arkivpolitik/>

<http://www.regeringen.se/rattsdokument/kommitteredirektiv/2017/10/dir.-2017106/>

<sup>18</sup> see *Gaps in the official record. Formal Request to the Russian Government and Archival Authorities*. September 2016

<sup>19</sup> Johan Matz, "Cables in Cipher, the Raoul Wallenberg Case and Swedish-Soviet Diplomatic Communication 1944-47", in: *Scandinavian Journal of History*, vol. 38, issue 3, 2013

<sup>20</sup> The Swedish Legation members authored individual reports, summarizing some of their experiences in Budapest in 1944-45. These reports are available to the public.

<sup>21</sup> Ivan Serov., *Notes from a suitcase: Secret Diaries of the First KGB Chairman, Found Over 25 Years after His Death*, with comments by Aleksandr Khinshtein. Moscow, 2016 (in Russian). For a detailed review and analysis of this publication, see the analysis by Dr. Vadim Birstein at <http://www.vbirstein.com>

<sup>22</sup> The relevant Soviet foreign intelligence reports from Stockholm and Budapest, as well as those of Soviet military intelligence

and of military counterintelligence *Smersh* units operating in Hungary in the years 1944-45, remain inaccessible, even though Russian officials have acknowledged that these files contain information about the work of the Swedish Legation, Budapest and its diplomats (including Raoul Wallenberg) in those years. Swedish officials have never insisted on an independent review of this documentation.

<sup>23</sup> Bo J. Theutenberg, *Dagbok från UD*. Vol. 1-3, Skara: Solveigs Tryckeri, 2012, 2014, 2017

<sup>24</sup> The information was obtained from a number of sources, including several internal Swedish Foreign Ministry memoranda contained in the Raoul Wallenberg case file

<sup>25</sup> See the discussions between Carl-Gustav Svingel and representatives of the Swedish Security Police 1965 -1974, in Susanne Berger, *The Swedish Aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg Case*, 2000.

<sup>26</sup> This collection replaced the official "Blue Books" that were issued in 1981

<sup>27</sup> An exception are the records of the supposedly independent Commission which probed the official Swedish handling of the Raoul Wallenberg Case from 1945 -2000, the so-called "Eliasson Commission". The papers related to this inquiry are archived separately at the Swedish National Archive.

<sup>28</sup> Jan Bergman. *Sekreterarklubben: Svenska kvinnliga spioner under andra världskriget*. Stockholm: Norstedts, 2014. Pp. 346-50. Bergman cites the fact that C-byrån formed and administered several such front companies.

<sup>29</sup> <https://www.wallenberg.com/arkiv/en>

<sup>30</sup> During WWII they negotiated on behalf of seven employees of the ASEA concern who had been arrested by the Gestapo in Poland for aiding the Polish underground. In the time from 1942-44 ASEA's representatives, on instructions from

Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg, conducted talks with German authorities in Berlin. Walter Schellenberg intervened in the matter as a favor to Jacob Wallenberg.

<sup>31</sup> Based on reports from researchers who have had at least limited access to the Wallenberg family holdings, some of the collections remain incomplete, due to temporary absences and loaning/borrowing of certain documentation.

<sup>32</sup> See Riksarkivet, Kálmán Lauer's private papers

<sup>33</sup> von Kantzow was the founder of *AB Kanthal* which had patented and sold special coated wiring (alloys) used in electrical turbines and other industrial machinery.

<sup>34</sup> Jan Bergman. *Sekreterarklubben: Svenska kvinnliga spioner under andra världskriget*. Stockholm: Norstedts, 2014.

<sup>35</sup> see C.G.McKay, Adler-Rudel visits to Sweden, 28 October 2015 <https://intelligencepast.com/?s=Adler>

<sup>36</sup> Sworn testimony by Jacob Wallenberg from 20 April 1948, submitted at the Military Tribunal in Nürnberg, for the Defense in the case against Walter Schellenberg [Document Number 26, Defense Exhibit 5]

<sup>37</sup> see *P.M. angående Raoul Wallenbergs specialkonto hos. S.E.B*, p. 3-4. Birger Zotterman, Ombudsman in Stockholm Enskilda Banken, 17 May 1946.

<sup>38</sup> Letter from the World Jewish Congress, Stockholm to Tage Erlander, 23 November, 1946.

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- <sup>39</sup> Staffan Thorsell, *Warszawasvenskarna: De som lät världen veta*. Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Förlag, 2015.
- <sup>40</sup> UD, P2 Eu1, Letter Lars Berg to Gunnar Lorentzon, January 16, 1956.
- <sup>41</sup> War Refugee Board files, Hyde Park
- <sup>42</sup> "It is necessary] to make a move towards the Swedes and recognize the need to take the course for improving our relations with Sweden. For this purpose: 1. Charge Com.[rade] Chernyshev I. S. [Soviet Envoy to Stockholm] to make it clear to Minister for Foreign Affairs [Östen] Undén [Günther's successor] that in case of the successful development of the negotiations about the credit, favorable conditions for further positive political Soviet-Swedish relations will be created. ..." Politburo decision P50/83, published in: O. Ken, A. Rupasov, and L. Samuelson. *Shvetsiya v politike Moskvy. 1930-1950-e gody [Sweden in Moscow's Politics: Years 1930s-1950s]* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005), 353-54 (in Russian). P. 353.
- <sup>43</sup> C.G.McKay, Notes on the Raoul Wallenberg Case, 30 October 2015, <https://intelligencepast.com/?s=Notes>
- <sup>44</sup> Staffan Thorsell, *Warszawasvenskarna: De som lät världen veta*. Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Förlag, 2015.
- <sup>45</sup> UD, P2 Eu1, Letter Lars Berg to Gunnar Lorentzon, January 16, 1956.
- <sup>46</sup> War Refugee Board files, Hyde Park
- <sup>47</sup> MFM, Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom
- <sup>48</sup> [http://bookline.hu/product/home.action?id=2100870320&type=10&v=Benda\\_Beliczay\\_Erdos\\_Nagy\\_A\\_Raday\\_gyujtemeny\\_evkonyve\\_IV\\_V\\_1984\\_85](http://bookline.hu/product/home.action?id=2100870320&type=10&v=Benda_Beliczay_Erdos_Nagy_A_Raday_gyujtemeny_evkonyve_IV_V_1984_85) Kállai Gyula, A magyar függetlenségi mozgalom 1936-1945, **Publisher?**
- <sup>49</sup> See C.G.McKay, 14 December 2015 <https://intelligencepast.com/2015/12/14/an-american-perspective-on-lolle-smit/>
- <sup>50</sup> [https://www.europeana.eu/portal/en/record/09218/EUS\\_3F3C74D011134525B9DDA812D6645B83.html](https://www.europeana.eu/portal/en/record/09218/EUS_3F3C74D011134525B9DDA812D6645B83.html)
- <sup>51</sup> P2Eu 1, testimony by Otto Prade, August 16, 1950
- <sup>52</sup> P.M., Prisoner of War Gfrorner about the Jewish organization Joint, February 9, 1995
- <sup>53</sup> see *P.M. angående Raoul Wallenbergs specialkonto hos. S.E.B.*, p. 3-4. Birger Zotterman, Ombudsman in Stockholm Enskilda Banken, 17 May 1946.
- <sup>54</sup> See *Svensk Numismatisk Tidskrift*, 3 April 2006, 13-14. In 2002, an official Swedish Commission investigated the deposits of valuables in various Swedish Legations abroad during WWII. The Commission's main focus, however, were valuables stored by individual persons, such as persecuted Jews and citizens of countries for which Sweden served as the official protective power. It did not discuss so-called "country deposits", meaning deposits owned by the Swedish government or foreign entities. *Utredningen inom Utrikesdepartementet om depositioner vid svenska utlandsmyndigheter vid tiden för den nazistiska förföljelsen och andra världskriget*, Ds 2002:50, 44.
- <sup>55</sup> Both men were later apprehended by Soviet military authorities in Hungary.
- <sup>56</sup> Document C16 in the UD database, letter from Major General Pavlov to the Commander of the Staff of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Colonel General Semyon Ivanov.
- <sup>57</sup> Jerome S. Berg. *On the Short Waves, 1923-1945: Broadcast Listening in the Pioneer Days of Radio*. Jefferson (NC): McFarland & Co., Inc., 2007. P. ; [http://www.rev.hu/history\\_of\\_56/szerviz/kislex/biograf/szanto.html](http://www.rev.hu/history_of_56/szerviz/kislex/biograf/szanto.html).
- <sup>58</sup> "Wallenberg: A Lingering Tragedy of WWII." *Studies in Intelligence*. Vol. 25 (Summer 1981). P. 94. [https://archive.org/stream/CIA-Studies-In-Intelligence-Declassified/DOC\\_0000617231\\_djvu.txt](https://archive.org/stream/CIA-Studies-In-Intelligence-Declassified/DOC_0000617231_djvu.txt).
- <sup>59</sup> See Susanne Berger, *Swedish Aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg Case*. 2000. The records of the American Section of the Allied Control Council, Hungary are available at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). See Records of Interservice Agencies, U.S. Representative, ACC Hungary 1945-1947, RG 334, Box 38.
- <sup>60</sup> Zoya Voskresenskaya, *Pod pseudonimom Irina [Under the Pseudo name "Irina"]* (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1997), 149, 182 (in Russian).
- <sup>61</sup> "It is necessary] to make a move towards the Swedes and recognize the need to take the course for improving our relations with Sweden. For this purpose: 1. Charge Com.[rade] Chernyshev I. S. [Soviet Envoy to Stockholm] to make it clear to Minister for Foreign Affairs [Östen] Undén [Günther's successor] that in case of the successful development of the negotiations about the credit favorable conditions for further positive political Soviet-Swedish relations will be created. ..." Politburo decision P50/83, published in: O. Ken, A. Rupasov, and L. Samuelson. *Shvetsiya v politike Moskvy. 1930-1950-e gody [Sweden in Moscow's Politics: Years 1930s-1950s]* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005), 353-54 (in Russian). P.353.
- <sup>62</sup> Bo Theutenberg
- <sup>63</sup> Sven Grafström, *Anteckningar 1945-1954*, cited in Johan Matz, "The Konnov-Mikhailov-Bakourskii espionage crises of July-August 1947 and the Vyshinskii note on Raoul Wallenberg", *The International History Review*, 2016
- <sup>64</sup> Deklaration Mellan Ryska Federationen och Sverige, 10 February 1993
- <sup>65</sup> These interviews are separate from the interviews conducted during the 1980s, as part of the Raoul Wallenberg Project of the University of Uppsala

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<sup>66</sup> Jan Bergman. *Sekreterarklubben: Svenska kvinnliga spioner under andra världskriget*. Stockholm: Norstedts, 2014.

<sup>67</sup> NARA, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 356

<sup>68</sup> Tore Pryser. "Var Wallenberg Spion for USA?" *Dagbladet*, 3 February, 2001

<sup>69</sup> MFM, Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom

<sup>70</sup> [http://bookline.hu/product/home.action?id=2100870320&type=10&v=Benda\\_Beliczay\\_Erdos\\_Nagy\\_A\\_Raday\\_gy\\_ujtemeny\\_evkonyve\\_IV\\_V\\_1984\\_85](http://bookline.hu/product/home.action?id=2100870320&type=10&v=Benda_Beliczay_Erdos_Nagy_A_Raday_gy_ujtemeny_evkonyve_IV_V_1984_85) Kállai Gyula, A magyar függetlenségi mozgalom 1936-1945, **Publisher?**

<sup>71</sup> See C.G.McKay, 14 December 2015 <https://intelligencepast.com/2015/12/14/an-american-perspective-on-lolle-smit/>

<sup>72</sup> [https://www.europeana.eu/portal/en/record/09218/EUS\\_3F3C74D011134525B9DDA812D6645B83.html](https://www.europeana.eu/portal/en/record/09218/EUS_3F3C74D011134525B9DDA812D6645B83.html)

<sup>73</sup> P2Eu 1, testimony by Otto Prade, August 16, 1950

<sup>74</sup> P.M., Prisoner of War Gfrorner about the Jewish organization Joint, February 9, 1995

<sup>75</sup> William Casey, *The Secret War Against Hitler*, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1988.

<sup>76</sup> Staffan Thorsell, *Warszawasvenskarna: De som lät världen veta*. Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Förlag, 2015.

<sup>77</sup> UD, P2 Eu1, Letter Lars Berg to Gunnar Lorentzon, January 16, 1956.

<sup>78</sup> War Refugee Board files, Hyde Park

<sup>79</sup> Document C16 in the UD database, letter from Major General Pavlov to the Commander of the Staff of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Colonel General Semyon Ivanov.

<sup>80</sup> See Susanne Berger. *Swedish Aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg Case*. 2000. The records of the American Section of the Allied Control Council, Hungary are available at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). See Records of Interservice Agencies, U.S. Representative, ACC Hungary 1945-1947, RG 334, Box 38.

<sup>81</sup> "It is necessary] to make a move towards the Swedes and recognize the need to take the course for improving our relations with Sweden. For this purpose: 1. Charge Com.[rade] Chernyshev I. S. [Soviet Envoy to Stockholm] to make it clear to Minister for Foreign Affairs [Östen] Undén [Günther's successor] that in case of the successful development of the negotiations about the credit favorable conditions for further positive political Soviet-Swedish relations will be created. ..." Politburo decision P50/83, published in: O. Ken, A. Rupasov, and L. Samuelson. *Shvetsiya v politike Moskvy. 1930-1950-e gody [Sweden in Moscow's Politics: Years 1930s-1950s]* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005), 353-54 (in Russian). P.353.

<sup>82</sup> At least one memorandum authored by Otto Danielsson, chief investigator of the Swedish Security Police, that is quoted in Carl

Persson's memoir *Utan Omsvep*, on the Svingel question and other related materials, have been withdrawn from SÄPO's Raoul Wallenberg case file. The file includes a note, dated November 11, 1974, which reads: "*Svingel, Carl-Gustav, Swedish;*

*working and living in West Berlin....he left information in the Wallenberg case. Documents are with RPC [Rikspolis Chef] ..."* When asked about this, Carl Persson refused to return the borrowed documentation, with the exception of one letter. see Susanne Berger (2000).

<sup>83</sup> Bo J. Theutenberg, *Dagbok från UD, Volym 1-3, 2012, 2014, 2017*

<sup>84</sup> Sven Grafström, *Anteckningar 1945-1954*, cited in Johan Matz, "The Konnov-Mikhailov-Bakourskii espionage crises of July-August 1947 and the Vyshinskii note on Raoul Wallenberg", *The International History Review*, 2016